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ABSTRACT 
  In the course of debates over same-sex marriage, many scholars 
have proposed new legal definitions of sexual orientation to better 
account for the role of relationships in constituting identities. But 
these discussions have overlooked a large body of case law in which 
courts are already applying this model of sexual orientation, with 
inequitable results. 
  This Article examines a set of fifteen years of sexual harassment 
decisions in which courts have endeavored to determine the sexual 
orientations of alleged harassers. Under federal law, sexual 
harassment is actionable because it is a subspecies of sex 
discrimination. A man who makes unwanted sexual advances toward 
a woman discriminates on the basis of sex, courts presume, because 
he would not have made sexual advances toward another man. In 
1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the same presumption is available 
in a case of same-sex harassment, i.e., a man harassing a man, if there 
is “credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.” Since then, 
federal courts have decided 154 cases on whether a harasser was 
homosexual or experienced same-sex desire, often conflating the two 
questions. 
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  Empirical assessment of these cases raises questions about legal 
determinations of sexual orientation and sexual desire. First, it finds 
that courts rely on overly simplistic assumptions about sexual 
orientation that are contradicted by social science research. 
Surprisingly, in searching for evidence of same-sex desire, courts 
compare the harasser’s behavior to an idealized vision of romantic 
courtship that resonates with the picture of same-sex intimacy drawn 
by advocates of gay marriage. Second, these judicial inquiries into 
desire reinforce biases in favor of heterosexuality. Courts interpret 
sexually charged interactions to be devoid of desire when the harasser 
is involved in a heterosexual marriage, while reading desire into far 
less suggestive scenarios when the harasser self-identifies as 
nonheterosexual. And third, the judicial preoccupation with desire 
distracts from the purpose of sexual harassment law: eliminating 
invidious sex discrimination. 
  This study has implications for other legal doctrines that may 
require definitions of sexual orientation or inferences of desire. It 
suggests that a relationship model of sexual orientation may not be 
appropriate in all legal contexts, and it calls into question the project 
of devising any all-purpose legal definition of sexual orientation. It 
also argues that reformers should be wary of how inquiries into 
sexual desire may operate as distractions and reinforce conventional 
notions of sexuality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent gay-rights victories have renewed legal interest in the 
question of how sexual orientation ought to be defined.1 Influenced 
by the same-sex marriage debate, many scholars have argued for new 
definitions of sexual orientation that would emphasize the role of 
relationships in defining identities.2 But these discussions have been 
largely theoretical, overlooking the one context in which courts 
routinely make determinations about individuals’ sexual orientations.3 
 
 1. Until extremely recently, the classification “homosexual” was used primarily for 
purposes of exclusion. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (banning military service by openly gay 
men and lesbians), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 
124 Stat. 3515, 3516; Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. 
Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771, 780–82 
(1993) (discussing how the Immigration Act of 1990 repealed an exclusion based on “sexual 
deviation” that had been used to bar gay men and lesbians from immigrating to the United 
States). Although some states restrict adoptions by same-sex couples, only Florida still has a law 
on the books that bans adoption by a “homosexual” individual. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) 
(West 2012). But see Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that § 63.042(3) violates the equal protection provision of the 
Florida Constitution).   
 2. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 1002 (2012) 
(arguing that “sexual orientation” should be defined to include both “General Orientation,” 
meaning the sex of the partner the individual is attracted to most of the time, and “Specific 
Orientation,” meaning the sex of the individual’s current partner); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage 
Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1196–99 (2012) (arguing for a “public” and 
“relational” concept of sexual orientation).  
 3. Professor Elizabeth Glazer discusses two main examples, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 
F. Supp. 2d 921, 996–97 (N.D. Cal. 2010), the case challenging the California initiative that 
barred gay marriage, and Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, 792 F. Supp. 2d 
1151, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2011), in which bisexual individuals sued over being labeled “non-gay” 
by an athletic organization. See Glazer, supra note 2, at 1000–01. Although the parties litigated 
the plaintiffs’ sexual orientations in both cases, neither court reached a finding on any specific 
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This Article is the first to analyze all sexual harassment cases in 
which courts have endeavored to infer the sexual orientations of 
alleged harassers since the Supreme Court held that sexual 
orientation might be relevant to a sexual harassment claim fifteen 
years ago.4 It engages in a close reading and empirical analysis of this 
set of 154 cases, informed by social science research on sexuality.5 
Surprisingly, it reveals that courts are employing a model of sexual 
orientation that emphasizes relationships, measuring same-sex desire 
against a set of romantic ideals.6 But rather than advancing equality, 
the effect of the doctrine is to privilege heterosexuality and distract 
from sexism.7 This study demonstrates that despite recent gay-rights 
 
plaintiff’s sexual orientation. But see Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual 
Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (2011) (discussing how the Los 
Angeles County Men’s Jail selects inmates for protective housing units based on whether the 
inmate is gay or transgender). 
 4. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998).  
 5. These cases are noted with asterisks in Appendix A. The 154 figure represents a subset 
of the 236 same-sex harassment cases reviewed for this Article. See infra note 46 and 
accompanying text. 
 6. An analysis of older case law led one scholar to conclude that judges were employing 
the prejudice that same-sex relationships are “predatory, lustful, or purely sexual [in] nature,” 
and “do not reflect loving, long-term relationships.” Todd Brower, Social Cognition “at Work”: 
Schema Theory and Lesbian and Gay Identity in Title VII, 18 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 14 (2009). 
Although these old prejudices are still at work, see infra Part II.B, new schemas about gay 
identity as based in loving and long-term relationships have also surfaced, see infra Parts I.C, 
II.A. 
 7. In the aftermath of Oncale, many law review articles criticized the opinion’s reasoning 
and made contradicting predictions about its likely effects with respect to sexual orientation. 
Compare Mary Coombs, Title VII and Homosexual Harassment After Oncale: Was It a Victory?, 
6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 113, 150 (1999) (fearing Oncale would give rise to claims based 
on “[p]uritanism” and “homophobia”), and Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS 
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182, 195 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) 
(theorizing that Oncale would result in homophobic claims), with Marc Spindelman, 
Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra, at 201, 204 
(arguing Professor Halley lacked empirical support for her concerns of homophobia), and 
Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries 
of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 680 (1998) (“[T]hese claims will not be used as a 
new tool in the oppression of gay men and lesbians under the law . . . .”), and with Kenji 
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 454 (2000) 
(concluding that Oncale had brought sexual harassment jurisprudence to a “crossroads” and 
hypothesizing that the increased visibility of bisexuality might “goad” courts into abandoning 
their focus on sexual desire). Yet little empirical analysis has focused on how courts have 
actually determined harassers’ sexualities since Oncale. But see YVONNE ZYLAN, STATES OF 
PASSION 157–60, 185–90 (2011) (exploring the role of legal discourse in the construction of 
sexuality through analysis of same-sex sexual harassment cases); Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex 
Sexual Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the “Because of Sex” Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 56–58 (2007) (offering doctrinal analysis of a set of 105 cases on the 
“because of sex” requirement decided between 1998 and 2006); cf. Ann C. McGinley, Creating 
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victories, laws that turn on sexual orientation may still operate to 
reinforce conventional notions of sexuality.8 
Understanding why liability for sexual harassment can turn on 
sexual orientation requires some background on the development of 
sexual harassment doctrine. No federal statute specifically forbids 
sexual harassment in the workplace. In fact, the term “sexual” 
harassment is a misnomer.9 Sexual harassment law derives from Title 
VII’s prohibition on discrimination against any individual “because of 
such individual’s . . . sex.”10 Title VII uses the term “sex” in the sense 
of male or female, not in the sense of erotic activity.11 Thus, to prevail 
on a sexual harassment claim, a woman must show she was harassed 
because she is female.12 It is not enough to show that the harasser’s 
conduct was sexual in nature.13 The Supreme Court has reasoned that 
in the typical case of an unwanted sexual advance by a man toward a 
woman, the harasser discriminated “because of sex” because he 
would not have made sexual advances toward the plaintiff had she 
been a man.14 Courts presume such male harassers are heterosexual. 
In the 1998 decision, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,15 
the Supreme Court held that a male plaintiff alleging another man 
harassed him could make out a claim of sexual harassment under the 
same theory if he had “credible evidence that the harasser was 
homosexual.”16 Again, the inference is that the harasser would not 
have made sexual advances toward the plaintiff had he been a 
 
Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 
1151, 1167–91 (2008) (applying research on masculinities and bullying to argue that forms of 
harassment that are “not overtly sexual or gendered” are “because of sex”). 
 8. For purposes of this Article, I use the term “sexuality” to refer both to sexual 
orientation, as commonly understood to mean heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, and the 
presence or absence of sexual desire. As discussed in Part I, these two questions are frequently 
conflated in sexual harassment jurisprudence.  
 9. Throughout this Article, I use the term “sexual” in the sense of the common 
understanding of the term “erotic.” I use the term “sex” to refer to notions of maleness or 
femaleness understood to be biological, and the term “gender” to refer to notions of masculinity 
or femininity understood to be cultural.  
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).  
 11. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.   
 14. Id.  
 15. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 16. Id. The Court left the door open for plaintiffs to advance other theories about how 
same-sex harassment might be “‘because of . . . sex,’” holding that the “sexual desire” theory 
was just one possibility. Id. at 80–81 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). However, most 
prevailing plaintiffs have relied on a sexual desire theory. See infra Figure 1. 
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woman. Many lower courts have interpreted Oncale to require that 
they look into the hearts and minds of harassers for evidence of 
sexual desire.17 
This Article argues that the resulting decisions are problematic 
on three main grounds. First, they essentialize sexuality, making 
unfounded assumptions about sexual orientation and same-sex desire. 
Although social science researchers have not agreed on any all-
purpose definition of sexual orientation, most courts have implicitly 
defined gay identity as public announcement and acceptance—in 
other words, being out of the closet at work. Courts assume that 
sexual orientations are binary, static, and transparent. They infer 
sexual orientation from desire, and vice versa. Unless a purported 
harasser identifies as nonheterosexual, courts are loath to 
characterize same-sex interactions as motivated by desire. Courts 
measure sexual orientation against a particular conception of same-
sex relationships—comparing a harasser’s actions to an idealized 
vision of romantic courtship that resonates with the picture of same-
sex intimacy drawn by advocates of gay marriage. Under these 
doctrines, the possibility of same-sex desire is negated if a court 
concludes that a harasser intended to humiliate, threaten, or engage 
in mere horseplay with a plaintiff. In contrast, the same conduct 
would likely be actionable harassment had a plaintiff and harasser not 
been of the same sex. 
This Article’s second main ground of criticism is that the same-
sex harassment cases reinforce heterosexism, in other words, 
discrimination in favor of cross-sex orientations and relationships. 
Confirming some of the fears of early critics,18 this empirical 
assessment reveals that the doctrine resulting from Oncale privileges 
heterosexuality. It does so in more complicated ways than scholars 
initially predicted, however. When holding that no inference of same-
sex desire is possible, courts often emphasize that harassers are 
involved in heterosexual marriages with children. The reasoning is 
not simply the (demonstrably false) assumption that a person who is 
involved in a cross-sex marriage could never harbor same-sex desire. 
Rather, the courts in these cases seem to be concerned about the high 
stakes of a legal finding of same-sex desire, which not only imposes a 
stigmatized nonheterosexual identity on the harasser, but also poses a 
 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 7, at 114; Halley, supra note 7, at 195.  
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threat to the harasser’s spouse and children.19 In effect, these 
decisions give purported heterosexuals license to experiment with 
same-sex sexuality in the workplace without undermining their 
heterosexual status. These cases stand in stark contrast those in which 
a harasser is “openly gay.” When a harasser is openly gay, courts infer 
desire with ease, reinforcing stereotypes about gay men, lesbians, and 
bisexuals as overly sexual. In almost every case in which a court found 
credible evidence of homosexuality, it held that a jury could infer the 
harasser desired the same-sex plaintiff.20 This doctrine, in which 
liability turns on an employee’s openness about his or her sexual 
orientation, creates incentives for employers to discourage employees 
from coming out at work.21 It also invites invasive discovery practices 
aimed at determining the sexualities of alleged harassers. 
Third, the judicial preoccupation with sexuality undermines the 
goals of sex-equality law. Legal scholars have engaged in extensive 
debate about why sexual harassment is discrimination “because of 
sex.”22 Their theories can be grouped into three main ideas: (1) that 
sexual harassment is sexual domination, (2) that sexual harassment is 
the perpetuation of gendered expectations for certain workers, and 
(3) that sexual harassment is deviation from the norm of sex 
blindness.23 This Article does not take a side in the debates among 
these theories. Nor does it advance a new theory about why 
harassment is “because of sex.” Rather, it argues that under any of 
the three main normative theories, judicial inquiries into the 
sexualities of harassers are distractions from the harm of sex 
discrimination. 
This is not to say Oncale’s ultimate holding, that Title VII bars 
same-sex harassment, is incorrect. Rather, this Article takes issue 
with Oncale’s suggestion that homosexual desire is what transforms 
 
 19. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 7, at 449 (“[C]ourts may believe that where any ambiguity 
exists, it is better to let the guilty homosexual go free than to convict the innocent 
heterosexual.”). 
 20. See infra notes 371–73 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Part II.D. 
 22. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1169, 1217 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 691, 762 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1683, 1755 (1998).  
 23. Others have argued that sexual harassment is harmful for reasons apart from sex 
discrimination. See infra note 445. Although they still operate as background norms, these 
justifications rarely surface in federal cases, because sexual harassment law is grounded in Title 
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination. 
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workplace interactions into sexual harassment. It argues that courts 
and advocates should not equate desire or sexual orientation with 
discriminatory intent. Superficially, sexuality may seem to be an 
appealing proxy for discriminatory motive at a time when courts are 
raising the bar for proof that sex discrimination still exists.24 But 
examination of the cases reveals that determining sexuality is not so 
simple. In inferring desire, courts uncritically rely on reductive 
notions of sexual orientation as a heuristic for determining 
discriminatory intent, rather than considering alternative 
presumptions that might better target sex-based harassment.25 Instead 
of endorsing any single alternative to the desire-based rule, this 
Article provides a set of potential rules that make sense from each 
normative standpoint.26 
The sexual harassment cases have lessons for other legal contexts 
involving classifications based on sexual orientation or the regulation 
of desire generally. By challenging the assumption that determining 
an individual’s sexual orientation is an easy doctrinal shortcut, these 
cases suggest caution with respect to legal efforts to classify 
individuals by sexual orientation. They shed light on questions such as 
whether proposed laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation should require a plaintiff to prove her sexual 
orientation to show she is part of the “protected class.”27 The 
harassment cases also suggest caution with respect to the regulation 
of desire more generally, in contexts such as family and criminal law. 
Despite the growing consensus in favor of gay rights, regulatory 
regimes that turn on sexuality are likely to be carried out in ways that 
privilege heterosexual identities and conventional relationships. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I argues that the same-
sex harassment cases rest on dramatically undertheorized notions of 
 
 24. See Martin J. Katz, Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND. L.J. 101, 
103–04 (2004) (defending the presumption that sexual desire is discriminatory on practical 
grounds).  
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Figure 2. 
 27. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation in employment. See Statewide Employment Laws and Policies, HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (June 19, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/employment_
laws_062013.pdf. Legislation to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis sexual 
orientation is proposed almost every year. Jennifer C. Pizer, Brad Sears, Christy Mallory & Nan 
D. Hunter, Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT 
People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal 
Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012). 
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sexual orientation and desire. Part II shows how determinations of 
sexual orientation and sexual desire raise troubling normative 
concerns by reinforcing heterosexism. Part III demonstrates that 
sexuality determinations are a distraction from the goals of sexual 
harassment law, under any plausible account of the doctrine. It also 
discusses a set of doctrinal alternatives for courts and advocates. 
Finally, Part IV draws out the implications of this study for other 
judicial or governmental efforts to determine sexual identity or to 
make desire the focal point of regulation. 
I.  ESSENTIALIZING SEXUALITY 
In this Part, I will explain how courts have come to focus on 
desire in same-sex harassment cases and argue that these courts are 
applying essentialist notions of both sexual orientation and same-sex 
desire. But before proceeding, a word on what I mean by 
“essentializing.” I do not argue that sexual desires or sexual 
orientations, insofar as orientation is defined as desires for one sex or 
both, have no biological basis. By essentialism, I mean a certain set of 
assumptions about sexuality.28 First is the assumption that the 
categories homosexual, heterosexual, and bisexual are a natural and 
necessary way of dividing up biological phenomena like desires.29 
Second is the idea that every individual has a stable essence that can 
be neatly classified as heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, and 
 
 28. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 22–27 (1990) 
(explaining how sexual orientation is an “inconceivably coarse ax[is] of categorization” such 
that “even people who share . . . our own positioning[] along [this] crude ax[is] may still be 
different enough from us, and from each other, to seem like all but different species”); Jessica 
A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 
1219, 1242–43 (2011) (discussing types of antiessentialist arguments); Gayle Rubin, Thinking 
Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: 
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 275–77 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984) (discussing “sexual 
essentialism”). 
 29. See, e.g., LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S LOVE 
AND DESIRE 21–24, 246–53 (2008); RITCH C. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, THE NEW GAY TEENAGER 27–
28 (2005). I do not intend to make the ontological claim that such experiences are entirely 
socially constructed without any physiological or psychological basis; rather, I make the 
epistemological claim that our understanding of such experiences is mediated through law, 
society, culture, and discourse. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 866–68 (2002) 
(reading Professor Judith Butler not as claiming “there is no biological substrate to sex,” but 
rather as claiming “there may be a biological component to sex, but that we will never be sure 
what that biological component is, as we can only apprehend it through culture (that is, 
gender)”). 
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discerned through common sense.30 And last is the assumption that 
members of each of these three groups share a common set of 
distinguishing characteristics and typical experiences.31 This Part will 
argue that sexual desires and orientations are complex, variable, and 
susceptible to many definitions.32 It will also argue that in the same-
sex harassment context, courts operate under essentialist assumptions 
about sexuality that are descriptively inaccurate. 
A. Conflating Sexual Orientation, Desire, and Discrimination 
By way of background, this Section will briefly explain how 
courts have found themselves determining the sexual orientations of 
alleged harassers in adjudicating sexual harassment cases, and 
conflating that question with the issue of whether the harasser desired 
the plaintiff. 
To prove a claim of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must generally 
establish four elements: (1) that the harassment was because of sex, 
(2) that it was severe or pervasive, (3) that it was unwelcome, and (4) 
that there is a basis for employer liability.33 A harasser’s sexuality is 
relevant to the first element—whether the harassment was “because 
of sex.” It is important to recall that the term “sex” here is used in the 
sense of identity as a man or woman, not in the sense of erotic in 
content. Oncale clarified: 
We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment 
between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of 
sex merely because the words used have sexual content or 
connotations. “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is 
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms 
or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are 
not exposed.”34 
 
 30. See PAUL BLOOM, HOW PLEASURE WORKS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WHY WE LIKE 
WHAT WE LIKE 9 (2010) (defining essentialism as “the notion that things have an underlying 
reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly and it is this hidden nature that really 
matters”). 
 31. Cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
581, 585 (1990) (discussing this sort of essentialism with respect to the category of “women”). 
 32. To say that sexual orientations are complex is not to say they can be freely chosen. See 
DIAMOND, supra note 29, at 249–53. 
 33. E.g., Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 34. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).  
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In Oncale, the Supreme Court gave three illustrations of how a 
plaintiff might prove sexual harassment was “because of sex” in a 
same-sex harassment case. First, when a plaintiff alleges “explicit or 
implicit proposals of sexual activity,” an inference of sex 
discrimination would be supported if “there were credible evidence 
that the harasser was homosexual.”35 Second, such an inference would 
be supported “if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and 
derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the 
harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in 
the workplace.”36 And third, an inference of sex discrimination would 
be supported by “direct comparative evidence about how the alleged 
harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”37 
Lower courts have interpreted these three illustrations as evidentiary 
routes plaintiffs might pursue. 
Oncale did not hold that its three examples were exhaustive, and 
some circuits have recognized same-sex harassment to be “because of 
sex” based on other theories.38 For example, many courts consider 
whether harassment was a result of sex stereotyping—that is, whether 
it was intended to enforce gender conformity.39 This theory is based 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins40 
that discrimination may include adverse treatment of an individual 
for failing to meet stereotypes associated with her group—in that 
case, a female accountant who was not promoted due to her failure to 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”41 A handful of 
 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 80–81. 
 38. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 39. E.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290–92 (3d Cir. 2009); Vickers v. 
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762–66 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 
F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th 
Cir. 2001); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000). 
  These courts have not gone so far as to hold that all animus based on sexual orientation 
is reducible to sex stereotyping. See, e.g., Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763. Rather, they require evidence 
that the discrimination was based on a plaintiff’s gender presentation. See, e.g., id. So, for 
example, a plaintiff might survive summary judgment if he were harassed with both antigay slurs 
and insults suggesting he failed to “look, speak, and act” in a masculine manner. Prowel, 579 
F.3d at 292. In other cases, however, courts have viewed sexual-orientation discrimination as 
swamping other motives and precluding a sex-discrimination claim. See Zachary A. Kramer, 
Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 207 & n.17 (2009). 
 40. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 41. Id. at 235. 
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courts have allowed cases to proceed on yet other theories.42 For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has held that unwelcome sexual touching 
is per se “because of sex.”43 
Although the Supreme Court held that “harassing conduct need 
not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of sex,”44 in practice, it has been difficult 
for plaintiffs to establish causation based on any other theory.45 For 
purposes of this Article, I reviewed 236 published and unpublished 
federal-court decisions in which courts reached a conclusion on the 
“because of sex” element of a same-sex harassment case from the 
time of the Oncale decision in March 1998 until March 2013.46 
 
 42. See Bradford v. Dep’t of Cmty. Based Servs., No. 09-206-DLB-CJS, 2012 WL 360032, at 
*9 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2012) (holding that harassment is based on sex if it is “explicitly sexual and 
patently degrading to women,” meaning “that a reasonable person, regardless of gender, would 
consider the sexually offensive conduct and comments more offensive to women than men”); 
Vargas-Cabán v. Caribbean Transp. Servs., 279 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (D.P.R. 2003) (denying the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss when the female plaintiff alleged a female supervisor harassed 
her out of jealousy over a relationship the plaintiff had with the defendant’s male president). 
 43. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see 
also Bligh-Glover v. Rizzo, No. 1:08CV2788, 2012 WL 4506029, at *13–14 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 
2012) (concluding a jury could find harassment was because of sex based on “sexually 
inappropriate comments” and “physical contact”); Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 
F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Minn. 1999) (“[A] reasonable fact-finder could conclude from the 
sexually explicit quality of the verbal and physical assaults, especially the frequent references to 
homosexual sex acts, that Plaintiff’s gender was one motivating factor of the offensive 
behavior.”); Bacon v. Art Inst. of Chi., 6 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766–67 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that 
evidence that an aggressor “continually touched or grabbed [the plaintiff’s] buttocks and other 
of [his] body parts,” “[ran] his fingers through [the plaintiff’s] hair,” and “rubbed his penis 
against [the plaintiff]” was sufficient to create a jury question as to whether harassment was 
because of sex). For discussion of cases in which male-on-male touching of genitalia was not 
considered “because of sex,” however, see infra notes 228–33 and accompanying text.  
 44. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 45. Confusion on this point is so persistent that the First Circuit recently found it necessary 
to “repeat previous reminders to the bar and bench that the harassing action need not be 
inspired ‘by sexual desire’ to be redressable under Title VII—the only requirement is that the 
action must be because of the victim’s sex.” Medina-Rivera v. MVM Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 138 n.4 
(1st Cir. 2013) (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80). 
 46. These cases are cited in Appendix A. The Appendix includes only cases decided by 
federal courts under Title VII or parallel federal or state employment-discrimination statutes 
from March 4, 1998 through March 31, 2013. It does not include cases in which the “because of 
sex” element appears not to have been contested, or in which the court did not reach any 
conclusion on that issue. It includes only dispositive motions, mostly summary judgment rulings, 
although I also reviewed a small number of decisions on discovery disputes, discussed in Part 
II.D. I attempted to collect all cases meeting these criteria, but I do not purport to have 
assembled a comprehensive list. I identified these cases through a number of traditional legal 
research methods, including broad searches in the “All Federal Cases” Westlaw database using 
a variety of search terms. I also independently reviewed all cases referenced in the secondary 
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Figure 1 sets forth the number of cases in which plaintiffs prevailed 
on each theory of why same-sex harassment is “because of sex.” 
Plaintiffs have relied on the theory that the harasser acted out of 
discriminatory sexual desire in the majority of these decisions. My 
research has uncovered just two opinions in which a plaintiff alleging 
same-sex harassment survived summary judgment exclusively based 
on the second evidentiary route—general hostility toward men or 
women in the workplace.47 With respect to the third route—evidence 
of more favorable treatment of one sex—the Seventh Circuit 
explained, “That evidence may be difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain when the plaintiff and his harasser work in the kind of single-
sex work environment that the Supreme Court confronted in Oncale; 
and it is in that kind of environment where same-sex harassment 
frequently occurs.”48 And although the sex-stereotyping theory is on 
the ascendance, it is not uniformly recognized or consistently 
considered by courts.49 
 
literature on this topic, including many of those cases collected by Clare Diefenbach. See supra 
note 7.  
 47. McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 819 F. Supp. 2d 923, 932 (E.D. Cal. 2011); 
Bailey v. Henderson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2000); cf. Amezaga v. Potter, No. 04-1944 
(RLA), 2007 WL 1387287, at *7 (D.P.R. May 8, 2007) (denying summary judgment in a case in 
which a female harasser insulted a female plaintiff’s “body and physique” and “denigrated her 
intellectual capacity and professional qualifications” based on both the second and third Oncale 
theories). See generally Ramit Mizrahi, Note, “Hostility to the Presence of Women”: Why 
Women Undermine Each Other in the Workplace and the Consequences for Title VII, 113 YALE 
L.J. 157 (2004). 
 48. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999); see, e.g., McCown v. 
St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543–44 (8th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, 
Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 520 (6th Cir. 2001); cf. EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 422 F.3d 840, 846–47 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the “accident of a mostly female workplace” could not insulate an 
employer from liability for male-on-female harassment). 
 49. See EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 689 F.3d 458, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2012) (declining to 
decide whether to recognize a sex-stereotyping theory, observing “there is at least some 
resistance to allowing, in same-sex harassment suits, evidence that does not fall within any 
Oncale category”); Borski v. Staten Island Rapid Transit, No. 04 CV 3614(SLT)(CLP), 2006 WL 
3681142, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2006) (failing to consider a sex-stereotyping theory in a case 
in which the harassment included an implication that the male plaintiff wore women’s clothes). 
Routinely, courts simply proceed mechanically through each of the three Oncale theories, even 
in jurisdictions that recognize sex-stereotyping claims. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Norfolk S. Ry., 
No. 10-cv-1556, 2011 WL 3568843, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2011).  
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Figure 1. Plaintiffs Prevailing on Theories of why Same-Sex 
Harassment was Because of Sex50 
Theory 


















41 5 16 8 9 
 
Thus, plaintiffs are most successful arguing they were harassed 
due to discriminatory sexual desire—Oncale’s first theory. In 
analyzing this theory, courts have conflated the question of a 
harasser’s sexual orientation with the question of a harasser’s sexual 
desire for a particular plaintiff. Although no court has explicitly 
formulated the rule in these terms, my review of the cases shows a 
plaintiff can prevail on Oncale’s first theory by showing either that (1) 
the same-sex harasser sexually desired her or (2) the harasser was 
homosexual. Some courts state that they require plaintiffs to 
demonstrate both of these elements.51 But in practice, courts treat 
these two inquiries as overlapping, to the point of being circular.52 I 
have found only one case in which a court expressly held that conduct 
was not “because of sex” when the plaintiff could demonstrate the 
same-sex harasser’s sexual desire for him but failed to make an 
 
 50. These cases are cited in Appendix B. I note that these plaintiffs did not necessarily 
prevail on every issue. They merely prevailed on the question of whether the harassment was 
“because of sex” by having sufficient evidence or allegations, depending on the applicable 
procedural standard. These decisions do not include those in which courts did not specify any 
theory. See, e.g., Wright v. Porters Restoration, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-163-PRC, 2010 WL 2559877, 
at *3 (N.D. Ind. June 23, 2010) (denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss a same-sex harassment 
claim without noting any Oncale theory because the plaintiff had met the pleading standard by 
“rais[ing] the possibility of a right to relief above a speculative level”). 
 51. See, e.g., Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 1010–11.  
 52. See id. (concluding that “[a]lthough none of these incidents [of harassment] necessarily 
proves that [the male harasser] Jemison is gay, the connotations of sexual interest in [the male 
plaintiff] Shepherd certainly suggest that Jemison might be sexually oriented toward members 
of the same sex” while “readily acknowledg[ing] that the factfinder could infer from [evidence 
that Jemison also harassed a woman] that Jemison’s harassment was bisexual and therefore 
beyond the reach of Title VII” (citations omitted)); see also Davidson-Nadwodny v. Wal-Mart 
Assocs., Inc., No. CCB-07-2595, 2010 WL 1328572, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2010) (concluding, 
from the “sufficiently intimate nature” of the harassment, that a factfinder could infer “an 
underlying sexual attraction” that was “motivated by some degree of homosexual desire 
towards [the plaintiff]” (alteration in original) (quoting Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 
1063, 1069 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005)) (quotation mark omitted)). 
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independent showing of the harasser’s homosexual orientation.53 The 
general trend is toward a rule that requires only a showing that the 
harasser sexually desired the plaintiff, without any independent 
showing of the harasser’s homosexuality.54 Alternatively, many courts 
hold that credible evidence of homosexuality is sufficient, interpreting 
Oncale to allow an inference of desire to be drawn from the fact that 
the harasser was homosexual.55 
Courts have also conflated the question of orientation/desire 
with the question of discrimination. Decisions that require only a 
showing of desire without any showing of homosexuality raise a 
logical dilemma: What if the harasser was bisexual and did not 
discriminate on the basis of sex in her desires?56 Such a “defense” has 
 
 53. See Myers v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 06-CV-11252, 2007 WL 2413087, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 21, 2007) (dismissing a case at summary judgment when the plaintiff did “not offer any 
evidence that [the alleged harasser] is a homosexual and thus allegedly attempted to kiss the 
plaintiff because of sex”).  
 54. See Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that “if a 
plaintiff presents evidence that he was harassed by a member of the same sex, and that the 
harassment was sexual rather than merely humiliating in nature, that evidence is sufficient to 
support a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor”); Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1265 
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that one “evidentiary route turns on whether the harasser acted out of 
sexual desire,” and that “[a] plaintiff who makes this showing establishes that the harassment 
took place because of her sex, regardless whether she has also demonstrated that her harasser is 
homosexual”). Courts have found evidence of same-sex sexual desire or erotic conduct 
sufficient without independent evidence of the harasser’s general sexual orientation in several 
other recent cases. E.g., Robinson v. Carefocus, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-208, 2011 WL 2672037, at *7 
(E.D. Tenn. July 8, 2011); Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (N.D. 
Ill. 2010); Cragle v. Werner Enters., Inc., Nos. 3:07cv2132, 3:07cv2133, 2010 WL 936774, at *6 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2010). 
 55. See EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 522 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001) (“When the 
harasser is a homosexual, however, the conclusion that the harassment was gender based is 
defensible.”); Ellsworth v. Pot Luck Enters., Inc. 624 F. Supp. 2d 868, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) 
(holding that “because there is no dispute that all of the alleged harassers in the present case 
were homosexual, there is an inference that their conduct was based on sexual desire, and thus, 
sex”); cf. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating 
that one way a plaintiff can allege sexual harassment is to demonstrate that “the harasser was 
motivated by sexual desire,” and that the inference of desire is “reasonable” when the 
harassment is “sexually charged” and the harasser is “gay or lesbian”); Hunter v. Allvac, No. 10-
CV-941S, 2012 WL 3746270, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2012) (“Nor is there any evidence from 
which to infer that any of the coworkers who allegedly harassed Plaintiff were homosexual, 
which would give rise to an inference of discrimination based on sexual desire.” (citing Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998))).   
 56. This dilemma preoccupied the Supreme Court for some time during the oral argument 
over Oncale. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–12, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 
751912. 
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succeeded only once.57 More often, this problem arises without 
resolution.58 Courts and commentators have been bothered by the 
“two wrongs don’t make a right” aspect of this theoretical bisexuality 
loophole since the inception of sexual harassment jurisprudence.59 
Their concern begs the question of what the harm is that sexual 
harassment law aims to address—sexist or sexual conduct in the 
workplace?60 In any event, the loophole for the “bisexual harasser” is 
quite narrow—those courts that recognize it will still find 
discrimination so long as the harasser subjected members of one sex 
to qualitatively or quantitatively different treatment.61 
Although few defendants raise bisexual-harasser defenses, a 
constant problem in these cases is the “equal-opportunity harasser”—
a harasser who behaves in a sexually charged manner with both men 
and women in the workplace, but does not claim to be bisexual, and 
 
 57. See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause Title VII is 
premised on eliminating discrimination, inappropriate conduct that is inflicted on both sexes, or 
is inflicted regardless of sex, is outside the statute’s ambit.”). In Holman, bisexuality was not 
technically raised as a “defense,” rather, the plaintiffs had pleaded themselves out of court by 
alleging that both plaintiffs (a married couple) suffered the exact same course of harassment. Id. 
at 405.  
 58. See, e.g., Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We 
need not delve into what inferences—if any—might be drawn from a harasser’s bisexuality.”); 
La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting, without resolving, 
the “difficult question of the status of bisexual harassers”). 
 59. See Yoshino, supra note 7, at 442–43 (noting that the lack of defendants employing the 
bisexuality defense may be a result of their fear that courts are not comfortable with the 
“double for nothing” reasoning). Compare EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 522 
(6th Cir. 2001) (commenting that the bisexual-harasser defense “should make for some 
interesting workplace notices posted by employers: ‘We do not tolerate sexual harassment; but 
if you must, make sure you are equally gross with both sexes’”), with Holman, 211 F.3d at 404 
(“Surely attorneys will not advise their employer-clients to instruct their employees to harass 
still more people—to commit, in most cases, state law torts—which could subject their clients to 
lawsuits and themselves to claims of malpractice and charges of professional misconduct.”). 
 60. See infra note 445. 
 61. Katz, supra note 24, at 130; Yoshino, supra note 7, at 445–46. Quantitatively different 
harassment could vary in frequency based on the victim’s sex. For example, a harasser might 
flash both a man and a woman, but the woman might only get flashed once, while the man gets 
flashed “four or five times weekly.” See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (requiring evidence of harassment of both sexes “in the same way and to the same 
degree” to support the bisexual-harasser defense). Qualitatively different harassment might 
vary in kind or severity. For example, women might be harassed by men “draping their arms 
around” them “and making suggestive comments,” whereas men might be harassed by “painful 
physical assault on their genitalia.” Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 
1170, 1176 (D. Minn. 1999).  
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does not admit she was motivated by any sort of desire.62 Courts 
distinguish bisexual harassers, who harass out of sexual desire, from 
equal-opportunity harassers, who harass out of generalized vulgarity 
or misanthropy. Because Oncale instructed that not all sexually 
charged conduct is harassment because of sex, courts must determine 
whether the harassment arose from sexual desire or some other 
motive. As the following sections will demonstrate, this determination 
often turns on whether a harasser identifies as gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual, as do the results in other scenarios in which a harasser’s 
intent is ambiguous.63 The next two sections will argue that courts 
apply essentialist notions both in assigning sexual orientations and in 
determining whether a jury could infer a harasser acted out of sexual 
desire. 
B. Reductive Definitions of Sexual Orientation 
How do courts determine who is gay? Oncale did not explain 
what sort of evidence might suffice to demonstrate homosexuality, or 
what definition of “homosexual” courts might use. Contrary to 
popular wisdom, there is no unitary definition. The practice of 
organizing all persons into the categories of heterosexual, 
homosexual, and bisexual based on their sexual desires is by no 
means universal; it is both culturally64 and historically65 contingent. It 
 
 62. See, e.g., Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[The 
harasser] was just an indiscriminately vulgar and offensive superior, obnoxious to men and 
women alike.”). 
 63. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 906–08 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(holding that a harasser who did not self-identify as gay or bisexual was not engaged in sexual 
harassment when she harassed both men and women), with Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 
F.3d 930, 934, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a harasser who self-identified as “queer” 
sexually harassed female employees, even though she also had also “grabbed two male 
employees’ buttocks”). Hy-Vee and Kampmier are discussed in greater detail in Parts II.A and 
II.B, respectively. 
 64. See generally JOSEPH A. MASSAD, DESIRING ARABS (2007); AFSANEH NAJMABADI, 
WOMEN WITH MUSTACHES AND MEN WITHOUT BEARDS: GENDER AND SEXUAL ANXIETIES 
OF IRANIAN MODERNITY (2005); JASBIR PUAR, TERRORIST ASSEMBLAGES: 
HOMONATIONALISM IN QUEER TIMES (2007); Gilbert H. Herdt, Ritualized Homosexual 
Behavior in the Male Cults of Melanesia, 1862–1983: An Introduction, in RITUALIZED 
HOMOSEXUALITY IN MELANESIA 1 (Gilbert H. Herdt ed., 1984); Sonia Katyal, Exporting 
Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97 (2002). I am indebted to Professor Katherine Franke’s 
work for pointing me to these sources. 
 65. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003) (“[A]ccording to some scholars 
the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th 
century.”). See generally JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY 
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may even be outdated. As psychologist Ritch Savin-Williams has 
observed, “[T]eenagers are increasingly redefining, reinterpreting, 
and renegotiating their sexuality such that possessing a gay, lesbian, 
or bisexual identity is practically meaningless.”66 Some individuals 
resist categorization based on the sex of their preferred sexual 
partner, opting instead for a sort of “it’s complicated”67 response to 
questions about sexual-orientation status.68 Others identify as asexual 
or gray-sexual.69  
Researchers have defined sexual orientation along at least three 
axes: self-identification, sexual behavior, and desires.70 They have also 
recognized that an individual’s sexual orientation, as defined along 
 
(1995); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon Books 
ed. 1978) (1976); SEDGWICK, supra note 28. 
 66. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 1. 
 67. Cf. Clare Suddath, Your Facebook Relationship Status: It’s Complicated, TIME (May 8, 
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1895694,00.html (discussing Facebook’s 
options for designating “relationship status,” including “single, in a relationship, engaged, 
married, it’s complicated, and in an open relationship”). 
 68. See SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 30 (“Members of the younger generation doubt 
that their sexual orientation can be reduced to either homosexual or bisexual or heterosexual.”); 
Ruth Colker, Response, Hybrid Revisited, 100 GEO. L.J. 1069, 1072–73 (2012) (describing 
“sexual orientation resisters” who oppose the notion that “the biological sex of one’s partner is 
of key importance in matters of self-identity”); Michael Schulman, Generation LGBTQIA, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2013, at E1 (“[T]his generation is seeking something more radical: an unbending 
of gender roles beyond the binary of male/female. The core question isn’t whom they love, but 
who they are—that is, identity as distinct from sexual orientation.”). The problem of individuals 
who respond with “other” or “something else” to questions regarding sexual orientation is 
endemic to social science research in this area. See, e.g., SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 31 
(discussing the “staggering” number of young survey respondents who answer questions 
regarding sexual orientation with “don’t know,” “not sure,” “none,” “queer,” or “all of the 
above”); Anjani Chandra, William D. Mosher, Casey Copen & Catlainn Sionean, Sexual 
Behavior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Identity in the United States: Data from the 2006–2008 
National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP., Mar. 3, 2011, at 1, 33–35 (2011), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr036.pdf (noting the difficulty in compiling 
national estimates of sexual identity and behavior due to the relative frequency of the 
“something else” response).  
 69. See SIMON LEVAY & JANICE BALDWIN, HUMAN SEXUALITY 230–31 (4th ed. 2012) 
(providing an overview of research regarding asexuality). See generally Elizabeth Emens, 
Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5–11) (discussing 
the emerging understanding of asexuality as an identity category), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2218783. 
 70. See, e.g., Donna Brogan, Erika Frank, Lisa Elon & Katherine A. O’Hanlan, 
Methodologic Concerns in Defining Lesbian for Health Research, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 109, 109 
(2001) (“Consensus is building that sexual orientation can be defined along three dimensions: 
self-identification, sexual behavior, and sexual attraction or desire.” (footnotes omitted)); Ritch 
C. Savin-Williams, Who’s Gay? Does It Matter?, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 40, 
40 (2006) (detailing the same).  
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any of these three dimensions, may vary over time.71 To further 
complicate matters, survey evidence demonstrates that these three 
definitions do not always yield the same result.72 These definitional 
difficulties have led some to suggest that researchers should “forsake 
the general notion of sexual orientation altogether and assess only 
those components relevant for the research question.”73 
With rare exception, courts have not endeavored to theorize 
which definition of sexual orientation is best suited to determining 
whether workplace harassment is discrimination because of sex.74 
Rather, they rely on assumptions that social science researchers have 
concluded “are patently false: that homosexuality is a uniform 
attribute across individuals, that it is stable over time, and that it can 
be easily measured.”75 
This Section will critically analyze how courts examine facts 
related to sexual orientation along each of these three axes—self-
identification, conduct, and desire—as well as a fourth category 
considered legally relevant, which I will refer to as “reputation.” The 
cases reveal that courts are generally wary of concluding that an 
individual is homosexual unless that individual identifies as such in 
the workplace. They privilege a model of sexual orientation based on 
public announcement and acceptance, in other words, being out of 
the closet at work. 
 
 71. Brogan et al., supra note 70, at 109. 
 72. See Luis F. Morales Knight & Debra A. Hope, Correlates of Same-Sex Attractions and 
Behaviors Among Self-Identified Heterosexual University Students, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 1199, 1199 (2012) (collecting surveys which provide “clear evidence of the disconnect 
between these variables” through the marked difference in the percentage of respondents who 
identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, and of those who reported same-sex attraction or behavior); 
Zhana Vrangalova & Ritch C. Savin-Williams, Mostly Heterosexual and Mostly Gay/Lesbian: 
Evidence for New Sexual Orientation Identities, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 85, 86 (2012) 
(collecting studies demonstrating discrepancies among sexual-orientation components). 
 73. Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Geoffrey L. Ream, Prevalence and Stability of Sexual 
Orientation Components During Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 36 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 385, 393 (2007). Rather than one universal definition of sexual orientation, researchers 
could define the term in accord with the purpose of the research, “[f]or example, to assess HIV 
transmission, measure sexual behavior; to assess interpersonal attachments, measure 
sexual/romantic attraction; and to assess political ideology, measure sexual identity.” Id. 
 74. One such exception, discussed below, is Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 
(7th Cir. 1999). See infra notes 569–72 and accompanying text.  
 75. EDWARD O. LAUMANN, JOHN H. GAGNON, ROBERT T. MICHAEL & STUART 
MICHAELS, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 283 (2000). 
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1. Self-Identification.  Many decisions regard self-identification as 
the litmus test of sexual orientation.76 Often, the harasser’s 
homosexuality was simply not contested by the employer-defendant.77 
In other cases, courts look to statements made by alleged harassers 
indicating same-sex preferences or relationships.78 
But as a general matter, courts apply rules of strict construction 
to admissions of gay identity, going to great lengths to avoid allowing 
juries to read hints, subtleties, or innuendos as expressions of the love 
that dare not speak its name. As literary critic Eve Sedgwick has 
written, “The speech acts that coming out . . . can comprise 
are . . . strangely specific.”79 Courts are wary of assigning a 
homosexual orientation to anyone who has not expressly chosen that 
identity and “come out” of the closet by following a very particular 
cultural script. 
For example, in Love v. Motiva Enterprises LLC,80 the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to consider evidence that a 
coworker had heard the alleged harasser, a woman, “state loudly 
several times that the reason the men did not like her was because she 
was gay or female.”81 The court did not consider this “clear and 
credible proof that [the alleged harasser] is homosexual sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment,” because the statement could be 
construed as reflecting the coworker’s uncertainty about which of the 
two conditions was stated as the reason men did not like the alleged 
harasser—perhaps the coworker could not recall if the harasser said 
 
 76. See, e.g., Bradley v. Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *4 
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010) (“[N]either the Plaintiff nor anyone else he has discussed self-
identifies as homosexual . . . .”); English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 846 
(E.D. Va. 2002) (“[Plaintiff] also concedes that [the alleged harasser] never told [Plaintiff] that 
he was a homosexual.”). A plaintiff may lose her case if she fails to secure an admission of 
homosexuality from the alleged harasser. See EEOC v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-
2569-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2008) (granting summary judgment for 
an employer when the plaintiff could not depose the alleged harasser to establish his sexuality). 
 77. E.g., Russell v. Univ. of Tex. of Permian Basin, 234 F. App’x 195, 201 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Caravantes v. 53rd St. Partners, LLC, No. 09 Cv. 7821(RPP), 2012 WL 3631276, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 
F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1788), 2006 WL 2024101, at *6; Reply Brief in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 6, Smith v. Pefanis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1308 
(N.D. Ga. 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-1042). 
 78. See, e.g., Adeshile v. Metro. Transit Auth., No. H-06-3480, 2008 WL 112103, at *6 (S.D. 
Tex. Jan. 9, 2008) (“Green’s discussion of her sexual preferences and exploits with women 
provides some evidence supporting a homosexual orientation.”). 
 79. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 80. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 81. Id. at 904. 
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the men did not like her because she was gay, or if she said the men 
did not like her because she was female.82 It was also possible that the 
harasser’s statement only reflected that the men thought she was gay, 
not that she self-identified as such.83 In another case, Warner v. USF 
Holland,84 an alleged harasser turned to the plaintiff in the restroom 
while the two men were standing side by side at urinals and, with his 
genitals exposed, said, “If I was gay, I would like to be with somebody 
like you.”85 The district court gave this statement a close grammatical 
analysis, concluding that “read literally, the subjunctive ‘if I was gay’ 
would mean that [the alleged harasser] was not gay.”86 
Some courts defer to an alleged harasser’s self-identification as 
heterosexual, even in the face of admissions of same-sex desire. In 
one case, a court reconciled an alleged harasser’s self-identification as 
“heterosexual” with his statements that “he liked males, told [the 
male] plaintiff he ‘wanted’ him, and once asked plaintiff if he ‘had a 
big dick’ and said that he ‘liked that sort of thing,’” by reasoning that 
there was no evidence the harasser “made such comments often.”87 
Courts will disregard even same-sex sexual contact when it conflicts 
with heterosexual identification.88 
One assumption behind this reliance on self-identification is that 
heterosexually identified individuals never desire same-sex sexual 
conduct or engage in same-sex sexual behaviors. This is demonstrably 
false. Indeed, the category of men who engage in same-sex sexual 
activity but do not identify as gay or bisexual is significant enough 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Warner v. USF Holland Inc., No. 08 C 6823, 2012 WL 245190 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2012). 
 85. Id. at *6. 
 86. Id. But see Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195 (D.R.I. 2003) (holding that an 
alleged harasser’s statement that she was “a lesbian” at a family gathering “so her mother would 
stop trying to fix her up with people” was enough “to support an inference, however strained, 
that [the alleged harasser] is a homosexual”). 
 87. Hubbard v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 06-43-JE, 2006 WL 2863222, at *12 (D. Or. 
Oct. 4, 2006), aff’d, 270 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 88. See Bradley v. Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *1, *4 
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010) (disregarding the harassers’ “consensual same-sex sexual behavior, 
including stroking one another’s penises and nipples, kissing, dancing, and humping each other” 
because they “never actually exposed themselves to one another”); Kreamer v. Henry’s Marine, 
No. Civ.A.03-3139, 2004 WL 2297459, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2004) (holding that harassment 
was not “because of sex” even though the harasser grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals), aff’d, 150 F. 
App’x 378 (5th Cir. 2005); English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 846 (E.D. 
Va. 2002) (holding that harassment was not “because of sex” even though the harasser placed 
his genitals on the plaintiff’s shoulder). 
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that public-health researchers denominate this group with the 
acronym MSM: “men who have sex with men.”89 According to a 2011 
national telephone survey, only 3 percent of men and 5 percent of 
women self-identified as lesbian, gay, or bisexual,90 although 6 percent 
of men and 13 percent of women reported experiencing same-sex 
sexual contact,91 and 6 percent of men and 16 percent of women 
reported feeling same-sex attraction.92 Of course, self-reporting is 
notoriously suspect due to the continued stigma attached to 
nonheterosexual identities—it is likely that same-sex contact and 
attraction are underreported.93 
Another assumption underlying this reliance on self-
identification is that every individual is consciously aware of and 
certain about his or her sexual orientation.94 In one case, a female 
plaintiff argued that her alleged harasser was homosexual based on an 
incident in which the harasser rubbed the plaintiff’s leg, another time 
when she stared at the plaintiff’s breasts, and a conversation in which 
she asked the plaintiff, “[H]ow do you know if you prefer men over 
women sexually[?]”95 One interpretation of this conduct is that the 
alleged harasser was questioning her own sexual orientation. This is 
no idle possibility: research suggests that, for women in particular, 
sexual desires may form that are inconsistent with prior sexual 
orientations, and identification as lesbian or bisexual may be a 
process.96 But the court refused to consider such an interpretation 
 
 89. See Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1465 n.3 (2009) 
(“[MSM] was first adopted by public health scholars and workers who recognized the significant 
community of men who had sex with men but do not identify as gay.”). 
 90. Chandra et al., supra note 68, at 29 tbl.12, 30 tbl.13. This study’s data came from an 
automated telephone survey of a national sample of 55,556 males and 56,032 females aged 
eighteen to forty-four in the United States. Id. at 31 tbl.14.  
 91. Id. at 31 tbl.14.  
 92. Id. at 12, 28 tbl.11.  
 93. LAUMANN, supra note 75, at 284; SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 37. 
 94. This presumption runs counter to long traditions in psychology and literature. See 
SEDGWICK supra note 28, at 26 (“[W]here would the whole, astonishing and metamorphic 
Western romance tradition (I include psychoanalysis) be if people’s sexual desire, of all things, 
were even momentarily assumed to be transparent to themselves?”). 
 95. Reissner v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., No. 02-CV-6353-CJS, 2004 WL 941645, at 
*1–2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2004). 
 96. See, e.g., Lisa M. Diamond, What Does Sexual Orientation Orient? A Biobehavioral 
Model Distinguishing Romantic Love and Sexual Desire, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 173, 173 (2003) 
(“[I]ndividuals can develop novel sexual desires—even desires that contradict their sexual 
orientations—as a result of falling in love.”); id. at 183 (detailing case studies from a longitudinal 
study). See generally KRISTIN G. ESTERBERG, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES: 
CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITIES, CONSTRUCTING SELVES (1997) (providing narrative accounts 
CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  6:29 PM 
2013] INFERRING DESIRE 547 
because the alleged harasser had “unequivocally denied being 
homosexual, denied ever having sexual relations with other women, 
and affirmatively stated that her sexual orientation was 
heterosexual.”97 
2. Reputation.  Although the Oncale Court did not provide 
instructions on how a plaintiff might prove a harasser’s 
homosexuality, it did caution that the plaintiff’s evidence had to be 
“credible,” perhaps to ward off arguments based on speculation or 
stereotypes about gay men and lesbians.98 Accordingly, courts 
routinely reject bald speculation or arguments explicitly based on 
stereotypes about the demeanor and dress of gay men and lesbians.99 
Courts also hold that “rumor”100 and “gossip”101 are not credible 
evidence of homosexuality.102 
However, courts frequently remark on the absence of reputation 
evidence establishing the harasser to be homosexual as if it would be 
expected that coworkers would know if a harasser really were gay.103 
For example, one court considered affidavits from twelve of the 
alleged harasser’s coworkers that indicated that none “believed [the 
harasser] was a homosexual or had reason to believe [the harasser] 
was gay.”104 These courts may have taken Oncale’s instruction that 
evidence of homosexuality be “credible” as a requirement that a 
 
showing that although some women consider themselves “lesbians from birth,” others came to 
see themselves as lesbian or bisexual as those terms became culturally and socially available). 
 97. Reissner, 2004 WL 941645, at *9. 
 98. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 99. See, e.g., Alleman v. La. Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 698 F. Supp. 2d 644, 660 (M.D. La. 2010) 
(rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that an alleged harasser “was homosexual based on her voice 
and appearance”); Smith v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(rejecting “bald assertions” of homosexuality “supported by nothing more than [the plaintiff’s] 
speculation about lesbian fashion”). 
 100. Aguilera-Corona v. Kefro LLC, No. Civ. 04-6283-AA, 2006 WL 696091, at *3 (D. Or. 
Mar. 14, 2006). 
 101. Reissner, 2004 WL 941645, at *9. 
 102. Courts may exclude such statements under the Federal Rules of Evidence. E.g., Dick v. 
Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1266 n.5 (10th Cir. 2005); Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 
397 F.3d 1063, 1069 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 103. See, e.g., Warner v. USF Holland Inc., No. 08 C 6823, 2012 WL 245190, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 25, 2012) (“Plaintiff has no independent evidence (from, say, co-workers or [the alleged 
harasser’s] friends) that he was gay or bisexual.”). 
 104. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 846 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also 
Lavack v. Owen’s World Wide Enter. Network, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2005) 
(“[The alleged harasser] lived with other male employees of Autofocus who have not 
experienced anything that would indicate that [he] is  homosexual.”). 
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harasser be “openly” gay105—meaning that he holds himself out as gay 
to the community. These courts go beyond requiring evidence that a 
harasser self-identifies as gay to require evidence that the harasser is 
out of the closet at work. 
Along these lines, some courts require that the plaintiff 
subjectively believed the harasser to be homosexual. They impose this 
requirement by refusing to find credible evidence of homosexuality if 
the plaintiff is unable to testify to the harasser’s sexual orientation. 
When deposed about their harassers’ motives, plaintiffs frequently 
respond that they just “don’t know” why harassers behaved the way 
they did.106 For example, one plaintiff lost his case because, although 
an alleged harasser had thrust his hips into the plaintiff’s groin area, 
when asked at his deposition, the plaintiff stated he did not believe 
the harasser to be homosexual.107 
In Love v. Motiva Enterprises, the Fifth Circuit held the plaintiff 
had failed to adduce evidence from which to infer her harasser’s 
homosexuality, even though the plaintiff stated that she had seen the 
alleged harasser kissing another woman for thirty seconds in a truck 
outside the worksite, and that the harasser had tried to kiss the 
plaintiff.108 The court refused to consider this evidence, because 
during her deposition, the plaintiff had stated she did not “know 
anything about [the harasser’s] sexual orientation.”109 The plaintiff 
 
 105. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Pot Luck Enters., Inc. 624 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872, 876 (M.D. Tenn. 
2009). 
 106. See Pedroza, 397 F.3d at 1067 (when asked about her harasser’s orientation, plaintiff 
stated “I don’t know which way she may go” (quotation mark omitted)); Noto v. Regions Bank, 
84 F. App’x 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff “admit[ed] she [did] not know whether [the 
alleged harasser was] a lesbian”); McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (plaintiff “did not understand what motivated [the alleged harasser’s] behavior”); 
Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (plaintiff admitted “I don’t 
know if [the alleged harassers] were asking me to have sexual relations with them. I don’t really 
know what they were saying”). 
 107. Ballard v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 8:06CV718, 2008 WL 1990787, at *2 (D. Neb. May 5, 
2008). But see Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding the 
victim’s perception of the harasser’s sexual orientation to be largely “irrelevant”); Tepperwien 
v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 427, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the 
victim’s perception of the harasser’s orientation is not dispositive), aff’d, 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 108. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900, 903 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 109. See Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 
17, 2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  6:29 PM 
2013] INFERRING DESIRE 549 
argued that she interpreted the deposition question to be asking 
whether the harasser had admitted to a lesbian identity.110 
The plaintiff’s explanation makes sense if sexual orientation is 
defined by the specific act of coming out of the closet. Sedgwick tells 
a story about two friends, a man and a woman.111 Although the 
woman had long been aware that her male friend’s “eroticism 
happen[ed] to focus exclusively on men,” she did not feel comfortable 
referring to him as a “gay man” until ten years into their relationship, 
when he stated to her, in casual conversation, that he had “com[e] 
out” to another acquaintance.112 The plaintiff in Love may have had 
this understanding of sexual orientation. Thus, her contention that 
she did not “know anything” about her harasser’s “sexual 
orientation” was not inconsistent with her claim that she had seen her 
harasser kissing another woman. 
The requirement that a harasser be known by the plaintiff and 
other coworkers to be gay, lesbian, or bisexual is therefore even more 
limiting than the requirement that the harasser self-identify as such. 
Coming out can be a long process.113 And even those who have come 
out in certain contexts may have incentives to remain in the closet at 
work.114 This high bar for credible evidence of homosexuality may be 
rooted in a negative view of gay identity: the idea that a court should 
not deviate from the presumption of heterosexuality without 
overwhelming evidence because homosexuality is thought to be 
inferior, morally suspect, or stigmatized. 
3. Sexual Behavior.  A few courts apply conduct-based 
definitions of homosexuality. These courts look to past behavior or 
sexual relationships as credible evidence of homosexuality.115 For 
 
 110. Id. On appeal, the dissent pointed out that the plaintiff likely thought she was being 
asked for “a clinical opinion.” Love, 349 F. App’x at 908 n.5 (Dennis, J., dissenting). I note that 
“homosexuality” has not been a diagnosis since 1973. See RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY 
AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 40 (1987).  
 111. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 112. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
 113. See LAUMANN, supra note 75, at 291 (“Development of self-identification as 
homosexual or gay is a psychologically and socially complex state, something which, in this 
society, is achieved only over time, often with considerable personal struggle and self-doubt, not 
to mention social discomfort.”). 
 114. See Pizer, supra note 27, at 735–37 (documenting “[n]umerous studies” that have found 
“many LGBT people conceal their sexual orientation and/or gender identity in the workplace”). 
 115. See, e.g., Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is 
undisputed that [the alleged harasser] had five children by a former marriage and was in a long-
term, live-in, heterosexual relationship with her boyfriend. There was no other evidence 
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example, one court considered an admission that a harasser had 
previously engaged in same-sex “affection[s]” while “intoxicated.”116 
Another considered “comments allegedly made by [the harasser to 
the plaintiff] in reference to possible homosexual activity during [the 
harasser’s] time in the Navy.”117 It is possible that these alleged 
harassers would have fallen into the category of “situational 
bisexuality,” engaging in sex with same-sex partners, but only in 
certain contexts or institutions, like single-sex schools, prisons, or the 
military.118 Nonetheless, these courts were willing to allow 
nonheterosexual identities to be ascribed to the harassers. The 
reasoning here is akin to a “one-drop” rule for bisexuality: that any 
same-sex sexual contact, regardless of how isolated or incidental, 
gives rise to a bisexual identity from which a jury could infer same-sex 
desire for the plaintiff.119 
But most courts have refused to adopt a one-drop rule, holding 
that evidence of past same-sex sexual behavior alone is insufficient 
evidence of homosexuality. In another case, the lawyers were left to 
quibble over the following exchange at a deposition of an alleged 
male harasser: 
  Q. Okay. When you say in response to the two questions that I 
just gave you, you say you might have bumped into somebody, do 
you understand that my question refers to intimate sexual contact 
with a man prior to October 23, 2000? 
  A. Yes, I understand your question. 
  Q. Okay. And is that your answer, you may have bumped into 
somebody? 
 
regarding [the alleged harasser’s] sexual history or preferences.”); King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68 
F. App’x. 659, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The record contains no evidence that any of [the plaintiff’s] 
male coworkers had ever been involved in homosexual relationships or distinctly homosexual 
conduct.”).  
 116. See Ogilvie v. N. Valley EMS, Inc., No. 07-485, 2008 WL 4761717, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 29, 2008) (finding a dispute as to the harasser’s sexual orientation in a case in which the 
harasser allegedly admitted that “when he was intoxicated he had ‘the tendency to engage in 
affection from members of the same sex’” although he “denie[d] being homosexual”). 
 117. See Thomas v. Willie G’s Post Oak Inc., No. H-04-4479, 2006 WL 1117959, at *7 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 25, 2006) (finding credible evidence of homosexuality). 
 118. See SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 171 tbl.8.3; see also MARJORIE GARBER, VICE 
VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY LIFE 30 (1995) (noting scholarly 
typologies of bisexuality); Amy Sohn, Bi for Now, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 10, 2003, at 118 (discussing 
“hasbians,” women who used to date women but have switched to men). 
 119. See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop 
Rule, 1600–1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 600 n.29 (2007) (discussing this analogy). 
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  A. Yes, that is my answer. 
  Q. All right. That’s your same answer to the question [regarding] 
having homosexual contact with men prior to October 23, 2000? 
  A. That is my same answer.120 
The court held that this answer could be construed as an admission 
that the alleged harasser had “prior ‘intimate sexual contact’ with 
men,” but noted the harasser had also “testified that he had a 
girlfriend during 2000,” around the time of the alleged same-sex 
harassment.121 The court concluded that this evidence alone “does not 
definitely support the plaintiff’s conclusion that [the alleged harasser] 
is currently a practicing homosexual.”122 However, the court 
concluded a jury could infer that this harasser was still “practicing” 
homosexuality because there was also evidence he had “rubb[ed] his 
penis against the plaintiff’s buttocks.”123 
It is unlikely the court would have inferred the harasser’s 
homosexuality from this action alone had there been no evidence of 
his history of same-sex intimate behavior to give the act a 
“homosexual” context. Many courts have dismissed cases in which 
male harassers exposed their genitalia124 or “rub[bed]” their genitalia 
up against the plaintiff,125 concluding these actions are not motivated 
by the desire for sexual gratification.126 The exception is when the 
 
 120. Jones v. Potter, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 n.3 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 121. Id. at 4 n.3. 
 122. Id. at 5 n.3 (emphasis added). The term “practicing homosexual” invokes a religious 
discourse in which homosexual behavior (the sin) is distinguished from homosexual identity (the 
sinner).  The first Google result for a search for the words “practicing homosexual” is Larry 
Tomczak, 6 Reasons Why Practicing Homosexuals Can’t Be Christians, CHARISMA NEWS (May 
31, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.charismanews.com/opinion/39696-six-reasons-why-gays-can-t-
be-christians. 
 123. Jones, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 4. 
 124. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 689 F.3d 458, 460, 463 (5th Cir. 2012); Warner v. USF 
Holland Inc., No. 08 C 6823, 2012 WL 245190, at *5–6, *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2012); Sisco v. 
Fabrication Techs., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936, 944 (D. Wyo. 2004). 
 125. Taylor v. H.B. Fuller Co., No. 06cv854, 2008 WL 4647690, at *1, 8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 
2008); Sisco, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 936, 944; English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 
833, 837, 848 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 541, 
544 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the harasser’s “grinding his genitals against [the plaintiff’s] 
buttocks in simulated intercourse” was “inappropriate and vulgar” but “insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that [the harasser’s] conduct towards [the plaintiff] was based on sex”). 
 126. Compare Bradley v. Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *4 
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010) (holding that harassment by same-sex coworkers, many of whom 
were married, was motivated to entertain, not for “sexual desire or gratification”), with Smith v. 
Pefanis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1325–26 & n.13 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (holding that a jury could 
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plaintiff alleges that the harasser had an erection.127 For example, in 
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co.,128 the Seventh Circuit confronted a 
harasser who had “rubbed himself into an erection while [the 
plaintiff] was laying on his stomach with cramps,” and then 
threatened to “crawl on top of [the plaintiff] and fuck [him] in the 
ass.”129 The court held that the “context” of this harassment left 
“room for the inference that the sexual overlay was not incidental.”130 
Nor do courts dismiss harassing behavior as merely crude 
entertainment in cases in which the alleged harasser engaged in 
masturbatory activity in same-sex company.131 
In searching for evidence of sexual gratification, courts 
distinguish “simulated” sex acts from the real thing.132 The distinctions 
drawn by courts in these cases are reminiscent of the notoriously 
difficult task of drawing lines between soft- and hard-core 
pornography.133 In one case, a plaintiff alleged his harasser had 
 
conclude that the defendant harassed men for sexual “gratification” when it was “undisputed 
that [the defendant was] homosexual”). 
 127. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999); see Thorne v. 
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 00-0913-CV-W-6, slip. op. at 11 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2008) (“It 
would seem that the act of rubbing a man’s shoulder with an erect penis would be ‘credible 
evidence’ that a man is homosexual.”); cf. Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 
2d 745, 752, 757 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that the trier of fact could find sexual desire in a case 
in which “[the alleged harasser] forced [the plaintiff] to engage in oral sex”). 
 128. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 129. Id. at 1009 (quotation marks omitted). 
 130. Id. at 1011. 
 131. See, e.g., id. at 1009; cf. Gray v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 3:07-CV-00374, 2009 WL 
305521, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2009) (holding that a jury could infer harassment was 
“because of sex” in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the harasser “groped herself in [the 
plaintiff’s] presence”). 
 132. Compare Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 905 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(dismissing a case in which the alleged female harasser “pushed [the plaintiff] up against a wall 
for ten to fifteen seconds while rubbing her hands and body up against [her]”), and Miller v. 
Kellogg USA, Inc., No. 8:04CV500, 2006 WL 1314330, at *6 (D. Neb. May 11, 2006) (“[The 
harasser’s] alleged behavior in positioning himself behind [the plaintiff] and simulating a sexual 
act . . . represent[s] boorish behavior that was tinged with offensive sexual connotations, which 
is not sufficient to create a jury question under the based [on] sex requirement.”), with La Day 
v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2002) (denying summary judgment in a case in 
which the alleged harasser “fondled [the plaintiff’s] anus,” in a way the plaintiff described “as 
similar to ‘foreplay with a woman’”), and Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 
745, 757 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“A reasonable trier of fact could find that Vijay’s alleged acts of 
forcing Benitez to engage in oral sex, propositioning him for sex, and groping Reyes’s genital 
parts were motivated by sexual desire.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(concluding that hard-core pornography may be “indefinable” but asserting, “I know it when I 
see it”); David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 
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touched his arm and commented on his muscle tone, poked him in the 
stomach and on the rear end, and gave him an “unwanted neck 
massage.”134 The plaintiff also alleged the harasser “‘fondled’ himself 
in the plaintiff’s presence” by touching the crotch area of his shorts.135 
This harasser, however, self-identified as heterosexual.136 The court 
expressly refused to accept the plaintiff’s characterization of the 
behavior as “fondl[ing],” concluding that the plaintiff’s deposition 
testimony only supported his claim that the harasser “‘play[ed] with 
himself’ and/or engaged in the ‘continual readjustment of his privates’ 
by touching his shorts in the crotch area.”137 The court regarded this 
latter characterization as nonmasturbatory behavior consistent with 
heterosexuality.138 Clothing may make the difference. In dismissing a 
claim, one court found it relevant that a harasser had been “clothed” 
when he forced the plaintiff’s face to his groin “to give the impression 
that [the plaintiff] was performing fellatio.”139 
As social science researchers have noted, defining sexual 
orientation based on conduct is problematic. This is not only because 
there is no agreed-upon standard for what conduct counts as sexual.140 
Additionally, conduct-based definitions exclude virgins and those 
who experience same-sex attractions but have only engaged in cross-
sex sexual activity, and miscount individuals who are heterosexual by 
all other definitions but have engaged in same-sex sexual behaviors 
under coercion or for other reasons unrelated to their preferences.141 
 
U. PA. L. REV. 111, 168 (1994) (“Thus, soft-core pornography, of the sort that appears in 
Playboy or Penthouse, obeys careful strictures . . . . Most pictorials depict women only, either 
alone or in pairs. Where men enter the picture, their genitals are generally obscured; if a penis is 
displayed, it is never erect. And actual penetration is virtually never depicted. Hard-core 
pornography, by contrast, is full of erect penises and penetration.”).  
 134. Nguyen v. Buchart-Horn, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1998, 2003 WL 21674461, at *1 (E.D. La. 
July 15, 2003).  
 135. Id. at *1 n.1. 
 136. Id. at *1. 
 137. Id. (alteration in original). 
 138. This was because the plaintiff testified that he did not understand the behavior to be 
“sexual harassment” until an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) officer 
informed him of his potential claim. Id. at *2. 
 139. Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 140. See SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 144 (noting that “which behaviors are deemed 
‘sexual’” varies depending on age, sex, sexual orientation, and other circumstances); SEDGWICK, 
supra note 28, at 25 (“Even identical genital acts mean very different things to different people. 
To some people, the nimbus of ‘the sexual’ seems scarcely to extend beyond the boundaries of 
discrete genital acts; to others, it enfolds them loosely or floats virtually free of them.”). 
 141. LAUMANN, supra note 75, at 291; Savin-Williams, supra note 70, at 40. 
CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  6:29 PM 
554 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:525 
In court, behavioral definitions require troubling evidentiary 
excursions into an alleged harasser’s sexual history on the 
questionable assumption that past conduct amounts to current 
preferences.142 Such assumptions have been rejected in other 
contexts.143 
4. Desire.  Other courts seem to regard the essence of sexual 
orientation to be sexual desire. Desire is a difficult object for legal 
determination because it refers to an internal state and a longing for 
something absent, rather than something present.144 That something 
absent might be sexual activity (lust), romantic intimacy (love), or 
some combination of the two.145 Thus, courts must interpret a 
harasser’s statements and conduct to determine whether a jury could 
reasonably infer the harasser harbored same-sex preferences. 
Some social science researchers consider measures of genital 
arousal as markers of sexual desire and indicia of sexual orientation.146 
Thankfully, in deciding harassment cases, no U.S. court has followed 
the Czech model of determining sexual orientation by requiring the 
subject to submit to a medical procedure testing for physical signs of 
genital arousal in response to same-sex stimuli.147 Physical signs of 
 
 142. See, e.g., Ogilvie v. N. Valley EMS, Inc., No. 07-485, 2008 WL 4761717, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 29, 2008) (refusing to consider hearsay evidence that two male employees had engaged in 
consensual sexual relationships with an alleged male harasser). 
 143. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2) (providing a heightened standard for the relevance of 
evidence of a victim’s sexual history in civil cases).  
 144. It is a cliché of postmodern literary theory that “the thing about desire is that there is 
no there there.” JEFFREY EUGENIDES, THE MARRIAGE PLOT 48 (2011). Consider Tennessee 
Williams’s metaphor for desire as streetcar. See generally Katheleen Hulley, The Fate of the 
Symbolic in A Streetcar Named Desire, reprinted in TENNESSEE WILLIAMS’S A STREETCAR 
NAMED DESIRE 111, 116 (Harold Bloom ed., 1988). 
 145. Social science researchers divide desire into two sorts: sexual and romantic. See, e.g., 
Stephanie Cacioppo, Francesco Bianchi-Demicheli, Chris Frum, James G. Pfaus & James W. 
Lewis, The Common Neural Bases Between Sexual Desire and Love: A Multilevel Kernel Density 
fMRI Analysis, 9 J. SEXUAL MED. 1048, 1049 (2012); Ritch Savin-Williams, How Many Gays 
Are There (It Depends), in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL 
IDENTITIES 5, 10 (Debra A. Hope ed., 2009); cf. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 25 (“For some 
people, it is important that sex be embedded in contexts resonant with meaning, narrative, and 
connectedness with other aspects of their lives; for other people, it is important that they not be; 
to others it doesn’t occur that they might be.”). 
 146. See generally, e.g., Kurt Freund, Diagnosing Homo- or Heterosexuality and Erotic Age-
Preference by Means of a Psychophysiological Test, 5 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 209 (1967). 
 147. See generally ORG. FOR REFUGE, ASYLUM & MIGRATION, TESTING SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION: A SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PLETHYSMOGRAPHY IN ASYLUM & 
REFUGEE STATUS PROCEEDINGS (2011), available at http://www.oraminternational.org/images/
stories/PDFs/oram%20phallometry%20paper%202010-12-15%20--for%20download.pdf 
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sexual arousal, such as erections, may occur without any triggering 
event and be outside an individual’s control or contrary to her 
desires.148 However, one court was persuaded that a harasser might be 
gay by conduct including his request for gay pornography from the 
plaintiff, who, so it happened, distributed pornography around the 
office.149 The assumption here—that the relationships between 
fantasy, pornography, and sexual orientation are corresponding and 
linear—is not necessarily true.150 
Some courts conclude that homosexuality can be inferred from 
the harassing conduct itself when that conduct amounts to a genuine 
“sexual advance,” that is, a proposition to engage in sexual activity.151 
Such propositions are evidence of desire. This appears to be a broad 
definition that would allow a jury to infer homosexuality from even a 
single same-sex sexual proposition, regardless of how the alleged 
harasser identifies or whether she has ever engaged in same-sex 
sexual behavior. For researchers, there is no agreement on “what 
proportion of an individual’s attractions must be directed toward 
same-sex others, or how strong the attractions must be to count as 
homosexual.”152 Although this seems to be a broad definition, as 
discussed in the next Section, courts narrowly construe sexual 
advances. 
 
(criticizing the Czech Republic’s use of phallometry to verify an asylum applicant’s claim of 
persecution based on sexual orientation); U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNCHR’S 
COMMENTS ON THE PRACTICE OF PHALLOMETRY IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO DETERMINE 
THE CREDIBILITY OF ASYLUM CLAIMS BASED ON PERSECUTION DUE TO SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4daed0389.pdf. 
 148. LEVAY & BALDWIN, supra note 69, at 232, 248. 
 149. Walton v. Van Ru Credit Corp., No. 10-344, 2011 WL 6016232, at *3, *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
2, 2011). 
 150. See DIAMOND, supra note 29, at 91 (describing a woman who “pursues casual sex with 
men and sometimes watches gay male pornography, but . . . has only fallen in love and formed 
meaningful relationships with women”); LEVAY & BALDWIN, supra note 69, at 233–34 (“Does 
[fantasizing about the same sex] mean all these people were actually sexually attracted to same-
sex partners in real life? Not if we are to go by their self-identification as heterosexual, which by 
definition means they are attracted only to the other sex.”); see also LAURA KIPNIS, BOUND 
AND GAGGED: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF FANTASY IN AMERICA x (1998) (arguing 
against policies “enacted on the basis of the most simplistic assumptions about the role of 
fantasy in the human psyche (that fantasy is synonymous with intent, for instance)”). 
 151. See, e.g., La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 152. Savin-Williams, supra note 70, at 40.  
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* * * 
In sum, although a minority of courts will conclude there is 
credible evidence of homosexuality based on an alleged harasser’s 
past or current behavior or indications of desires, the majority will not 
conclude that an individual is “homosexual” unless that individual 
identifies as such in the workplace. 
C. Fictions Regarding Same-Sex Desire 
How do courts determine if a harasser experienced sexual desire 
for a plaintiff if that harasser does not identify as gay? As discussed, if 
a court finds credible evidence that a harasser is homosexual, it may 
automatically infer that the harassment was because of sex.153 But 
courts rely on a narrow, self-identification-based definition of 
homosexual identity. Thus, courts often find themselves deciding 
whether a reasonable jury could infer that the ostensibly heterosexual 
harasser harbored sexual desire for the plaintiff based only on that 
harasser’s conduct toward the plaintiff. This may be part of the 
circular inquiry into whether a harasser is gay, or it may be 
considered a replacement for that inquiry.154 This Section will describe 
how courts analyze desire in such cases. 
Courts undertaking this inquiry have created an elaborate set of 
fictions about what types of motives are consistent with same-sex 
desire, comparing the conduct at issue to an idealized sort of romantic 
courtship, which takes the form of earnest solicitations, in private 
settings, without mixed emotion or hostility. These fictions mirror the 
images of model gay couples portrayed by same-sex marriage 
advocacy groups, in “long term, committed, marriage-like 
relationships, whose personal narratives appeal[] to middle 
America.”155 Such relationships are simple love stories. Thus, courts 
hold that a harasser cannot both loathe and desire her object. They 
read sexual propositions as insincere mockery, rather than 
acknowledging the element of insincerity in many forms of flirtation. 
 
 153. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra Part I.A. 
 155. Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 21, 33 (2010); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage 
Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) (describing the public performance 
required of “respectable” and “domesticated” same-sex couples: “lining up in pairs outside of 
City Hall the moment the Mayor deems the marriage registry open to homo business; placing 
your wedding announcement in the New York Times; posing model homo families—our perfect 
plaintiffs—before the media”). 
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They understand aggression, hostility, and threats as inimical to 
desire. And they see public displays as devoid of sexuality. 
It is tempting to understand this set of cases as a result of the fact 
that federal judges have very limited imaginations when it comes to 
sexuality, particularly of the same-sex variety.156 But a close reading 
reveals an active judicial imagination infused with preconceptions, 
myths, and stereotypes about sex (meaning both stereotypes about 
men and women and stereotypes about what is erotic) and sexual 
orientation. Courts imagine that only those who are truly gay might 
harbor same-sex desire. Gay identity is determined based on whether 
the individual performs a certain cultural script about what it means 
to be gay.157 One such script is performed by coming out of the 
closet,158 being “openly” gay, and working to recruit straight 
coworkers.159 But there is another, newly available cultural script 
about gay identity as romantic: a search for same-sex relationships 
that fulfill “yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection.”160 For 
the most part, judicial decisions hold same-sex desire to one or the 
other of these two standards. Same-sex desire is not understood as 
complicated, paradoxical,161 humorous, or otherwise exhibiting the full 
range of the human experience.162 
 
 156. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992) (“[J]udges know next to nothing 
about [sex] beyond their own personal experience, which is limited, perhaps more so than 
average, because people with irregular sex lives are pretty much . . . screened out of the 
judiciary . . . .”).  
 157. A foundational text on the idea of scripts about sexual identity is JOHN H. GAGNON & 
WILLIAM SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (1973). 
 158. See supra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 159. See infra Part II.B. 
 160. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (“Because it 
fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, 
civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among 
life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”); see also Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 
54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1400 (2005) (describing “Goodridge’s constitution of lesbian and gay male 
identities” as “immaculate[], cleansed identities, scrubbed clean not only of the homophobic lies 
(the good news), but also of a certain truth (not so good): that sex, even, or especially, sex in 
relationships, same-sex and cross-sex both, can—and, at times, does—cause harm”). 
 161. See ZYLAN, supra note 7, at 184–85 (“Indeed, one way to make sense of the odd and 
conflictual behavior often observed in these cases is as a scene of gender and sexual confusion, 
as desire in contestation with efforts to make sense of one’s own identifications.”).  
 162. Cf. Rubin, supra note 28, at 282 (“[H]eterosexual encounters may be sublime or 
disgusting, free or forced, healing or destructive, romantic or mercenary. As long as it does not 
violate other rules, heterosexuality is acknowledged to exhibit the full range of human 
experience.”). Psychologists describe this phenomenon as the “out-group homogeneity effect.” 
See Thomas M. Ostrom & Constantine Sedikides, Out-Group Homogeneity Effects in Natural 
and Minimal Groups, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 536, 536 (1992). 
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My point in highlighting the complexities of same-sex desire is 
not to argue that courts should allow cases to proceed to juries in all 
of these circumstances.163 Deciding whether any of these plaintiffs 
ought to have prevailed requires a first-order normative framework 
for thinking about why harassment is sex discrimination and a second-
order set of legal rules that correspond with that framework. This 
Article is agnostic on these questions, although possibilities are 
explored in Part III. Additionally, it is impossible to reach a 
conclusion on whether any of these cases should have survived 
summary judgment given that the focus on desire by litigants and 
courts obscured other ways of thinking about how harassment might 
be “because of sex,” impoverishing the record. The purpose of this 
Section is to expose the incoherence of the desire inquiry in the same-
sex harassment context by examining various fictions underlying that 
inquiry. This in turn sets up the argument that desire should not be 
the test of whether harassment is discriminatory.164 
1. Disgust Is Inconsistent with Desire.  In determining whether 
same-sex scenarios might be interpreted as sexual advances, courts 
measure those scenarios against an idealized version of mutually 
affirming romantic love. Thus, they hold that disgust, pity, revulsion, 
shaming, humiliation, and insult all indicate the absence of desire. As 
one court quite awkwardly put it, the essence of a claim is “proof of 
non-humiliating sexual contact of some kind with the claimant.”165 
For example, in Love v. Motiva Enterprises, the plaintiff, Connie 
Love, alleged that she had been harassed by her coworker, Jeanne 
Sirey, while the two women worked together in the “coker unit” at 
Motiva’s plant in Norco, Louisiana.166 The Fifth Circuit described the 
record as follows: 
 
 163. Additionally, in describing the facts of the various cases discussed in this Article, I do 
not represent that any events alleged are true. Rather, I describe the facts from the plaintiff’s 
perspective. This is because the bulk of these cases resolve a defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment. At summary judgment, courts are required to consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). 
 164. See infra Part III. 
 165. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 
2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see also Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 
668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that harassment must be “sexual rather than merely 
humiliating in nature”). 
 166. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900, 902 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
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Sirey derided Love, frequently calling her a “stupid bitch,” “fat 
cow,” and “disgusting.” She allegedly told Love that she was a 
“sorry excuse for a woman because she did not make the coker 
conducive for women to work in;” that she was a “failure as a 
woman;” and that “You think that’s a body you have? You should 
be ashamed.” Sirey also allegedly touched Love with her hands on 
two occasions. On the first, Sirey confronted Love in the changing 
room and ran her finger under Love’s bra strap and her underwear 
near her hip while at the same time calling Love “fat” and 
“disgusting.” On another occasion, Sirey began rubbing Love’s 
shoulders and back while Love was at the lunch table. When Love 
protested, Sirey said she was “just being friendly.” Love testified 
that Sirey also would seek her out at company functions, stand next 
to her, and touch her arm to let her know Sirey was present.167 
The court concluded that Sirey’s behavior was inconsistent with 
sexual attraction.168 Rather, Sirey’s “consistent insults” and 
expressions of “negative feelings about Love and her appearance” 
were “more indicative of humiliating or bullying behavior.”169 In 
response, Love argued that after she had gastric-bypass surgery and 
returned to work, “she was obviously more attractive to Sirey, and 
that Sirey’s inappropriate conduct was no longer accompanied by 
negative remarks.”170 She alleged Sirey attempted to hug her, rubbed 
her breasts against her when reaching for a log book in Love’s 
workspace, and locked Love in the bathroom, telling Love that she 
would not free her unless Love did “favors for her.”171 This was not 
enough for the court, which held that “Sirey had a long history of 
insulting Love, which cannot be ignored or explained away by the 
overly simplistic view that Love’s surgery rendered her desirable to 
Sirey.”172 As evidence of Sirey’s sexual interest, Love argued that 
Sirey had licked her lips and made comments such as “‘[y]ou think 
you’re a woman,’” and “‘[j]ust be aware. Always look over your 
shoulder.’”173 The district court concluded: “[W]hile licking one’s lips 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 903. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 
2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
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may be sexually suggestive in some contexts, when combined with 
this threatening language, the sexual connotation disappears.”174 
The dissent observed: “The majority ignores that love-hate 
relationships, for example, are quite common and well 
documented.”175 Indeed, American popular culture is saturated with 
representations of the eroticization of relations of dominance and 
submission, humiliation, and shame.176 The interrelationship between 
sex and humiliation was well recognized by early sexual harassment 
cases177 and is no barrier to the success of plaintiffs alleging cross-sex 
harassment.178 One factor the Supreme Court has recognized for 
determining whether harassment is severe or pervasive is whether the 
conduct is “humiliating.”179 Part of the reason the majority in Love 
could not see desire could be that it had difficulty imagining (or 
taking seriously) a woman as a sexual aggressor and as an agent of an 
undomesticated brand of sexual desire.180 This scenario does not 
match a certain ideal of lesbian sexuality, which “tend[s] to cede raw 
sexuality to men, equate femininity with intimacy rather than 
sexuality, and argue for the purity of lesbian sex as a full expression of 
feminism, egalitarianism, and the joys of mutual desire untainted by 
the power dynamics inherent in patriarchal heterosexuality.”181 
Courts also draw an artificial line between “gay bashing” and 
same-sex desire. Wheatfall v. Potter182 was a Texas case in which the 
male plaintiff, a self-described “gay American,”183 alleged he had been 
harassed when a male manager “would come into his office and 
initiate conversations with sexual overtones.”184 For example, the 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Love, 349 F. App’x at 907 n.3 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 176. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, 20 Million Shades of Green: Racy Book Hits 
Milestone, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2012, at B1 (describing Fifty Shades of Grey, a book series about 
a sadomasochistic relationship, as “this year’s pop-culture phenomenon”); RIHANNA, S&M, on 
LOUD (Def Jam Recordings 2010) (radio hit about sadomasochism). 
 177. See Marianne C. DelPo, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Same-Sex Hostile 
Environment Sexual Harassment, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1999) (discussing cases). 
 178. E.g., Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 761 (8th Cir. 2003).  
 179. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 
 180. Cf. Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, Gender Trouble at Abu-Ghraib?, 1 POL. & GENDER 
597, 616–17 (2005) (analyzing the domestic reaction to a female soldier photographed abusing 
male Iraqi prisoners as deviating from norms regarding proper feminine and feminist conduct). 
 181. JUDITH HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY 135 (1998). 
 182. Wheatfall v. Potter, No. H-07-1937, 2010 WL 2854284 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2010).  
 183. Id. at *4. 
 184. Id. at *1. 
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manager invited the plaintiff “to his ranch ‘to ride [his] horse until 
[the plaintiff] was sore.’”185 But the manager also allegedly called the 
plaintiff a “motherfucking faggot.”186 The manager asserted he was 
“exclusively heterosexual.”187 The court concluded that a jury could 
not infer sexual desire from this interaction because the manager 
“inten[ded] to humiliate” the plaintiff.188 The assumption, again, is 
that humiliation and desire are incompatible. The particular 
assumption here is that antigay attitudes are not compatible with 
same-sex sexual desire.189 This assumption is false, of course: some of 
the most outspoken opponents of gay rights have ended up embroiled 
in same-sex scandals.190 A Freudian might argue that homophobia 
results from the repression of same-sex desire.191 An individual 
struggling to repress his own same-sex desires transfers his shame 
onto others and acts out his guilt through gay bashing, thus publicly 
reaffirming his heterosexuality. Some empirical research bears out 
this theory.192 This is not to say that all homophobia is at base 
 
 185. Id. (first alteration in original). 
 186. Id. at *2. 
 187. Id. at *1. 
 188. Id. at *5 (citing La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2002)). The 
court also pointed out that the plaintiff did not provide “any evidence that [the manager] 
propositioned other male employees” and thus failed to show the manager was motivated by a 
“desire to have sex with [the plaintiff].”  Id.  
 189. See Silva v. E.U.A. Nova, No. 97-117ML, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22977, at *2, *12 
(D.R.I. Jan. 22, 1999) (holding, in a case in which the plaintiff endured many forms of antigay 
harassment, including a request from his supervisor to “[g]et on your knees and suck my dick,” 
that there was “no evidence that either [the harasser or the plaintiff] actually engages in 
homosexual activities, and no evidence that the statement was made as a serious proposition”). 
 190. See Richard M. Ryan & William S. Ryan, Homophobic? Maybe You’re Gay, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2012, at SR12 (discussing scandals involving evangelical leader Ted Haggard, 
Senator Larry Craig, and Young Republican leader Glenn Murphy, Jr.). This is not to say that 
the assumption was necessarily false with respect to the manager in Wheatfall; rather, it is to 
point out the flaw in the court’s categorical reasoning. 
 191. See id. (discussing Freud’s theories). 
 192. See Henry E. Adams, Lester W. Wright, Jr. & Bethany A. Lohr, Is Homophobia 
Associated with Homosexual Arousal?, 105 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 440, 441 (1996) (using 
survey questions regarding homophobia and measuring sexual arousal in response to 
pornographic videos with penile plethysmography); Netta Weinstein, William S. Ryan, Cody R. 
DeHaan, Andrew K. Przybylski, Nicole Legate & Richard M. Ryan, Parental Autonomy 
Support and Discrepancies Between Implicit and Explicit Sexual Identities: Dynamics of Self-
Acceptance and Defense, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 815, 828 (2012) (studying 
reaction time tasks and concluding that “discrepancy between implicit and explicit sexual 
orientation measures[] was . . . shown to relate to greater self-reported homophobia”). I do not 
mean to imply that penile plethysmography, a technique for measuring erections, and implicit 
attitudes are definitive indicators of sexual desire. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying 
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homoerotic, but rather, that homophobic attitudes do not necessarily 
undercut the inference of desire if, for example, the harasser made a 
statement that could be construed as a sexual proposition. 
The idea that disgust is opposed to desire is not one courts 
indulge in cross-sex harassment cases.193 For example, in a 2010 First 
Circuit case in which the male harasser engaged in a persistent 
campaign of professional intimidation against the plaintiff, including 
daily complaints that her attire was too revealing in violation of the 
dress code, the court found a jury could infer that harassment was 
based on the plaintiff’s sex.194 Although it held the plaintiff did not 
have to prove she was the object of the harasser’s sexual interest, it 
noted that the unusual fervor of the harasser’s frustration suggested 
to another employee that he might have “a crush” on the plaintiff.195 
2. Humor Is Inconsistent with Desire.  Many cases dismissing 
same-sex harassment claims label the conduct at issue “‘male-on-male 
horseplay,’” “‘simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the 
same-sex,’”196 “indiscriminate[] vulgar[ity],”197 and “juvenile 
 
text. But these studies at least call into question the assumption that homophobia and 
homosexuality are inherently opposed. 
 193. See, e.g., EEOC v. Donohue, No. 2:09cv280, 2011 WL 4572020, at *7, *12 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that discriminatory intent was implicit, even though a male harasser had 
told a female plaintiff he thought she was “fat”).  
 194. Rosario v. Dep’t of Army, 607 F.3d 241, 245, 248–49 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 195. Id. at 248. 
 196. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 844 (E.D. Va. 2002) (quoting 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)). I note that these 
quotations come from Oncale’s discussion of whether harassment is “severe or pervasive,” not 
whether it is “because of sex.” Nonetheless, many courts have conflated the two questions. See, 
e.g., Peone v. Cnty. of Ontario, No. 12-CV-6012 CJS, 2013 WL 775358, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 
2013) (concluding that an incident in which a supervisor wrestled the plaintiff to the ground and 
“‘grind[ed]’ his ‘pelvis’” against the plaintiff’s leg was not “because of sex” because it was 
“‘male-on-male horseplay’” (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81)). But see Tepperwien v. Entergy 
Nuclear Operations, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 427, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (refusing to decide, at 
summary judgment, whether the harasser’s conduct in grabbing the plaintiff’s genitals was 
“teasing or hazing” or “sexually threatening”), aff’d, 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 197. Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001); see also EEOC v. Boh 
Bros. Const. Co., 689 F.3d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 2012) (dismissing the claim by characterizing the 
harasser as “a world-class trash talker and the master of vulgarity in an environment where 
these characteristics abound”); EEOC v. McPherson Cos., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1245 
(N.D. Ala. 2012) (characterizing harassment as mere “[b]arracks humor”). 
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provocation.”198 These courts are looking for “earnest . . . 
solicitation”199 in the form of sincere “proposal[s] for sex.”200 
However, even when they find proposals of sex, often, courts do 
not take them seriously.201 In a 2012 Sixth Circuit case, the alleged 
male harasser, Paul Ottobre, touched the male plaintiff “in a sexual 
manner” by “grabbing his buttocks” and “poking him in the rear with 
a hammer handle[] and . . . a long sucker rod.”202 When the plaintiff 
protested, Ottobre “inflamed the situation with comments such as 
‘you’ve got a pretty mouth,’ ‘boy you have pretty lips,’ and ‘you know 
you like it sweetheart.’”203 After the plaintiff quit, Ottobre left him a 
voicemail stating “‘I miss holding you. I miss spooning with you. I 
love you. Please call me back.’”204 The plaintiff testified that he knew 
Ottobre was married to a woman but thought Ottobre harassed him 
because Ottobre was bisexual.205 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the employer. It held simply that the plaintiff failed to 
offer “‘credible evidence’” of Ottobre’s “sexuality,” as required by 
Oncale.206 It did not remark on why Ottobre’s sexually charged 
conduct toward the male plaintiff could not be construed by a jury to 
evince a bisexual orientation. Likely, the court of appeals found it 
obvious that, as the district court held, Ottobre harassed the plaintiff 
because he thought it “was funny, not sexually gratifying.”207 Perhaps 
this is explained by the fact that Ottobre, a convicted felon standing 
 
 198. English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 845.  
 199. Lack, 240 F.3d at 261; see also Atkins v. Computer Scis. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 
(E.D. Va. 2003) (discussing “earnest sexual solicitation”); Pedroza v. Cintas Corp., No. 6-01-
3247-CV-S-RED, 2003 WL 828237, at *9 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2003), aff’d sub nom. Pedroza v. 
Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005) (contrasting “teasing motivated by a mutual 
dislike” with “earnest sexual solicitation”).  
 200. English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 845; see also Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900, 
902 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (noting that the harasser never made any “explicit proposals” 
for sexual activity); EEOC v. Belle Glade Chevrolet-Cadillac-Buick-Pontiac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 
No. 07-80169-CIV, 2008 WL 62159, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2008) (holding that a jury could find 
that sexually explicit propositions indicated the alleged harasser was “sincerely interested in 
beginning a relationship”). 
 201. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 202. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 466. 
 205. Id. at 465, 468. 
 206. Id. at 468 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). 
 207. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., No. 09-11350-BC, 2010 WL 3904697, at *6 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 29, 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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six foot five and weighing 330 pounds, did not match stereotypes of 
bisexual men.208 The district court saw Ottobre as a “bully” who 
enjoyed “mentally and physically tormenting weaker people around 
him.”209 It read his come-ons as sarcastic rather than genuine, 
exploiting the plaintiff’s sensitivity toward suggestions that he was 
gay.210 No other interpretation would be reasonable. 
In English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc.,211 the alleged harasser, 
Joseph Dutchburn, engaged in a “daily, albeit brief, campaign of lewd 
behavior directed at English [the male plaintiff].”212 For example, 
Dutchburn told English that he “‘wanted to plant his salami between 
[English’s] cheeks,’ while walking behind English.”213 On another 
occasion, “Dutchburn walked up behind English, wrapped his arms 
around English and said ‘I’m going [to lunch] with you.’”214 At lunch, 
Dutchburn wanted to discuss the men’s sex lives, a topic that made 
English “uncomfortable.”215 Later that day, Dutchburn told English 
“‘they needed to bond,’” and then “approached English from behind 
while English was seated at his desk and pressed his genitals against 
English’s shoulders.”216 The next day, after English called Dutchburn 
a “wacko,” “Dutchburn retorted ‘I love you,’ winked and then added 
‘like a step son.’ Dutchburn then asked English ‘if he’d like to put his 
meatballs on [English’s desk].’”217 Later that afternoon, “Dutchburn 
approached English from behind, stuck his finger in English’s side 
 
 208. See id. at *1; see also Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that the harasser, who was “six inches taller and at least 100 pounds heavier” than the 
plaintiff, forced the plaintiff to perform simulated sex acts simply “to demonstrate physical 
domination”); Farren v. Shaw Envtl., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 352, 359 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(concluding that repeated threats of sexual assault were motivated by “simple malice” rather 
than desire when “both men were similarly described as ‘large’ and ‘imposing’” and the alleged 
harasser was a “tough guy”), aff’d on other grounds, 510 F. App’x 44 (2d Cir. 2013). In another 
decision, a district court seemed to regard a plaintiff’s large stature as evidence of 
impenetrability to harassment. See Beseau v. Fire Dist. No. 1, No. 05-2162, 2006 WL 2795716, at 
*2 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2006) (noting that the harasser was much smaller than the plaintiff, who “is 
6ʹ2ʹʹ tall and weighs approximately 315 pounds with a chest measurement of about 52ʹʹ”). 
 209. Wasek, 2010 WL 3904697, at *7. 
 210. Id. 
 211. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 212. Id. at 837. 
 213. Id. (alteration in original). 
 214. Id. (alteration in original). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 838 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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and said ‘next time it would be [my] 9MM.’”218 After noticing English 
was unhappy with his behavior, “Dutchburn asked English to go for a 
walk so they could ‘smoke the peace pipes,’ looked down at his lap 
and said, ‘you know, the bones.’”219 
The court held no reasonable jury could read sexual innuendo 
into these comments. For example, the court held that the “smoke the 
peace pipes” comment “could mean anything from an invitation to 
mend fences to smoking illicit drugs.”220 The court concluded this 
conduct was not an “earnest sexual solicitation.”221 Rather, it 
amounted to “horseplay,” or “expressions of juvenile provocation 
and offensive behavior driven by Dutchburn’s desire to tease or 
humiliate English and others,” analogous to use of the phrase “kiss 
my ass” among men.222 The court saw Dutchburn as “juvenile” and 
hence asexual, not the sort of “grown man” who might experience 
sexual desire.223 The court would not infer desire from the harassment 
because it concluded that the acts were no more than “casual 
obscenity,” akin to “‘a friendly slap on the buttocks.’”224 
 
 218. Id. (alteration in original). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 845. Another judge refused to interpret the expression “ass breath” as having any 
“homosexual connotation,” even though it was uttered in the context of a series of colorful 
descriptions of sexual activities associated with gay men. EEOC v. McPherson Cos., 914 F. 
Supp. 2d 1234, 1237 (N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 221. English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 845. 
 222. Id. at 848. 
 223. Id.; see also McPherson Cos., 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (describing a litany of antigay 
insults by the harasser as “childish”). 
 224. English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (quoting Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 
1010 (7th Cir. 1999)) (quotation mark omitted); see also McPherson Cos., 914 F. Supp. 2d at 
1242 (analogizing the harassment at issue to the hazing the judge received from his “grizzled 
veteran drill sergeant during basic training”). 
  The reference to a slap on the buttocks may be a misinterpretation of a passage from 
Oncale in which Justice Scalia wrote: “A professional football player’s working environment is 
not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he 
heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by 
the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the office.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). This passage does not speak to whether such conduct was 
“because of sex”; it is about a different question, whether the harassment was “severe or 
pervasive.” See supra note 196. Additionally, the passage suggests that sexual touching “back at 
the office,” of exactly the sort that occurred in English, might give rise to a harassment claim.  
  One must wonder whether the Court would use the football example today, in the 
wake of sexual abuse scandals involving football coaches and players. See Joe Drape, Sandusky 
Guilty of Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2012, at A1; Amos Kamil, Great 
Is the Truth, and It Prevails, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 10, 2012, at 26. 
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One interpretation of these decisions is that they reflect an 
impoverished view of how sexual desires are expressed and how such 
desires are formed in their expression, ignoring how humor is often a 
mode of flirtation, a way to probe boundaries and express desire 
without commitment. The very value of flirtation may lie in its 
ambiguity, openness, and suspense.225 This does not mean it is 
opposed to serious desire; rather, flirtation is a way of relating to 
things serious.226 One might argue judicial modes of interpretation are 
ill-equipped to integrate a liminal category like flirtation. 
On the other hand, all schoolchildren know teasing often results 
from crushes. You need not be a Freudian to recognize that desires 
are not always fully conscious. Courts have no trouble understanding 
male come-ons to women as sexual harassment, no matter how 
absurd. For example, in a 2010 Fourth Circuit case, the court easily 
concluded that a remark by a male harasser that he wanted to help 
the nursing female plaintiff pump breast milk was a “proposal[] of 
sexual activity,” notwithstanding the harasser’s reputation around the 
office as a “shock jock” who “made offensive remarks in front of both 
male and female audiences.”227 Courts, however, have difficulty 
fathoming same-sex desire of this sort, expressed through humor 
rather than earnest request. They view these jokesters as certain 
archetypes: asexual juveniles and hypermasculine bullies. Neither is 
consistent with the stereotype of the adult, effeminate gay man. 
3. Aggression Is Inconsistent with Desire.  In the same-sex 
context, courts view sexualized threats, aggression, and hostility as 
inconsistent with desire. This is evident in cases in which courts must 
decide whether a man’s touching another man’s genitals could be 
characterized as sexual. Courts look to the nature of the touch, 
distinguishing the rough from the tender. The verbs courts use are 
telling. “[S]triking,”228 “slapping,”229 “grabbing,”230 “goosing,”231 
 
 225. Cf. ADAM PHILIPS, ON FLIRTATION xvii–xix (1994) (“[F]lirtation . . . exploits the idea 
of surprise. From a sadistic point of view it is as though the known and wished-for end is being 
refused, deferred or even denied. But from a pragmatic point of view one could say that a space 
is being created in which aims or ends can be worked out . . . .”).  
 226. See id. at xvii (“The fact that people tend to flirt only with serious things—madness, 
disaster, other people—and the fact that flirting is a pleasure, makes it a relationship, a way of 
doing things, worth considering.”). 
 227. EEOC v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, 609 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2010).  
 228. Linville v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 335 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 229. Lavack v. Owen’s World Wide Enter. Network, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (E.D. 
Mich. 2005). 
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“tap[ping] and swat[ting],”232 are considered nonsexual. Thus, the 
following male-on-male harassment could not be interpreted as 
motivated by sexual desire: 
[G]rabbing [the plaintiff] by the waist, chest and buttocks; grinding 
his genitals against [the plaintiff’s] buttocks in simulated intercourse; 
telling [the plaintiff] to “squeal like a pig, or a woman,” and making 
other lewd comments; attempting to stick the handle of a shovel and 
a tape measure in [the plaintiff]’s anus; and kicking [the plaintiff] in 
the buttocks.233 
The more threatening the behavior, the less likely courts are to 
find sexual desire.234 For example, consider this scenario from Shafer 
v. Kal Kan Foods,235 which the Seventh Circuit held evinced “physical 
domination” rather than desire: 
 
 230. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 514 (6th Cir. 2001); Barrows v. Seneca 
Foods Corp., No. 09-CV-6554, 2012 WL 268339, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012), vacated, 512 F. 
App’x 115 (2d Cir. 2013); Taylor v. H.B. Fuller Co., No. 06cv854, 2008 WL 4647690, at *2 (S.D. 
Ohio Oct. 20, 2008); Collins v. TRL, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
 231. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d at 503. 
 232. See Barrows, 2012 WL 268339, at *2 (holding that conduct was not “because of sex” in 
a case in which the supervisor would “frequently tap and swat [Plaintiff’s] penis,” and on one 
occasion, “while Plaintiff was pushing a wheel barrow weighing approximately four hundred 
pounds, his supervisor . . . grabbed his testicles by his hands in a vice like grip causing extreme 
pain and embarrassment to Plaintiff”). 
 233. McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 541–42 (8th Cir. 2003) (emphases 
added). 
 234. See Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that 
conduct was not “because of sex” in a case in which harassers made crotch-grabbing gestures 
and “used a phrase describing oral sex,” slashed plaintiff’s tires, and threatened plaintiff’s life); 
Strishock v. Swift & Co., No. Civ.A.04CV2603PSFCBS, 2005 WL 1587300, at *1 (D. Colo. July 
5, 2005) (holding that conduct was not “because of sex” in a case in which the plaintiff’s 
supervisor “wrestled [the plaintiff] to the ground, bound his hands and feet, pulled his pants 
down, spanked him with his bare hand 35 times, wrote ‘Happy Birthday’ in black magic marker 
across his bare buttocks and smeared birthday cake on his face,” then took a photo, and “left 
him lying bound for a period of time during which he told co-workers not to help him or cut him 
loose or else that person would be next” (quotation marks omitted)). In two recent cases, courts 
drew the line at conduct reported by the plaintiff as “assault.” Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, 
Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (denying a motion for summary judgment in a 
case in which the harasser allegedly “forced [the plaintiff] to engage in oral sex” and three male 
employees filed police reports); Reagan v. City of Knoxville, No. 3:07-cv-189, 2010 WL 2639933, 
at *1 (E.D. Tenn. June 28, 2010) (denying a motion for summary judgment in a case in which 
the alleged harasser twice kneed the plaintiff in the groin and once pinned him against a truck 
and “simulated sexual acts on him,” and the plaintiff informed his supervisor “that he had been 
assaulted and required medical attention”). But see Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 
666 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that state tort law claims for assault and battery alone were 
insufficient to give rise to a sexual harassment claim). 
 235. Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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In June 2001 Dill, who earlier had remarked that Shafer has a 
“cheerleader ass” that “would look real nice on my dick,” forced 
Shafer’s face down to his crotch (while clothed), moving his groin to 
give the impression that Shafer was performing fellatio. A few 
weeks later, in the same company, Dill grabbed Shafer’s hand and 
moved it to his crotch (again while clothed) while moaning as if 
Shafer were masturbating him. The force was enough to put Shafer 
in fear that Dill would break his arm. The next month Dill 
approached Shafer in the locker room when Shafer was not wearing 
a shirt and pulled a handful of hair from Shafer’s chest, causing 
considerable pain. Finally, in August 2001 Dill bit Shafer in the neck 
hard enough to raise welts, though not to penetrate the skin.236 
Even when a male coworker threatens to rape a male plaintiff, 
courts may conclude the motive is “simple malice” rather than 
desire.237 In one case, a court did not find desire even though the male 
harassers repeatedly grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals and buttocks, 
simulated sex acts with the plaintiff, and subjected the plaintiff to 
repeated viewings of the “male-on-male rape scene from 
Deliverance.”238 
Such holdings are not limited to cases involving male-on-male 
harassment. In one case involving a female harasser and a female 
plaintiff, the court held that sexual desire was lacking even though the 
harasser stated she was attempting to simulate a “rape.”239 In another, 
the female harasser “pressed her breasts against plaintiff,” and, on 
several occasions, “grabbed plaintiff in a full body hug that plaintiff 
 
 236. Id. at 665. 
 237. See Farren v. Shaw Envtl., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 352, 356, 359 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2012) 
(holding that there was no evidence the defendant, the plaintiff’s coworker, felt any sexual 
desire toward the plaintiff, even though he repeatedly threatened sexual abuse by saying, for 
example, “‘I’m going to fuck you, and tell everyone I fucked you,’” and “would grab himself in 
front of [plaintiff] and say I have a big schwanz and it’ll go up in you; I’ll bend you over and fuck 
you”), aff’d on other grounds, 510 F. App’x 44 (2d Cir. 2013); cf. King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68 F. 
App’x. 659, 661, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that conduct involving taunts about oral sex and 
homosexuality, and “grabbing, punching, and kicking” by two self-identified heterosexual men, 
was not motivated by desire because it was borne of “animus, power, or whatever it is that 
drives bullies to single out others for taunting and ridicule”). 
 238. Taylor v. H.B. Fuller Co., No. 06cv854, 2008 WL 4647690, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 
2008). 
 239. See Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 905 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). For further 
discussion of Hy-Vee, see infra Part II.A. 
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described as brutal and unwelcome,” but the court did not find desire, 
since there were no “direct[] . . . proposition[s] for sexual favors.”240 
It need hardly be said that courts consider male-on-female 
genital touching to be “because of sex,” especially when violent and 
aggressive.241 The first Supreme Court case recognizing sexual 
harassment involved a female plaintiff’s allegations that her male 
harasser had “forcibly raped her on several occasions.”242 That courts 
do not see hostile forms of male-on-male genital touching as sexual is 
perhaps not surprising considering the cultural invisibility of male 
victims of sexual assault.243 As Professor Bennett Capers has written, 
even some male victims of rape do not view their experiences in 
sexual terms, assuming that “rape was something that only happens to 
women.”244 The failure to see female-on-female forms of violence may 
stem from a failure to understand women as serious threats.245 
4. Exhibitionism Is Inconsistent with Desire.  One final fiction 
courts use to screen out cases is that same-sex sexual desire is 
 
 240. Atkins v. Computer Scis. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (E.D. Va. 2003); see also Klen 
v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., No. CIVA05CV02452EWNCBS, 2007 WL 2022061, at *2, *14 (D. 
Colo. July 9, 2007) (holding that harassment was not “because of sex” in a case in which 
coworkers pulled the plaintiff’s hair, “threw pens and paperclips at her,” “flicked their hands in 
her face,” “bumped Plaintiff’s chair,” “‘snapped’ Plaintiff’s neck,” and “elbowed Plaintiff in the 
head”). But see Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 396 F.3d 1088, 1094, 1097 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a jury could find harassment was “because of sex” in a case in which the harasser 
“reached over and pulled open Plaintiff’s shirt exposing her chest and bra to coworkers,” and 
the harasser did not treat male employees similarly), overruled on other grounds as recognized 
in Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 241. See, e.g., Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that a jury’s finding of a sexually hostile work environment was reasonable in a case 
in which the male harasser “knocked [the female plaintiff] to the ground, undressed her and 
digitally penetrated her, bit and choked her, and repeatedly threatened to kill her”); Lockard v. 
Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming a jury verdict in favor of a female 
sexual harassment plaintiff in a case in which male customers “grabbed [the plaintiff] by the 
hair” and one customer “then grabbed her breast and placed his mouth on it”). 
 242. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986). 
 243. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2011). 
 244. Id. at 1268. 
 245. In various studies in which participants are given vignettes about domestic violence and 
the researchers vary the sex of the victims and perpetrators, participants rate violence in the 
context of same-sex relationships as less serious than male-on-female violence in heterosexual 
relationships. See generally Michael J. Brown & Jennifer Groscup, Perceptions of Same-Sex 
Domestic Violence Among Crisis Center Staff, 24 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 87 (2009); Sheila M. 
Seelau & Eric P. Seelau, Gender-Role Stereotypes and Perceptions of Heterosexual, Gay and 
Lesbian Domestic Violence, 20 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 363 (2005); Amy J. Wise & Sharon L. 
Bowman, Comparison of Beginning Counselors’ Responses to Lesbian vs. Heterosexual Partner 
Abuse, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 127 (1997). 
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manifested only in private. For example, in Bradley v. Bates 
Acquisition, LLC,246 the plaintiff alleged “he witnessed several of his 
male co-workers engaging in consensual same-sex sexual behavior, 
including stroking one another’s penises and nipples, kissing, dancing, 
and humping each other.”247 The court concluded the plaintiff could 
not demonstrate that these coworkers were homosexual, because 
“they were just ‘putting on a show’” intended to entertain.248 “Thus, 
the primary purpose of and motivation for the behavior in which 
[they] engaged appears not to have been sexual desire or 
gratification.”249 In English v. Pohanka, the court concluded that the 
harasser’s act of “pressing his genitals against English’s shoulder” was 
not an earnest sexual solicitation, because it “was done in view of 
other coworkers and was not followed by a proposal for sex.”250 All of 
the conduct complained of in that case “occurred on a showroom 
floor” where sales consultants worked in “office cubes” and “had 
little privacy.”251 The harasser even got a “few laughs” out of those 
coworkers, to his “twisted delight.”252 Some of them “implicitly 
encouraged” his behavior.253 
In these cases, the conduct is compared to the sort of private, at-
home vision of sexuality protected by the Supreme Court in Lawrence 
v. Texas.254 Of course, sexual desire can be and often is displayed in 
public settings,255 for entertainment,256 and in groups.257 And, like the 
 
 246. Bradley v. Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *1 (W.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010).  
 247. Id. at *1.  
 248. Id. at *4. It was also relevant to the court that some of the alleged harassers were 
married. Id. 
 249. Id.; see also Collins v. TRL, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (concluding 
that a harasser who grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals was not motivated by sexual desire, in part 
because “[i]t appears from the record that actions that [the harasser] took were performed in 
the presence of others who would then laugh regarding what happened”). 
 250. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 845 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 251. Id. at 847. 
 252. Id. at 846. 
 253. Id. at 847. 
 254. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that the Constitution protects 
the “most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the 
home”). 
 255. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 149–93 (1999). 
 256. See supra note 133. 
 257. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous 
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 301 (2004) (discussing “the scope, terms, and 
structures of polyamory today” and “portray[ing] several polyamorous relationships”). 
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other fictions described in this Section, the assumption that sexual 
desire is only expressed in private is not generally made in cross-sex 
cases.258 
* * * 
Thus, courts have developed a set of rules about what constitutes 
credible evidence of homosexuality that implicitly requires evidence 
that the harasser held him or herself out as gay, lesbian, or bisexual in 
the workplace. Absent that, courts may infer homosexuality from 
desire for a same-sex plaintiff, but only when that desire manifests 
itself in accord with a certain idealized picture of same-sex intimacy 
that matches the image promoted by gay-marriage advocates.259 
Courts do not see desire in scenarios involving disgust, humor, 
violence, or exhibitionism, because they understand the agents of 
harassment in those cases as heterosexual or asexual archetypes: 
bullies, clowns, and perpetual children. These holdings have now 
taken on a life of their own as precedents about what constitutes 
same-sex desire.260 
II.  REINFORCING HETEROSEXISM 
This Part will discuss how this notion of “homosexuality” as 
being openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual at work, combined with the set 
of fictions that flatten same-sex desire into a simple, earnest, gentle, 
private emotion, work to privilege heterosexual identities and protect 
heterosexual marriage. The cases act to preserve the reliance interests 
of spouses and children in heterosexual marriage. They also protect 
the interests of plaintiffs in defending their heterosexual identities 
against threats by “openly” gay coworkers. These cases, in which 
desire is inferred from gay identification, punish expressions of gay 
identity at work. When alleged harassers self-identify as gay, courts 
find it easy to see same-sex desire, even if it is not simple, earnest, 
 
 258. Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 567 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the 
argument that indiscriminate harassment is not based on sex if it occurred in an “open forum 
where men and women worked together”). 
 259. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 260. See, e.g., Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1069–70 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(applying the fiction that humor and play are desexualized to a female harasser, and rejecting 
the plaintiff’s argument that “because such bawdy, ‘locker room’ behavior is not as 
commonplace among females, a reasonable jury could more readily infer actual sexual desire 
based on similar statements or acts by females”). 
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gentle, or private. The doctrine has spawned invasive litigation 
practices in which workers must sit for depositions regarding their 
sexual orientations, employers routinely ask for sworn affirmations of 
heterosexuality, and plaintiffs’ lawyers appeal to homophobia.261 This 
Part will explain how the doctrine serves to reinforce heterosexism.262 
A. Privileging Straight Marriages 
In analyzing pre-Oncale decisions, Professor Kenji Yoshino 
argued that the concept of bisexuality would undermine the doctrinal 
focus on homosexual identities.263 Once courts recognized bisexuality, 
they would no longer allow a harasser to negate the possibility that he 
experienced same-sex desire by arguing that he experienced cross-sex 
desire.264 Courts would then shift the focus of inquiry from status 
(homosexual identity) to behavior (homosexual advances).265 But this 
has not occurred. Today, bisexuality is ubiquitous.266 Yet courts 
continue to indulge the argument that a harasser who has been 
involved in a heterosexual marriage would not experience same-sex 
desire.267 
A frequent refrain in cases dismissing sexual harassment claims is 
that the alleged harasser, “who is married and has children, asserts 
that he is heterosexual.”268 It should be well known by now to any 
 
 261. See infra note 428 and accompanying text. 
 262. One response might be that Title VII does not prohibit heterosexism, or any form of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, for that matter. This may not be true for long. See, 
e.g., Pizer, supra note 27, at 719–20. In any event, my argument in this Part should appeal to 
anyone who questions whether the state should endorse heterosexual over nonheterosexual 
identities and unions.  
 263. Yoshino, supra note 7, at 450–51. 
 264. Id. at 454. 
 265. Id. at 452. 
 266. Glazer, supra note 2, at 1000. 
 267. Courts do not see a harasser’s marital status as relevant to a claim of cross-sex 
harassment. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 993, 1000–01 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (affirming a claim against a married harasser); Moser v. MCC Outdoor, LLC, 256 F. 
App’x 634, 637, 645 (4th Cir. 2007) (same). 
 268. Hubbard v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 06-43-JE, 2006 WL 2863222, at *3 (D. Or. 
Oct. 4, 2006), aff’d, 270 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2008); see Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., No. 08-
228-JJB, 2010 WL 3035758, at *2 (M.D. La. Aug. 3, 2010), vacated, 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Sillars v. Nevada, No. 3:07-CV-00041-LRH-RAM, 2008 WL 4540457, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 6, 
2008), aff’d, 385 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. 2010); Cole v. Kone Elevators, Inc., No. CV-05-1969-
PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 3313707, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2006); Beseau v. Fire Dist. No. 1, No. 05-
2162, 2006 WL 2795716, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2006); Lavack v. Owen’s World Wide Enter. 
Network, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 230 
F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1274, 1365–66 (D. Kan. 2002); cf. Ashmore v. J.P. Thayer Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 
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follower of American politics or celebrity gossip that a heterosexual 
marriage is no barrier to same-sex desire.269 Some courts have rejected 
the argument that straight marriage is a defense to same-sex desire,270 
while others recognize the fallacy of such reasoning, but partially rely 
on it anyway.271 Perhaps these courts are assuming that most people, 
especially those who are married to cross-sex partners, do not 
experience same-sex desire. But even if this were a safe assumption, 
why would it hold true for the subset of married people accused of 
same-sex sexual harassment?272 This Section will suggest that one 
possible explanation is a concern about how a finding of same-sex 
desire might threaten a marriage and the interests of the harasser’s 
spouse and children.273 The claim that courts are protecting 
heterosexual marriage is supported by cases in which courts seem to 
draw implicit comparisons between cross-sex marriages and 
propositions for same-sex trysts at the office. But regardless of 
whether this holds true as a causal explanation, this Section argues 
that the effect of these cases is to allow married heterosexuals to 
engage in harassing conduct that would be illegal but for their marital 
and sexual-orientation status, thus privileging heterosexual marriage. 
For example, in Smith v. Hy-Vee,274 the plaintiff, Dru (Dani) 
Smith, worked in a bakery with another woman, Sherri Lynch, who 
“engaged in rude, vulgar, sexually charged behavior toward Smith.”275 
 
1359, 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (finding no evidence the harasser was “actually homosexual” in a 
case in which “Plaintiffs testified that [the harasser’s] obnoxious behavior included descriptions 
of his sexual relationship with his wife”).  
 269. See, e.g., David Greenberg, Sex and the Married Politician, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, at 53, 
53.  
 270. See Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 299–300 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); Provensal v. Gaspard, No. 10-4276-SS, 2011 WL 2004416, at *3 & n.1 (E.D. La. May 23, 
2011); Davidson-Nadwodny v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. CCB-07-2595, 2010 WL 1328572, at 
*4–5 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2010); Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752, 
757 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 271. See Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005); Bradley v. 
Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010).  
 272. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 7, at 449 (arguing that the judicial presumption of 
heterosexuality may “be defended on the grounds that we believe the majority of the population 
to be straight,” but that defense “may be insufficient, in that courts are not dealing with the 
general population, but with the subset of that population whose same-sex conduct has given 
rise to a claim of harassment”). 
 273. Cf. Wendy C. Ortiz, Newly Wed and Quickly Unraveling, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at 
ST6 (discussing her experience as “part of that population of 30-something people who come 
out, and, unintentionally, take down a couple of people (or more) in the process”). 
 274. Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 275. Id. at 905. 
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The Eighth Circuit described an incident in which Lynch pretended to 
rape Smith: 
In May 2006, Smith observed Lynch “dry humping” a male Hy-Vee 
manager. After the manager left, Smith said, “God, Sherri, it’s like 
you practically raped him.” Lynch replied “[n]o Dani, if I were going 
to rape someone, it would be like this.” Lynch then pushed Smith up 
against a wall for ten to fifteen seconds while rubbing her hands and 
body up against Smith.276 
On another occasion, Lynch “rubbed her fingers against Smith’s 
fingers and told Smith ‘[t]hat’s what a penis feels like.’”277 Lynch also 
“smacked [Smith] on the buttocks approximately six times.”278 The 
court held that Lynch’s conduct was not “motivated by a particular 
attraction to Smith because Lynch exposed both men and women to 
the same behavior.”279 Lynch also “made sexually explicit cakes for 
male-Hy-Vee employees,” “‘dry humped’ the same [male] manager 
about once a week,” “put her hands in this manager’s pockets and 
said ‘hey there big boy,’” and “hit several male employees on the 
posterior on several occasions.”280 
Although it did not resolve the question, the court made 
reference to a debate between the parties about Lynch’s sexual 
orientation. Smith argued that Lynch was a lesbian or bisexual based 
on her observations of Lynch’s conduct: kissing another female 
employee, smacking that woman on the buttocks, and dry humping a 
third female employee.281 Lynch denied that she was a lesbian or 
bisexual.282 The court observed that Lynch had “been married to the 
same man for sixteen years and [had] two daughters.”283 In affirming 
the dismissal, the court did not conclude that Lynch was a bisexual 
harasser, whose desires were strictly sex blind.284 It did not hold that 
the case had to be dismissed because Lynch treated men and women 
equally badly. Rather, it concluded that Lynch’s behavior was not a 
serious sexual advance, citing a case holding that the use of crude 
 
 276. Id. (alteration in original). 
 277. Id. (alteration in original). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 908.  
 280. Id. at 906. 
 281. Id.  
 282. Id.  
 283. Id.  
 284. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
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humor in the presence of both men and women did not constitute sex 
discrimination.285 
The Hy-Vee court seems to have drawn an implicit contrast 
between Lynch’s nonserious workplace vulgarity and her serious 
marriage, which it noted was to the “same man” for sixteen years, to 
underscore the stability of the monogamous relationship.286 It did not 
hold that a married woman could not experience same-sex desire,287 
but its interpretation of the facts seems to have been shaded by its 
interest in protecting the stability of Lynch’s heterosexual identity 
and marital status, as well as the interests of her husband and 
children.288 The doctrine’s requirement that the court assign a sexual-
orientation status to the alleged harasser upped the ante. The court 
was not willing to disrupt Lynch’s heterosexual identity based on 
workplace indiscretions.289 But for Lynch’s marriage and claim to 
heterosexual status, the outcome might have been different.290 
Another example is Sillars v. Nevada.291 In that case, the female 
plaintiff and the alleged harasser, Patsy Cave, worked together for a 
Nevada state agency.292 The plaintiff had been promoted and was 
 
 285. Hy-Vee, 622 F.3d at 908 (citing Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W. 3d 675, 681 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 286. See id. at 906. 
 287. The Eighth Circuit has stated that a cross-sex marriage does not preclude a jury from 
finding that a harasser “was motivated by some degree of homosexual desire.” See Pedroza v. 
Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 288. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1399, 1415–16 (2004) (“The landscape post-Lawrence is not one that makes formal legal 
distinctions between heterosexual and homosexual practices, but rather one that likely renders 
different legal treatment to those who express their sexuality in domesticated ways and those 
who don’t—regardless of orientation.”). 
 289. The doctrine functions like the “queen-for-a-day” exemptions to the military’s former 
ban on gay service members, protecting those who engage in “isolated” incidents of same-sex 
eroticism based on “immaturity, curiosity or intoxication.” JANET E. HALLEY, DON’T: A 
READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY POLICY 46–47 (1999) (quotation marks 
omitted); see also id. (explaining the exemption “protect[ed] heterosexual persons from any 
status-like consequences of their homosexual acts”). 
 290. Compare Hy-Vee, 622 F.3d at 906, 908, with Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 
934 (7th Cir. 2007). For further discussion of Kampmier, see infra Part II.B. My argument is not 
that the outcome should have been different. Whether one sees this case as troublesome 
depends on one’s theory of what harm sexual harassment law should address. See infra Part III. 
My argument is that the focus on sexual desire results in unequal outcomes insofar as liability 
turns on whether harassers are married. See supra note 267. 
 291. Sillars v. Nevada, No. 3:07-CV-00041-LRH-RAM, 2008 WL 4540457, at *1 (D. Nev. 
Oct. 6, 2008), aff’d, 385 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 292. Id. 
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training Cave to take over her former job.293 Over the course of the 
training, the two struck up a friendship.294 On one occasion, Cave 
visited the plaintiff’s house, and 
during the course of their conversation, they drank one or two 
margaritas. Cave informed Plaintiff that she “had feelings for 
someone in the office,” and Plaintiff began naming male employees 
to determine who the person was. Cave said that it was no one that 
Plaintiff had named. At some point during the conversation, Cave 
began to cry.295 
A few nights later, “Cave called Plaintiff in tears stating, ‘I don’t want 
you to think bad of me.’ She asked if she could come to Plaintiff’s 
home and talk to her, but Plaintiff said, ‘No, it’s late at night.’”296 The 
plaintiff contended that after this incident she noticed Cave would 
stand too close to her and stare at her breasts.297 Cave denied having 
feelings for the plaintiff.298 Although the court was evaluating a 
summary judgment motion,299 it credited this denial, holding the 
plaintiff had “no evidence demonstrating that Cave is homosexual. 
Instead, Cave is married and has several children. There is no 
evidence that she has ever been in, or intends to be in, a homosexual 
relationship, and Cave denies having romantic feelings for 
Plaintiff.”300 Why did the court conclude that no reasonable jury could 
infer desire from Cave’s late-night visit to the plaintiff’s house and 
odd confession? The incident described by the court is a scène à faire 
of unrequited desire.301 The decision protects Cave’s marriage from a 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at *5. 
 299. Id. at *4. 
 300. Id. at *5. The court also may have been under the mistaken impression that Oncale 
requires that harassment be in “‘sex-specific and derogatory terms.’” Id. (quoting Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1997)). This quotation comes from Oncale’s 
description of how a plaintiff might prove harassment was motivated by “general hostility to the 
presence of women in the workplace,” which was not at issue in Sillars. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 
80. 
 301. ROLAND BARTHES, A LOVER’S DISCOURSE: FRAGMENTS 44 (Richard Howard, trans., 
Hill and Wang 2001) (1977) (“[S]o that a long series of verbal contentions (my ‘politenesses’) 
may suddenly explode into some generalized revulsion: a crying jag (for instance), before the 
other’s flabbergasted eyes, will suddenly wipe out all the efforts (and the effects) of a carefully 
controlled language.”). 
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one-time lapse, a near confession of same-sex desire over too many 
margaritas. 
Myers v. Office Depot302 is a similar example, this one involving 
men.303 The story began at an employer-sponsored “Kickoff event” in 
Orlando, Florida, which was intended to motivate Office Depot’s 
sales force.304 During the event, the male plaintiff, described by the 
court as “openly homosexual,” became involved in an “intense 
conversation” at the bar with a coworker, Ron Sorey.305 After the 
conversation, the plaintiff went into the bathroom and entered a stall, 
where Sorey grabbed him and tried to kiss him.306 The plaintiff 
rebuffed the advance.307 Later, Sorey became the plaintiff’s 
supervisor.308 Sorey was confrontational with the plaintiff and tried to 
pressure him to leave the company.309 The court dismissed the case, 
holding that the “[p]laintiff [did] not offer any evidence that Ron 
Sorey [was] a homosexual and thus allegedly attempted to kiss the 
plaintiff because of sex.”310 The court also made a cryptic reference to 
“calls to female co-workers,” which proved that “Sorey was an equal 
opportunity harasser, which is not actionable.”311 The “calls” to which 
the court referred were drunken calls from Sorey during another 
corporate event to the hotel room of two female coworkers.312 During 
those calls, Sorey informed the women that “his wife doesn’t like anal 
sex,” and they all shared a laugh.313 Here, as in Sillars, the court 
 
 302. Myers v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 06-CV-11252, 2007 WL 2413087, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 21, 2007). 
 303. Id.  
 304. Id.  
 305. Id.  
 306. Id.  
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at *4. The court also dismissed the case because the single incident of the 
“attempted kiss” did not meet the requirement that harassment be “severe or pervasive.” Id. at 
*5. There was no quid pro quo claim because Sorey was not the plaintiff’s supervisor at the time 
of the alleged harassment. Id. 
 311. Id. at *4. 
 312. Id. 
 313. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 9 & Ex. B, 
Myers, 2007 WL 2413087 (No. 06-CV-11252). One of the coworkers, Mary Miller, testified that 
when Sorey first called, she told him, “Ron, you need to go to sleep, you’re drunk.” Id. Ex. B.  
Sorey hung up but called again, and “began to tell [her] how his wife doesn’t like anal sex.” Id. 
Miller responded, “Ron, have you ever heard of lubricant,” and the two laughed. Id. Miller 
testified “it wasn’t—there was no insinuation of him and I or anything like that.” Id. The next 
day, Miller told Sorey, “We do stupid things when we’re drunk and, you know, you had one too 
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refused to understand a one-time lapse as sexual desire that would 
give rise to a bisexual or gay identity. The implicit comparison is 
between sex in a public restroom and marriage. 
The set of fictions narrowly construing evidence of same-sex 
desire discussed in Part I.C apply with special force in cases in which 
harassers are married. Kreamer v. Henry’s Marine314 is an example of 
a case in which a court refused to read conduct as evincing sexual 
desire when the alleged harasser was involved in a heterosexual 
marriage.315 The plaintiff, Thomas Kreamer, worked as a deckhand on 
a boat.316 He alleged he had been harassed by a coworker, Carroll 
Carerre, a man whose “language was consistently profane 
and . . . [who] had been known to engage in excessive horseplay.”317 
The plaintiff testified that on eight occasions, Carerre grabbed him in 
the crotch, and “[o]n the third or fourth time, Carrere allegedly told 
plaintiff that ‘he would like to compare packages.’”318 The plaintiff 
told Carrere to stop.319 Carrere also attempted to annoy the plaintiff 
by throwing the rope off the bit of his boat when the plaintiff was 
attempting to tie two boats together.320 After the plaintiff complained, 
Carrere blew him a kiss.321 On another occasion, “Carrere allegedly 
burned plaintiff’s wrist with a hot Zippo lighter that Carrere was 
allegedly trying to put between plaintiff’s legs.”322 The plaintiff also 
related a strange story about an incident in his sleeping quarters: 
[O]ne morning during the time in question, Carrere entered his 
sleeping quarters on the Bacchus. Plaintiff stated that when he 
awoke, Carrere was standing next to plaintiff’s bed, just looking at 
plaintiff. Carrere did not say anything, did not touch plaintiff and 
did not attempt to get into plaintiff’s bed. When plaintiff told 
Carrere to “get the hell out,” Carrere left without saying anything.323 
 
many. Don’t worry about it.” Id. When asked if she ever made a formal complaint, Miller said, 
“There was no reason to. It wasn’t offensive to me; it was funny.” Id. 
 314. Kreamer v. Henry’s Marine, No. Civ.A.03-3139, 2004 WL 2297459 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 
2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 378 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 315. Id. at *1. 
 316. Id.  
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at *1, *6. 
 319. Id. at *1. 
 320. Id. at *2. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id.  
 323. Id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
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When the plaintiff later came into contact with Carrere, Carrere 
whistled at him and made “offensive gestures.”324 Near the end of his 
time on this particular job, “Carrere approached plaintiff from behind 
as he was bent over slightly over the engines, grabbed his sides and 
said he ‘would like to f**k that piece of ass.’”325 The plaintiff pushed 
him away and left the engine room.326 
The court concluded, as a matter of law, that this evidence, “as a 
whole, reveals an intent of Carrere to humiliate plaintiff for reasons 
unrelated to a sexual interest, rather than an actual intent to have 
sexual contact.”327 The court refused to read Carrere’s statement that 
he would like to “f**k that piece of ass” literally.328 Because Carrere 
was leaving that day, the court reasoned, the incident must have been 
“nothing more than a final parting shot directed at plaintiff” rather 
than “a realistic sexual proposition of the type necessary to be 
actionable under Title VII.”329 
This raises the question: How much time did the court think a 
sexual encounter between the two men might take? Is the court 
assuming that sexual propositions are only made in an effort to start 
long-term relationships? One fact the court highlighted was that 
“Carrere never asked [the plaintiff] out or expressed an interest in 
him socially outside of work.”330 The court held that nothing salacious 
could be inferred from the odd incident in which the plaintiff awoke 
to find Carrere standing in his sleeping quarters, silently staring at 
him.331 The court would not read desire into this pointed silence.332 
The explanation, most likely, is that the court considered this 
evidence in light of the fact that “Carrere, who is married with 
 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. (quotation mark omitted). 
 326. Id.  
 327. Id. at *6. 
 328. Id. at *3, *6 & n.14. 
 329. Id. at *6. 
 330. Id. at *7. 
 331. See id. (“When this one incident is considered in light of all the other summary 
judgment evidence, plaintiff has simply failed to present any proof indicating that Carrere was 
acting out of any bona fide homosexual interest.”).  
 332. Cf. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 3 (“‘Closetedness’ itself is a performance initiated as 
such by the speech act of a silence—not a particular silence, but a silence that accrues 
particularity by fits and starts, in relation to the discourse that surrounds and differentially 
constitutes it.”). 
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children, has denied that he is homosexual.”333 On comparison, 
Carrere’s conduct toward Kreamer looks insignificant; at most it was 
a brief flirtation with the idea of a same-sex tryst, not the sort of effort 
to initiate a relationship that might lead to a same-sex marriage. 
Thus, comparison between same-sex trysts and marriage is made 
part of the doctrine by the set of fictions narrowly construing 
evidence of same-sex desire. These fictions serve to protect straight 
marriages from the disruption that ascription of gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual identity to a spouse can effect. 
B. Defending Straight Workers from Gay “Recruitment” 
The doctrine not only protects heterosexual identities from 
internal threats, it defends them against external threats as well, in 
the form of “predatory homosexual conduct” that could convert the 
straight victim to a gay or lesbian identity.334 
In Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp.,335 the female plaintiff, Shannon 
Kampmier, alleged she had been harassed by another woman, Lena 
Badell, when the two worked together as nurses.336 The Seventh 
Circuit observed that Badell had “referred to herself as ‘queer little 
old me,’” and described sexual activities with her “girlfriend.”337 
Notable here is the court’s choice of the term “girlfriend.” The briefs 
described the woman as Badell’s “domestic partner of more than 20 
years.”338 The plaintiff made much of the fact that, notwithstanding 
this domestic partnership, Badell had previously carried on “a 
homosexual affair with a female subordinate” and “kissed and 
sexually touched said female employee while at work.”339 
 
 333. Kreamer, 2004 WL 2297459, at *7. But see Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., No. 08-228-
JJB, 2010 WL 3035758, at *2–3 (M.D. La. Aug. 3, 2010) (holding that a married man did not 
desire the male plaintiff), vacated, 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012).  
 334. See EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 519 (6th Cir. 2001). Courts and 
parties frequently refer to “homosexual advances,” rather than simply “sexual advances,” as 
though the “homosexual” nature of the advance rendered it more threatening. See, e.g., Redd v. 
N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 179 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 335. Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 336. Id. at 934. 
 337. Id.  
 338. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, Kampmier, 472 F.3d 930 (No. 061788), 2006 WL 
2024101, at *6; see also Brief for Appellant at 6, Kampmier, 472 F.3d 930 (No. 06-1788), 2006 
WL 1497454, at *6 (using the term “live-in partner”). 
 339. Brief for Appellant, supra note 338, at 7. The defendant characterized it as “a 
consensual romantic relationship.” Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 338, at 7. 
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The plaintiff alleged that Badell continuously grabbed her 
buttocks, hugged her, grabbed her around the arms, jumped in her 
lap, kissed her on the cheek, and rubbed up against her.340 Badell also 
told the plaintiff “that she could turn any woman gay ten to twelve 
times,” described sex acts she had performed with her “girlfriend,” 
and stated she could do the same with the plaintiff.341 The plaintiff’s 
initial complaint about this conduct was, “‘What’s up with our 
executive director? She is really touch-feely. She is always talking 
about being gay,’” to which her supervisor responded, “‘I know. I 
know. She’s like that with everybody.’”342 
The employer made the “equal opportunity harasser” 
argument—introducing evidence that Badell had also “grabbed two 
male employees’ buttocks” and sexually propositioned another man, 
who agreed to go out on a date with Badell, but then stood her up.343 
The court rejected the employer’s argument that Badell was an 
“equal opportunity harasser” because it concluded that the plaintiff 
endured more “severe and prevalent” harassment than the men.344 It 
reasoned that “Badell made constant references to female employees 
at the Loyalton, made comments about their ‘boobs,’ and told the 
women at the Loyalton that she could turn any woman 
gay. . . . [A]nother Emeritus employee[] also testified that she heard 
Badell claim to be able to turn any woman gay.”345 The court was 
quite concerned with Badell’s statement that she could “turn any 
woman gay,” a fact it repeats four times throughout the opinion.346 
The court’s fixation on Badell’s offer to turn any woman gay 
resonates with the old stereotype of gays and lesbians as recruiters 
and seems to imply that the threat of recruitment, in other words, the 
threat to these women’s heterosexuality, is what makes this 
 
 340. Kampmier, 472 F.3d at 934. 
 341. Id. at 941–42.  
 342. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 338, at 10. The parties disputed the point at 
which Kampmier complained about the conduct as sexual harassment. Brief for Appellant, 
supra note 338, at 8.  
 343. Kampmier, 472 F.3d at 940. Badell told the man the next day, “‘I was waiting and ready 
for you. If you did not want it and did not want to be bothered by me, then you should have said 
something.’” Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 940–41.  
 346. Id. at 934, 940–41; see also Harris v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 2011-94, 2012 WL 5289392, at 
*1, *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 23, 2012) (concluding summarily that harassment was “because of sex” in a 
case in which the male harasser told the male plaintiff that he was “homosexual” and stated that 
he could make the plaintiff “go gay”). 
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harassment “because of sex.”347 The plaintiff’s brief made this 
argument expressly: “Badell was a homosexual, and her agenda was 
to ‘recruit people,’ even though she had a live-in female partner, as is 
evidenced by her affair with her female Marketing Director at the 
Loyalton.”348 
Badell’s harassment discriminated against women because her 
desire for them was of a same-sex nature, threatening to undo their 
heterosexual identities. Badell expressed desire to date both men and 
women at work, but only threatened the sexualities of women. By 
contrast, when ostensibly straight men harass other straight men by 
threatening their sexualities, courts conclude the harassment was 
based on sexual orientation, not sex, and is therefore not actionable 
under federal law.349 In Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products,350 also a 
Seventh Circuit case, the plaintiff, who identified as heterosexual, 
alleged that his coworkers thought he was gay based on the fact that 
he was single and had a close friendship with a male coworker.351 As a 
result, they referred to him as a “‘faggot’” and threatened to “snap his 
neck.”352 The court dismissed the claim, holding that this harassment 
was because of Hamm’s perceived sexual orientation (gay), not his 
sex (male).353 
The distinction is that in Hamm, the plaintiff’s coworkers did not 
sexually desire him (they only threatened to kill him). Accordingly, 
although courts do not understand aggressive male-on-male genital 
touching as the type of “predatory homosexual conduct” that could 
ground a Title VII claim,354 they will see desire in physical contacts 
that include hand holding,355 massages,356 “fondl[ing],”357 and 
 
 347. See RUBIN, supra note 28, at 271 (discussing moral panic in the 1970s over the threat of 
gay recruitment of children). 
 348. Brief for Appellant, supra note 338, at 34 (citation omitted). It is not clear from the 
brief whether the statement “‘recruit people’” was Kampmier’s characterization of Badell’s 
behavior or a quotation attributed by Kampmier to Badell herself. Id. 
 349. See generally Kramer, supra note 39.  
 350. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 351. Id. at 1060. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 519 (6th Cir. 2001); see also supra Part 
I.B.3. 
 355. Knobbe v. Artco Casket Co., Inc., No. 4:10CV322 CDP, 2010 WL 2947731, at *1–2 
(E.D. Mo. July 22, 2010). 
 356. Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 
Thorne v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 00-0913-CV-W-6, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 
2008); Tainsky v. Clarins USA, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Mann v. Lima, 
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“caress[ing].”358 In Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc.359 the alleged male 
harasser sent the male plaintiff text messages stating “‘I want cock’” 
and “‘your missing the dipper,’” referring to his penis.360 The district 
court held that these text messages, although “regarding sexual 
matters, are not propositions.”361 The Fifth Circuit disagreed.362 It 
emphasized that the harasser “repeatedly physically touched and 
caressed Cherry’s body.”363 The harasser had placed his hand on the 
plaintiff’s buttocks, knee, and thighs, and “rubbed [plaintiff’s] 
shoulders and stroked his hair.”364 
In Cherry, a witness stated the harasser had touched Cherry 
“‘like I do my wife.’”365 This echoes another Fifth Circuit decision, in 
which the court held a jury could infer sexual intent when a male 
harasser “approached [the plaintiff] from behind while he was 
bending down and fondled his anus,” in a contact the plaintiff 
described “as similar to ‘foreplay with a woman.’”366 These courts saw 
the harasser’s conduct as sexual, and hence injurious, because the 
harasser treated the plaintiff like a woman. As Yoshino has 
explained, these types of interactions are injurious because they are 
homoerotic, as opposed to homosocial.367 Homoerotic interactions are 
ways of “unmaking men,” in which men are revealed to be 
“‘inverts’—that is, as women trapped inside men’s bodies.”368 By 
contrast, homosocial interactions are ways of “making men,” “insofar 
 
290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 192 (D.R.I. 2003). But see Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 230 F. Supp. 2d 
1261, 1274 (D. Kan. 2002) (“[C]ontinu[ing] to rub Plaintiff’s shoulders after Plaintiff asked him 
to stop . . . [was not] ‘credible evidence’ that [the alleged harasser] is homosexual or his conduct 
is motivated by sexual desire.”).  
 357. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 358. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012); Cromer-Kendall v. 
District of Columbia, 326 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 359. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 360. Id. at 185. The harasser also offered the plaintiff the opportunity to spend the night at 
his house and borrow his clothes and underwear. Id. 
 361. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., No. 08-228-JJB, 2010 WL 3035758, at *2 (M.D. La. Aug. 
3, 2010), vacated, 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 362. Cherry, 668 F.3d at 188. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Cherry, 2010 WL 3035758, at *2. 
 365. Cherry, 668 F.3d at 189. The court pointed to this statement in explaining why the 
harassment met the “severe or pervasive” requirement for a sexual harassment claim. Id. 
 366. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 367. Yoshino, supra note 7, at 448. 
 368. Id. 
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as the men who can take (and dish out) hazing, razzing, or horseplay 
are constituted as ‘real’ men.”369 
But it is more than simply that the harassers are treating men 
like women. Sexualized violence against women has often been 
understood in terms of desire. And courts apply the same horseplay 
exemption to cases involving women harassing women.370 In these 
cases, harassers are not just treating men like women, they are 
treating men tenderly and with affection, like women they might want 
to marry. This threat to heterosexuality is one that courts recognize. 
C. Punishing Self-Identification as Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual 
When the alleged harassers are “openly homosexual,” some 
courts hold there is an automatic “inference that their conduct was 
based on sexual desire, and thus, sex.”371 I have found only one case in 
which a court held there was credible evidence of homosexuality, but 
nonetheless concluded the harassment was not “because of sex.”372 
That case involved a female harasser who did not specifically target 
the plaintiff with her alleged harassment. In every other case in which 
a court found credible evidence that the harasser was gay, it 
concluded the harassment was because of sex.373 These courts did not 
require that the alleged harasser express her desire in a way that was 
 
 369. Id. 
 370. See, e.g., Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1070 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 371. Ellsworth v. Pot Luck Enters., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2009); see 
also supra note 55. 
 372. Adeshile v. Metro. Transit Auth., No. H-06-3480, 2008 WL 112103, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 9, 2008). In a similar case, the alleged harassers were two female coworkers engaged in a 
romantic relationship with each other. Baugham v. Battered Women, Inc., 211 F. App’x 432, 439 
(6th Cir. 2006). The female plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to vulgar comments and 
behavior related to this same-sex relationship. Id. Without specifically remarking on the alleged 
harassers’ sexual orientations, the court held that the female plaintiffs did not present any 
evidence to support the claim that they were subjected to harassment because of sex. Id. at 439; 
see also Espinosa v. Burger King Corp., No. 11-62503-CIV, 2012 WL 4344323, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 21, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim because she alleged that her gay coworkers harassed 
her because she was heterosexual, not because she was a woman, without reaching a conclusion 
as to whether the jury could infer the harassers were in fact gay). 
 373. I have found twenty-two cases in which plaintiffs prevailed on the question of whether 
harassment was “because of sex” with sufficient allegations or evidence of a harasser’s 
homosexuality. They are noted with an asterisk in Appendix B. In three other cases finding 
evidence of desire, the court noted that alleged harassers self-identified as nonheterosexual 
without reaching any holding on the question. Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 934 
(7th Cir. 2007); Harris v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 2011-94, 2012 WL 5289392, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 23, 
2012); Rogers v. Johnson, No. C08-4395 TEH, 2010 WL 1688564, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 
2010). 
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simple, sincere, gentle, and private.374 Because courts rely so heavily 
on self-identification, together with reputation, as the marker of 
homosexuality, the effect of this doctrine is to punish expressions of 
gay identity, imposing an implicit “don’t tell” requirement in the 
workplace. Theoretically, homosexual identification might be a shield 
against liability in cross-sex harassment cases too, but this has not 
been a significant phenomenon.375 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Dick v. Phone Directories Co.376 
illustrates how self-identification as gay can create a nearly automatic 
inference that harassment was because of sex. There, the plaintiff, 
Diane Dick, worked in a sales office consisting mostly of female 
employees. She alleged she was sexually harassed by several of her 
female coworkers.377 As the district court noted, “One central theme 
animating Ms. Dick’s memorandum is her insistence that a strong 
lesbian atmosphere prevailed in the office, and that the Vernal Office 
was known as the ‘lesbian factory.’”378 As evidence that her harassers 
were homosexual, Dick pointed out “that the office bulletin board 
was decorated in rainbow colors—which symbolizes gay pride.”379 She 
also alleged that two of her female coworkers would “lock themselves 
into various rooms at the office for extended periods of time.”380 Dick 
admitted to being “upset” that she was not informed that a coworker 
was a lesbian, because Dick’s granddaughter had often babysat for 
that coworker’s children.381 
 
 374. See, e.g., Kampmier, 472 F.3d at 940. 
 375. I have found one decision, Lewis v. North General Hospital, 502 F. Supp. 2d 390 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), in which the male plaintiff (who, incidentally, self-identified as “gay”), alleged 
that his female harasser, also “gay,” had “brushed up against him” and “rubbed her breast on 
him.” Id. at 403. The court dismissed the claim because the plaintiff failed to argue he had been 
harassed because he was a man. Id. at 404. However, another district court allowed a claim to 
proceed in which the harasser was an “openly homosexual” man and the plaintiffs were female. 
See Francois v. Washmonbo, Inc., No. 05-23368-CIV, 2007 WL 1362796, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 9, 
2007) (“[The harasser] allegedly grabbed Plaintiffs from behind on many different occasions and 
would tell them to ‘dame la lengua’ or ‘give me your tongue.’”). 
 376. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 377. Id. at 1260. 
 378. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1278 n.4 (D. Utah 2003), rev’d, 
397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 379. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1261. In noting this evidence, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s holding that the plaintiff’s assertion that the office used “‘rainbow colors . . . symbolizing 
gay pride’” on a bulletin board did not raise a “disputed factual issue” as to the “lesbian 
atmosphere” in the office. Dick, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 n.4 (alteration in original). 
 380. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1261. 
 381. Id. 
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Dick described the alleged harassment in terms of “‘a working 
environment permeated by sexually explicit banter, insults, lewd 
jokes, gestures, games, and devices.’”382 The only physical conduct 
directed at Dick, however, involved two incidents in which Camie 
Hinkle, a female coworker, attempted to pinch her breasts, but was 
rebuffed, and one incident “at a novelty shop over the lunch hour [in 
which] Ms. Hinkle shoved a sex toy in the shape of a penis toward Ms. 
Dick.”383 Dick alleged that she was referred to as “‘Ivanna Dick’” and 
“‘Granny Dick,’” and that another female coworker “often would 
point to Ms. Dick’s collection of stuffed cats on her desk and say that 
Ms. Dick had a ‘pussy.’”384 Her coworkers made crude jokes about 
oral sex, simulated sex with a stuffed bear, and played vulgar rap 
music in front of her.385 The district court noted that Dick admitted 
that this was the “office environment” and that the vulgarity also 
seemed to offend a male coworker, a returned missionary.386 The 
record also included evidence that Dick was harassed out of dislike, 
due to jealousy over her professional success, as a result of her 
comment expressing concern that the coworker who hired her 
granddaughter as a babysitter was a lesbian, and because she had a 
reputation as a “busybody.”387 
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit found enough evidence of sexual 
desire to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.388 
The court did not understand the coworkers’ insults (“‘Granny 
Dick’”) as evidence of disgust that would cancel out any desire. It did 
not conclude that the evidence suggesting the harassers disliked Dick 
proved that they did not desire her.389 It did not characterize the 
humor in the office as “horseplay.”390 And it was not concerned that 
 
 382. Id. at 1260 (quoting Dick, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1275). 
 383. Id. at 1261. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Dick, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (quotation mark omitted). 
 387. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1265–66. 
 388. Id. at 1270. 
 389. Id. at 1261, 1266. This stands in contrast with cases involving ostensibly straight 
harassers in which courts viewed disgust and dislike as inconsistent with desire. See supra Part 
I.C.1. 
 390. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 
81 (1998)). This stands in contrast with cases involving ostensibly straight harassers in which 
courts viewed humor as inconsistent with desire. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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the harassment was put on for show.391 Referring to Hinkle’s two 
rebuffed efforts at touching Dick’s breasts, the Tenth Circuit held 
that “Ms. Hinkle touched, on more than one occasion, one of the 
most intimate parts of Ms. Dick’s body—an act seldom carried out 
without some sort of sexual motivation.”392 The fact that differentiates 
Dick from the many cases in which courts have not interpreted sexual 
touching as evidence of desire is that in Dick, the alleged harassers 
had previously engaged in consensual same-sex relationships in the 
workplace.393 Contrast this with a case such as Kreamer, in which the 
court held that no inference of desire was reasonable when a married 
man grabbed the plaintiff’s crotch eight times and later stood over 
him, watching him as he slept.394 The Dick court concluded that 
evidence that two other female coworkers had locked themselves in 
various rooms suggested tolerance for “sexually motivated conduct in 
the workplace,” supporting an inference that the harassment of the 
plaintiff resulted from sexual desire.395 The court implied that the 
problem was tolerance of same-sex workplace sexuality, even of the 
consensual variety, rather than discriminatory harassment. Thus, 
expressions of lesbian identity and relationships exposed the 
employer to liability for harassment.396 
Courts will not understand male-on-male conduct as humorous 
“horseplay” when the harassers are gay, even when the plaintiff 
understood that conduct as “horseplay” rather than a manifestation 
of desire. In Johnson v. Dollar General Corp.,397 the harassing conduct 
consisted of an incident in which three alleged male harassers held 
 
 391. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1265–66. This stands in contrast with cases involving ostensibly 
straight harassers in which courts viewed exhibitionism as inconsistent with desire. See supra 
Part I.C.4. 
 392. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1266. In discussing the evidence of desire, the court also referred to 
evidence that the same harasser had “shoved a sex toy in the shape of a penis toward Ms. Dick” 
“at a novelty shop over the lunch hour.”  See id. at 1266, 1261. 
 393. See id. at 1266 (“[The harassers] engaged in same-sex sexual conduct with other people 
in the workplace.”). By contrast, other courts have viewed aggressive sexual touching as 
inconsistent with desire. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 394. Kreamer v. Henry’s Marine, No. Civ.A.03-3139, 2004 WL 2297459, at *6–7 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 7, 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 378 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 395. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1266.  
 396. See Brower, supra note 6, at 32–33 (“The specter of a hardworking Utah grandmother 
employed in a ‘lesbian factory’ is a fairly vivid image. Accordingly, the schema of lesbian 
sexuality interposed itself and led the court to find a same-sex desire-based harassment case 
where it did not exist.”).  
 397. Johnson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 2:06-CV-173, 2008 WL 2781660 (E.D. Tenn. July 14, 
2008). 
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the plaintiff down while they attempted to pull off his pants.398 Earlier, 
the harassers had admitted to the plaintiff that they were gay399 and 
had made comments to the plaintiff such as “‘if you’ve got big feet, 
you’ve got to have a bigger penis.’”400 According to a witness, 
precipitating the “pantsing” incident was a conversation about body 
piercing, in which the plaintiff said he would never allow his penis to 
be pierced unless “someone caught him and held him down.”401 
Thereafter, one of the harassers began “chasing Plaintiff around the 
store,” and eventually caught him and pulled him into an office.402 
Once there, two of the harassers held the plaintiff’s arms back while 
the third pulled his pants down but was unable to pull down his 
boxers.403 The plaintiff had testified that he had no reason to think 
that the harassers were sexually aroused during the alleged incident, 
but rather, that they ‘“just thought it was something funny to do.’”404 
Nonetheless, the court did not address the defendants’ argument that 
the case was simply “crude male horseplay” of the sort routinely 
dismissed when the alleged harassers do not self-identify as gay.405 
Thus, liability turns on status, defined as being out of the closet. 
The not-so-implicit message of these cases is that it is not acceptable 
to be out at work. The cases use the term “openly homosexual” 
almost as an epithet; indeed, the plaintiff’s brief in Kampmier went so 
far as to describe the harasser’s homosexuality as “blatant.”406 In 
penalizing nonheterosexual identities, the doctrine creates incentives 
for employees to cover or downplay nonheterosexual identities at 
work.407 Workers might be cautious to display symbols of gay pride or 
engage in consensual same-sex relationships in the view of coworkers, 
 
 398. Id. at *1. 
 399. Memorandum in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment with 
Imbedded Motion To Amend Complaint Caption at 4, Johnson, 2008 WL 2781660 (No. 2:06-
CV-173), 2008 WL 3853708 (summarizing the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that two harassers 
admitted they were gay and that the plaintiff had seen one of them kissing a man he referred to 
as his husband).  
 400. Johnson, 2008 WL 2781660, at *1. 
 401. Id. at *1 n.2. 
 402. Id. at *1 & n.2. 
 403. Id. at *1. 
 404. Reply Brief in Further Support of Defendant Dollar Gen. Corp.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 10, Johnson, 2008 WL 2781660 (No. 2:06-CV-173), 2008 WL 3853709. 
 405. Id. For a discussion of other “horseplay” cases, see supra Part I.C.2. 
 406. Brief for Appellant, supra note 338, at 34. 
 407. See Yoshino, supra note 29, at 772, 836–65 (describing the harms of “covering”).  
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lest they be hauled into court as alleged harassers, as in Dick.408 On 
the flip side, workers have added incentive to talk up their cross-sex 
marriages, which detract from the inference of desire, and to 
emphasize heterosexual longings, which suggest the harasser is not 
“openly gay.” Some courts understand heterosexual banter as 
negating the possibility of same-sex desire, for example, by dismissing 
a same-sex harassment claim in which the alleged male harasser 
“would often grace those in his company with his opinions regarding 
the sexual desirability of various women who worked” alongside 
them.409 
D. Forcing the Closet Door Open 
Shortly after Oncale was decided, Professor Janet Halley argued 
that the case had the potential to turn Title VII into a tool of 
“homosexual panic,” used by purported “victims” of benign, but 
unwanted, same-sex sexual overtures in the workplace to label gay 
men or lesbians harassers.410 Professor Marc Spindelman, defending 
Oncale, argued that Halley’s claim lacked empirical support, insofar 
as she could not point to any cases in which homophobic plaintiffs 
“were permitted to sue.”411 The issue, however, is not that plaintiffs 
are winning these cases, or even that they are getting to trial, 
considering the high rate of settlement.412 Civil litigation today is 
 
 408. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 409. King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68 F. App’x. 659, 663 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Armintrout v. 
Bloomingdale’s Pizza, Inc., No. 04 C 313, 2007 WL 837279, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2007) 
(observing, with respect to an alleged male harasser’s sexuality, “it is uncontroverted that Luis 
would pinch and grab female employees on the buttocks, that other employees did not perceive 
Luis as a homosexual, and that Luis openly talked with other employees ‘about girls’ and asked 
one of the female waitresses out on a date”); English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 
2d 833, 845 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2002) (concluding the alleged male harasser’s “frequent comments 
about his girlfriends and [the male plaintiff’s] relations with his wife further undercut any 
reasonable inference that [the harasser] sought to initiate an affair with [the plaintiff]”). 
 410. Halley, supra note 7, at 195. 
 411. See Spindelman, supra note 7, at 204 (“It would, of course, be worrisome if 
homophobic plaintiffs, wrongly claiming sexual harassment that never occurred, were permitted 
to sue. [Halley] predicts just such an ‘alarming class of cases’ will arise under Oncale, but cites 
not one example.” (quoting Halley, supra note 7, at 192)). 
 412. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 123–24 (2009) 
(discussing the “dominance of settlement” in all types of cases, including employment 
discrimination); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical 
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 
693–95 (discussing the high rates of dismissal due to settlement in employment discrimination 
cases). 
CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  6:29 PM 
590 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:525 
dominated by discovery, which occurs prior to summary judgment. 
The problem is that plaintiffs, some with questionable motives, are 
now able to subject alleged harassers to inquisition about their sexual 
histories and desires through discovery. Moreover, because 
employers, not individuals, are the defendants in Title VII cases, 
accused harassers now find themselves asked by their employers to 
testify to their heterosexuality. Discovery gives plaintiffs tools to 
harass coworkers with the threat of outing. In addition to discovery 
abuses, in constructing their summary judgment arguments to courts, 
some plaintiffs’ lawyers expressly draw on antigay biases and 
stereotypes.413 
Many same-sex harassment cases seem to have been filed due to 
the plaintiffs’ discomfort with homosexuality, if not outright 
homophobia. In some cases, courts quote statements from plaintiffs 
suggesting the plaintiff brought the case because he or she was 
“uncomfortable” with the alleged harasser’s homosexuality, rather 
than because he or she thought sex discrimination was afoot.414 In one 
case, the plaintiff had referred to her alleged harasser as a “‘fat 
lesbian.’”415 In another, the harassment complained of was that a 
customer’s employee had made “‘unmanly gestures’” by wiggling his 
fingers and had given the plaintiff a “‘gay look’” with “‘googling 
eyes.’”416 In response, the plaintiff “asked a non-receptive, married, 
female employee for a dinner date” just to demonstrate he was “not 
‘gay.’”417 
 
 413. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 37 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 699, 705 n.26 (1996) (“At least one practitioner has admitted to me that she exploits anti-
gay prejudice in her efforts to induce the court to recognize same-sex harassment in the context 
of unwelcome sexual advances.”). For examples of antigay rhetoric from the plaintiffs’ briefs in 
Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp. and Dick v. Phone Directories Co., see supra notes 338–39, 348, 
378, and 406.  
 414. See Sillars v. Nevada, No. 3:07-CV-00041-LRH-RAM, 2008 WL 4540457, at *2 (D. Nev. 
Oct. 6, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff informed her supervisor that it “‘just really made [her] 
uncomfortable, to have a female that [she] considered a friend have romantic feelings toward 
[her]. [She] didn’t know what to do about it. [She] was looking for guidance’” (alterations in 
original)), aff’d, 385 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Potter, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 
2004) (“Plaintiff testified that he is a Christian man and therefore, in his view homosexuality is a 
sin, and it makes him ‘[r]eal uncomfortable.’” (alteration in original)). 
 415. Reissner v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., No. 02-CV-6353-CJS, 2004 WL 941645, at *3 
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2004). 
 416. Higgins v. Vitran Express, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-228, 2011 WL 3652253, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio 
June 6, 2011). 
 417. Id. at *1. 
CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  6:29 PM 
2013] INFERRING DESIRE 591 
In other cases, the alleged “harassment” is so insignificant as to 
suggest that the plaintiff was motivated by homophobic panic.418 For 
example, in Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P.,419 the plaintiff’s “primary 
complaint” of harassment was that his male colleague repeatedly gave 
him shoulder massages, lasting from one to five seconds, while he was 
working at his computer in his cubicle.420 Shoulder massages may be 
unwelcome, but they certainly do not rise to the level of severe or 
pervasive harassment.421 The plaintiff thought the massage constituted 
sexual harassment because it was not “normal for a guy to massage 
another guy’s back.”422 The plaintiff’s problem was his fear that the 
harasser was gay (not “normal”). He pointed to the fact that his 
harasser had friends with “‘alternative lifestyles.’”423 In another case, 
the Eleventh Circuit observed that a male plaintiff “found certain 
behavior sexual that no reasonable person would, perhaps because it 
was coming from a gay man.”424 These cases are consistent with 
research that suggests same-sex sexual overtures toward men are 
more likely to be perceived as harassment than opposite-sex 
overtures toward men.425 
Before these cases are weeded out at summary judgment, 
homophobic accusations become occasions for employers and their 
 
 418. See, e.g., Thomas v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., Inc., No. CIV-07-1378-D, 2010 WL 565272, at 
*5 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 11, 2010) (asking the plaintiff about her marital status and inviting her out 
for a drink); Berkeley v. Potter, No. CIV A 06-4490(NLH), 2008 WL 746602, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 
18, 2008) (invading the plaintiff’s “personal space,” brushing against his chest, and giving the 
plaintiff a “‘strange and unusual, queer gaze,’” all on a single occasion); Landrau Romero v. 
Caribbean Rests., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D.P.R. 1998) (winking and smiling on several 
occasions). 
 419. Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Kan. 2002).  
 420. Id. at 1266.  
 421. Sometimes even heads of state give unwelcome shoulder massages. See Warren St. 
John, The Politics of Good Touch, Bad Touch, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at H1 (discussing a 
“diplomatic goof” in which President George W. Bush gave German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
a shoulder massage at the 2006 G8 summit). 
 422. Budenz, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (quotation mark omitted). 
 423. Id.  
 424. Corbitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 589 F.3d 1136, 1154 n.11 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated 
and reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 611 F.3d 1379 (11th 
Cir. 2010). In that case, the issue was not whether the harassment was “because of sex,” but 
whether it met the “severe or pervasive” requirement. The court rejected the suggestion that 
“the fact that the touchings were same-sex somehow makes them more severe.” Id. at 1155. 
However, the opinion was vacated by an order granting rehearing en banc, and the parties 
agreed to dismiss the case before it could be reheard. 
 425. See generally Margaret S. Stockdale, Perceptions of the Sexual Harassment of Men, 5 
PSYCH. MEN & MASCULINITY 158, 165 (2004). 
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lawyers to investigate the sexuality of alleged harassers. For example, 
as a result of the shoulder massages in Budenz, the alleged harasser 
found himself having to “den[y] that he is [a] homosexual or that he 
has ever desired a homosexual experience.”426 Employers, not 
individuals, are liable under Title VII.427 Employers may not have any 
reason to protect the interests of accused harassers in discovery. It is 
common practice for employers to seek declarations of 
heterosexuality from accused harassers, whether in the form of 
written affidavits or deposition testimony.428 An employer may even 
ask an alleged harasser to testify about her sexual orientation at 
trial.429 
Citing Oncale, courts hold such discovery is plainly relevant.430 It 
is true that courts are increasingly requiring a plaintiff to show only 
that her harasser sexually desired her, rather than “credible evidence 
of homosexuality.”431 One reason for this trend is that courts are 
concerned that “credible evidence of homosexuality” will be too hard 
for the plaintiff to come by.432 But the trend toward requiring only 
 
 426. Budenz, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1266. 
 427. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2006). 
 428. See, e.g., Noto v. Regions Bank, 84 F. App’x. 399, 402 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003); Hinton v. 
Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. 3:11-0158, 2012 WL 3626773, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 21, 
2012); Davidson-Nadwodny v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. CCB-07-2595, 2010 WL 1328572, at 
*4 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2010); Ogilvie v. N. Valley EMS, Inc., No. 07-485, 2008 WL 4761717, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2008); Reissner v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., No. 02-CV-6353-CJS, 2004 WL 
941645, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2004); Nguyen v. Buchart-Horn, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1998, 2003 
WL 21674461, at *1 (E.D. La. July 15, 2003); Smith v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 
1117 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Pedroza v. Cintas Corp., No. 6-01-3247-CV-S-RED, 2003 WL 828237, at 
*9 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2003), aff’d, 397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005); Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, 
L.P., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (D. Kan. 2002); Pavao v. Ocean Ships, Inc., No. C-97-4059-
VRW, 1998 WL 917528, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 1998). In one case, an employer collected 
affidavits from twelve of an alleged harasser’s coworkers stating that none had any reason to 
believe the alleged harasser was homosexual. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 
2d 833, 846 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 429. See Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 923 F. Supp. 2d 393, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (ruling on a 
motion in limine). 
 430. Smith v. Café Asia, 256 F.R.D. 247, 252 (D.D.C. 2009); Sorrell v. District of Columbia, 
252 F.R.D. 37, 41 (D.D.C. 2008); see Herron v. Chisolm, No. CV412-041, 2012 WL 4753394, at 
*2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2012) (dictum) (“The discoverability [o]f sexual orientation has long been 
relevant in Title VII cases. Such information can be used to prove, for example, the invidious 
discriminatory intent of same-sex defendants in sexual-harassment based, Title VII cases.”). 
 431. For opinions demonstrative of this trend, see supra note 54. 
 432. See Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e find it 
would often be extremely difficult to obtain evidence tending to show a person’s sexual 
orientation.”); Thorne v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 00-0913-CV-W-6, slip op. at 10 (W.D. 
Mo. Dec. 23, 2008) (“[E]vidence that a sexual harasser is gay may be hard to come by. 
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evidence of desire has not made the issue of sexual orientation 
irrelevant; indeed, as discussed, assumptions about sexual orientation 
determine the result in cases in which courts must decide whether the 
harasser desired the plaintiff.433 
In cases in which the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) is the plaintiff, it may be the government, 
rather than the employer, asking for discovery on an employee’s 
sexual orientation. In EEOC v. Glenview Car Wash,434 the EEOC 
issued an interrogatory asking an employer to identify the alleged 
harasser’s “‘sexual orientation.’”435 The court had rejected the parties’ 
attempts to enter a protective order limiting public access to the court 
files in that case.436 The EEOC argued that Oncale requires inquiry 
into the “harasser’s gender preference,” because “[i]t would seem an 
odd situation where the fact to be proven is that the harasser is 
homosexual, but it may not be proven by an admission from the 
harasser.”437 The EEOC clarified that it did “not believe that the 
sexual orientation of harassers ought to be a matter of concern in 
Title VII sexual harassment litigation,” but stated it was “concerned, 
however, that if it [did] not inquire as to the sexual orientation of the 
harasser it [would] be foregoing the most efficient and effective 
method of providing ‘credible evidence’ that the harasser is a 
homosexual to the fact finder.”438 The court deferred decision on this 
motion several times until the case was settled.439 
In one particularly egregious case, Vaughn v. St. Tammany 
Parish School Board,440 the plaintiff accused his former supervisor, a 
 
Unfortunately, many homosexuals take great care to hide their sexual orientation from those 
with whom they work for fear that disclosure may lead to humiliation or even physical harm.”). 
 433. See supra Parts I.C & II.C. 
 434. EEOC v. Glenview Car Wash, Inc., No. 05 C 5568 (N.D. Ill. consent decree entered 
July 5, 2006).  
 435. Defendant’s Sur-Reply to EEOC’s Motion To Compel at 1–3, Glenview Car Wash, Inc. 
(No. 05 C 5568) (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2006), 2006 WL 1773265.  
 436. Id. at 3.  
 437. EEOC’s Brief on Discovery Disputes at 3, Glenview Car Wash, Inc. (No. 05 C 5568) 
(N.D. Ill. May 2, 2006), 2006 WL 1773264.  
 438. Id. at 6. 
 439. See Consent Decree, Glenview Car Wash, Inc. (No. 05 C 5568) (July 5, 2006); see also 
Docket Nos. 44, 64, 66, 68, Glenview Car Wash, Inc., No. 05 C 5568 (N.D. Ill.) (deferring 
decision on the motion).  
 440. Vaughn v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., No. 04-1633, 2006 WL 950109 (E.D. La. July 
5, 2006). 
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male, of sexual harassment. Citing Oncale, the plaintiff submitted the 
following two requests for admission to his alleged harasser: 
No. 2: Admit or Deny that you ever desired to have sex or sexual 
relations with Plaintiff. 
No. 3: Admit or Deny that you have had sex or sexual relations with 
another man at any time during the period of your employment by 
the St. Tammany Parish School Board.441 
The plaintiff went so far as to oppose the defendant’s request that any 
response be submitted under seal, a fact that made clear to the court 
that the requests were “intended to humiliate, oppress and harass the 
defendant.”442 Although the court did not allow the discovery requests 
to proceed, the questions themselves stand as accusations. 
Thus, civil discovery has become a tool for plaintiffs to accuse 
alleged harassers of homosexuality in contexts, such as education, in 
which the stigma of that label might carry extreme professional 
consequences. Even if a plaintiff does not intend to intimidate her 
alleged harasser, she has every incentive to seek discovery on her 
harasser’s sexual orientation to bolster her case. Thus, those accused 
of same-sex harassment are subjected to questioning about their 
sexual histories and desires, by strange lawyers, in the formal, stifling, 
and intimidating context of a deposition. They are asked to sign 
sworn statements, most likely drafted by their employers’ lawyers, 
attesting to their heterosexual identities, desires, and relationships. 
It might be objected that sexual harassment law has privacy 
implications in cross-sex cases as well, for example, by allowing 
female plaintiffs to publicly impugn the professionalism and marital 
fidelity of alleged male harassers with frivolous charges. Although 
this may be true, the privacy implications noted here are of a different 
nature because these cases not only accuse harassers of a lack of 
professionalism or possible infidelity, but also of possessing a 
stigmatized gay identity. The law reaffirms that stigma by placing a 
harasser’s sexual orientation at the fulcrum of a same-sex harassment 
claim and immunizing harassment by ostensible heterosexuals, while 
punishing the same conduct if perpetrated by “open” homosexuals. 
The harm is not merely that the law requires exposure of matters 
considered by most people to be deeply personal and private. In this 
 
 441. Id. at *1 (denying a motion to compel due to constitutional concerns regarding the 
second request and overbreadth concerns regarding the third request). 
 442. Id. at *2. 
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context, the doctrine and discovery procedures act to reinforce the 
normative value and privilege of heterosexual identification, while 
underscoring the danger and stigma for anyone who might 
acknowledge experiencing same-sex desire. 
III.  DISTRACTING FROM DISCRIMINATION 
In effect, in same-sex harassment cases, liability turns on whether 
a harasser identifies as gay. This doctrine protects the stability of 
heterosexual marital unions while punishing expressions of 
nonheterosexual identity or desires that may threaten a plaintiff’s 
heterosexuality. This is not simply because the doctrine requires 
“credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.”443 It results 
even in cases in which courts refuse to determine the harasser’s 
sexual-orientation status, and ask instead whether the harasser 
desired the plaintiff.444 These disparate results are part and parcel of 
the doctrine’s focus on desire. This should be troubling for anyone 
concerned about gay rights or queer theories. But what about those 
whose concern is sex discrimination? Some may argue that the 
presumption that desire fulfills the “because of sex” requirement for a 
sexual harassment claim is necessary to accomplish the aims of sex 
discrimination law. Analyzing this argument requires a closer look at 
the harms that sexual harassment law is intended to address. This Part 
examines theories of the harm of sexual harassment, and argues 
courts and lawyers should abandon the presumption that desire is a 
proxy for sex discrimination.445 
 
 443. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 444. See, e.g., Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005). For discussion 
of Dick, see supra Part II.C. 
 445. Many people consider the harm of sexual harassment to be something other than 
discrimination against men or women. Because sexual harassment law is generally grounded in 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination, I do not discuss these theories at length. I am 
skeptical of these views and the legal rules they would require for reasons beyond the scope of 
this Article. But due to the fact that these alternative accounts of the harm of harassment may 
ground state laws and employer policies and may lurk behind the outcomes in federal cases, it is 
worth sketching out my bases for skepticism here.   
  Some consider sexual harassment harmful based on generalized disapproval of sexual 
desire, particularly when expressed outside of traditional marriage and the home. See Rubin, 
supra note 28, at 278. I am skeptical of these theories because, as Professor Martha Nussbaum 
has described, projective disgust at sexual desire has operated in the service of group 
subordination in many eras and contexts. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: 
DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW 107–14 (2006).  
  Others consider the harm of sexual harassment to be the threat that sexuality in the 
workplace poses to productivity. Professor Vicki Schultz has demonstrated how corporate 
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This Part will not offer a singular normative theory of the harm 
of harassment.446 It is beyond the scope of this Article to defend a 
position on what theory or combination of theories, and what 
corresponding set of legal rules and presumptions, would best 
accomplish the statutory purpose. Rather, I argue that under any 
defensible theory, the focus on sexual orientation and desire distracts 
from sex discrimination, and precludes alternative legal presumptions 
that might expose whether harassment is sex discrimination. This 
results from what anthropologist Gayle Rubin has described as the 
“fallacy of misplaced scale” in which “[s]exual acts are burdened with 
an excess of significance.”447 When desire is treated as a proxy for 
discrimination, same-sex desire and its threat to the plaintiff’s 
heterosexuality become seen as the principal harms, thereby 
displacing discrimination. This Article’s claim is that sexual 
orientation and desire are not adequate proxies for discrimination in 
sexual harassment law. Although this Article criticizes cases for how 
they analyze evidence of sexual desire, it does not take a position on 
how any particular sexual harassment case should be resolved, 
because that question ultimately depends on one’s normative theory 
of harassment. 
For purposes of this discussion, I group views on why sexual 
harassment is sex discrimination into three perspectives: (1) sexual 
domination, (2) gender disadvantage, and (3) sex differentiation. This 
taxonomy of theories is a stylized one, intended for purposes of 
analysis of whether the presumption that desire is discriminatory is 
necessary to target the harm of sexual harassment. It is not intended 
for all purposes. It glosses over overlaps among, internal divisions 
within, and complications related to these three theories that may be 
 
managers have enlisted this view of harassment in deeply troubling ways: to fashion the 
workplace into a sterile site of production rather than a potential site of citizenship and 
community, to enforce sexual conformity, and to undercut gender equality. See Vicki Schultz, 
The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2067–72 (2003).  
  Some regard the fundamental harm of sexual harassment not to be discrimination 
against men or women, but rather, disrespect of any worker. See Anita Bernstein, Treating 
Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 452 (1997) (“Hostile environment 
sexual harassment . . . is a type of incivility . . . or disrespect.”). My view is that, in the U.S. 
context, a legal rule based on this perspective is likely to occlude sex discrimination and strain 
the political will for any antiharassment projects. See Clarke, supra note 28, at 1252–65. 
 446. Cf. Kathryn Abrams, Postscript, Spring 1998: A Response to Professors Bernstein and 
Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1258, 1267 (1998) (arguing for “a theory that directs 
attention specifically to the multiplicity and variability of the dynamics that characterize sexual 
harassment”). 
 447. Rubin, supra note 28, at 278–79. 
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important in other contexts. Additionally, legal rules and 
presumptions that flow from one theory may be consistent with or 
find support in the other theories. 
The following sections will describe each theory of the harm of 
harassment and will argue that the preoccupation with desire is a 
distraction from that harm in each case. Each section will then turn to 
what sexual harassment doctrine would look like, from each 
normative perspective, if courts were to stop searching for sexual 
orientation and sexual desire, and instead adopt other presumptions 
related to what types of harassment are discriminatory. Figure 2 lays 
out the various theoretical perspectives on why sexual harassment is 
discrimination because of sex, the paradigmatic story of sexual 
harassment in each case, and a nonexhaustive list of ways in which 
plaintiffs might establish causation without recourse to evidence 
regarding a harasser’s desires or orientation. 
 
Figure 2. Proving Causation in Sexual Harassment Cases Without 
Desire or Sexual Orientation 
Theory of Sexual  
Harassment 
Paradigm Case 
Evidentiary Routes for 
Proving Causation 
Sexual Domination 
Sexual abuse in the 
workplace (Meritor v. 
Vinson) 
1. Unwanted sexual 
touching 
2. Quid pro quo sexual 
extortion 
3. Threats of sexual 
violence 
Gender Disadvantage 
Exclusion based on 
gendered stereotypes and 
structures (Harris v. Forklift 
Systems) 
1. Admissions of sex 
stereotyping 
2. Sex segregation or 
stratification 
3. Harassment patently 
degrading to women or 
men 
Sex Differentiation 
Differential treatment of 
men and women (Oncale v. 
Sundowner) 
1. Comparator evidence 
2. Counterfactual 
admissions (for 
example, that plaintiff 
would not have been 
hazed had he been a 
woman)  
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A. Sexual Domination 
The sexual-domination theory regards sexual harassment as 
discriminatory because it is a mode of male domination, like other 
forms of sexual abuse.448 The key here is that sexuality, in the sense of 
the erotic, is the mode of domination. The paradigm case for this 
theory is the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor v. Vinson,449 in 
which the female plaintiff was coerced into having sex with her male 
supervisor forty or fifty times and “even forcibly raped.”450 The sexual 
domination theory might best be exemplified by the work of 
Professor Catherine MacKinnon.451 MacKinnon argued that gender 
roles are not natural but rather part of a socially constructed 
hierarchy of men over women “in which women are defined as 
gender female by sexual accessibility to men.”452 Sexual harassment is 
the convergence of “men’s control over women’s sexuality and 
capital’s control over employees’ work lives.”453 Hence, “[s]exual 
harassment is discrimination ‘based on sex’ within the social meaning 
of sex, as the concept is socially incarnated in sex roles.”454 Although 
there are many grounds for criticism of this argument, its influence 
cannot be denied.455 
The sexual-domination perspective does not support the 
inference of discrimination from desire. The problem, from the 
sexual-domination perspective, is domination, not desire per se. Thus, 
courts err by dismissing cases in which desire seems to be lacking but 
sexual domination is present. MacKinnon filed a brief in Oncale 
arguing not for any desire-based rule, but rather, to establish the rule 
that “if acts are sexual and hurt one sex, they are sex-based, 
regardless of the gender and sexual orientation of the parties.”456  
 
 448. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A 
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 156–58, 174 (1979). 
 449. Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 450. Id. at 60. 
 451. See generally, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the 
State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).  
 452. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 107 (1987). 
 453. MACKINNON, supra note 448, at 174. 
 454. Id. at 178. 
 455. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the 
California Law Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 404 (2012). 
 456. Brief for Nat’l Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 4, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 
96-568), 1997 WL 471814. The brief expressly argued that “[s]exual orientation on its face 
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This raises a number of questions, including, what if acts are 
sexual and they hurt both sexes? Or, to rephrase, what does 
MacKinnon’s theory have to say about the bisexual and equal-
opportunity harassers? The response is that these “loopholes” are 
generated by a sort of legal formalism that fails to comprehend how 
unwanted sexual aggression is a form of masculine dominance. 
Harassment is about power, not desire. The law “typically conceives 
that something happens because of sex when it happens to one sex 
but not the other.”457 This leads to “head counting” in which courts 
ask whether a particular harasser victimized only members of one sex, 
and it is what gives rise to the theoretical possibility of the “bisexual 
defense.”458 But as courts have recognized in other contexts, “both 
sexes can be discriminated against based on sex at the same time from 
a single practice.”459 Imagine, for example, a racist supervisor who 
harasses both black and white employees using the same racial 
epithet.460 Should only the black employees have a claim? MacKinnon 
concluded that although “head counting can provide a quick 
topography of the terrain, it has proved too blunt to distinguish 
treatment whose meaning is based on gender from treatment that has 
other social hermeneutics, especially when only two individuals are 
involved.”461 
Gender here is about masculinity and femininity, not men and 
women. Women can wield masculine power just as men can be 
feminized. Thus, in her Oncale brief, MacKinnon also made an 
argument about the gendered power dynamics at play: that “[m]ale 
rape—whether the victim is male or female—is an act of male 
 
disposes of nothing” while acknowledging that the sexual orientations of the perpetrator and 
victim “both can be relevant (if sometimes only minimally).” Id. at 24. For another 
interpretation of MacKinnon’s argument, see JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND 
WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 293–94 (2006).  
 457. MACKINNON, supra note 452, at 107. 
 458. Id. at 107–08. 
 459. Brief for Nat’l Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., supra note 456, at 22 n.6. 
The Supreme Court struck down, on equal protection grounds, a law that required a widower 
seeking to collect benefits from his wife’s work-related death to prove he was dependent on his 
deceased wife, but presumed that widows were dependent on their deceased husbands. Id. 
(citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980)). Such a law discriminates 
against both widowers who may be denied benefits and working women who cannot be sure 
their husbands will be able to collect benefits upon their deaths. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 146.  
 460. See Jennifer A. Drobac, The Oncale Opinion: A Pansexual Response, 30 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 1269, 1279 (1999) (“Arguably, a perpetrator who calls all workers, regardless of race, 
‘niggers’ discriminates, and is liable to any person so called.”). 
 461. MACKINNON, supra note 448, at 108. 
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dominance, marking such acts as obviously gender-based and making 
access to sex equality rights for Joseph Oncale indisputable.”462 Male 
here means masculine, not by men. This is the crux of the argument—
that sexual harassment is male dominance, not necessarily dominance 
by men. The key is the act, not the actor. The argument parallels that 
made by feminists in the 1970s about rape: that it should not be 
understood as a psychological phenomenon, that is, a deviant desire 
for sexual gratification, but rather, as a social phenomenon, that is, a 
way for the rapist to express masculine dominance and aggression.463 
Whatever the motive, the effect of rape is to maintain male 
supremacy, just as lynching maintained white supremacy.464 Sexual 
harassment is not stripped of its meaning as an act of male supremacy 
when the harassers are of the same sex, just as lynching would not 
escape its historical connotation as a technology of racial supremacy if 
it were done by and to people of the same race. Rather than 
examining the harasser’s motivations, from this perspective, courts 
ought to be focusing on the harm to the victim. 
This theory raises other questions: What does it mean for an act 
to be “sexual”? Do the “simulated” sexual acts referred to so often in 
the case law qualify?465 What about humor and “horseplay”? Asking a 
coworker out on a date? More importantly, is sexuality always 
domination? Should the law treat all sexual expression in the 
workplace as harassment, even if welcomed?466 Professor Katherine 
Franke has referred to the sexual domination theory as “anti-sex.”467 
She argues that it “conflates sex and sexism.”468 The antisex position 
resonates with cultural conservatives and those who view all sex in 
the workplace as a threat to efficiency.469 However, very few legal 
theorists argue that all sexual expression or conduct in the workplace 
is because of sex.470 Indeed, adherents of the sexual domination theory 
 
 462. Brief for Nat’l Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., supra note 456, at 4.  
 463. E.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15, 105 
(1975). 
 464. Id. at 254–55. 
 465. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text. 
 466. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 860 (1991) (arguing for a rule 
prohibiting even consensual relationships).  
 467. Franke, supra note 22, at 704. 
 468. Id. at 705; see also ZYLAN, supra note 7, at 176–79. 
 469. See Schultz, supra note 445, at 2063–64. 
 470. But see Estrich, supra note 466, at 820 (arguing that the problem with sexual 
harassment is that it is “sexual,” and so “[n]ot only are men exercising power over women, but 
they are operating in a realm which is still judged according to a gender double standard, itself a 
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of harassment argue that their brand of feminism is not a blanket 
condemnation of workplace sexuality.471 Their arguments respond to 
the charge that radical feminism is antisex or eliminates the possibility 
of women’s sexual agency, attributing a false consciousness to any 
woman who chooses sex.472 The appropriate question, then, is how to 
judge whether sexual expression in the workplace is unwelcome.473 
From this perspective, the judicial focus on desire has obscured 
how sexual harassment is a mode of male domination in same-sex 
cases. For example, in Smith v. Hy-Vee, the court was so preoccupied 
with the search for desire and its defense of the alleged harasser’s 
heterosexual status that it failed to consider the social meaning of her 
simulated rape of the plaintiff—an imitation of the paradigmatic act 
of male dominance.474 That the act was done by a woman to a woman, 
or that she had done the same thing to a man, does not change the 
social meaning of rape as male dominance. From the sexual-
domination perspective, the fixation with desire has led courts to 
dismiss cases in which a harasser was motivated by disgust or 
aggression, allowing sexual abuse in the workplace to proceed 
unchecked. 
What would sexual harassment doctrine look like, from this 
perspective, if the desire-based presumption were abandoned? Some 
might argue that the best solution would be to move to a “sex per se” 
rule that counts any unwanted sexual conduct or expression as 
“because of sex.”475 “Sex” here means erotic. Ten states have enacted 
 
reflection of the extent to which sexuality is used to penalize women”); David S. Schwartz, 
When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1697, 1728 (2002) (arguing for a revival of the “sex per se” rule, primarily for practical, 
rule-of-law reasons). Although MacKinnon has criticized hierarchical forms of sexual 
expression in the pornography context, she has not argued that sexual harassment law should 
prohibit all hierarchical sexual expression at work. See Robin West, Law’s Nobility, 17 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 437–38 & n.173 (2005) (“MacKinnon has never argued (that I can find, 
and I have looked) that sexual harassment law should target hierarchic sex.”). 
 471. Spindelman, supra note 7, at 212.  
 472. This charge resonates with the claim that MacKinnon has said all sex is rape. See 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography Left and Right, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143, 143 
(1995) (book review) (denying the claim). 
 473. See Louise F. Fitzgerald, Who Says? Legal and Psychological Constructions of Women’s 
Resistance to Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 7, 
at 94, 94; West, supra note 470, at 388–89. 
 474. See supra notes 274–90 and accompanying text. 
 475. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 470, at 1702; see also Meredith Render, Misogyny, 
Androgyny, and Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimination in a Gender-Deconstructed World, 29 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 148 (2006). 
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statutes defining sexual harassment to include conduct of a “sexual 
nature.”476 
Although a sex per se rule would be less problematic than rules 
that turn on desire or orientation explicitly, it is not without 
disadvantages. A sex per se rule still requires courts to determine 
whether conduct is erotic or merely social, a question they are likely 
to answer by reference to normative notions of sexual orientation and 
desire, with the same disparate results they are reaching now.477 Even 
in states that define sexual harassment to mean conduct of a “sexual 
nature,” some courts have muddled the inquiry with the question of 
whether the harassment is motivated by desire.478  
Another problem with these state laws is that nonsexual 
(meaning not erotic) harassment directed at one sex may not be 
cognizable as sex discrimination. For example, imagine a woman is 
constantly undermined and excluded from important meetings, 
trainings, and mentoring opportunities because she is a woman. 
Courts may not see nonsexual bullying of women thought to have 
“taken men’s jobs” as discrimination.479 Even if state courts are willing 
to consider nonsexual forms of harassment, they may regard them as 
not severe or pervasive, as compared to sexual conduct.480 From the 
 
 476. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46A-60(8) (West 2009); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/2-101(E) (West 2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 151B, § 1(18) (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 37.2103(i) (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(43) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-02(6) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7(V) (LexisNexis 
2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-51-1(B) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495D(13) (2009); WISC. 
STAT. ANN. § 111.32(13) (West 2002); see also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 155B (2009); V.I. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, § 64a(b)(4) (Supp. 2013). Some of these statutes may be interpreted to also require 
a plaintiff to show the harassment was “because of sex” as per Oncale. See Robinson v. Ford 
Motor Co., 744 N.W.2d 363, 367–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (“[P]laintiff must nonetheless show 
that he was subjected to a sexually hostile workplace ‘because of sex.’”). But see Cummings v. 
Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Minn. 1997) (“[I]t is not necessary for a sexual harassment 
plaintiff to prove that the harassment occurred ‘because of sex,’ in addition to proving the 
elements of sexual harassment . . . .”). 
 477. Cf. Schultz, supra note 22, at 1744–47 (describing courts’ difficulty in determining 
whether particular actions or words constituted conduct of a sexual nature). 
 478. See Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, 679 F.3d 464, 472 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing Barbour v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 497 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam)).  
 479. See Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Mich. 2003) (holding that, under Michigan 
law, “gender-based harassment” is not “sexual harassment” unless it took the form of 
“‘unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct 
or communication of a sexual nature’” (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2103(i)). But see 
LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W. 2d 14, 19–21 (Minn. 2012) (rejecting the 
argument that Minnesota’s statute limits sexual harassment claims to those alleging “conduct or 
communication of a sexual nature”). 
 480. See LaMont, 814 N.W. 2d at 22.  
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sexual-domination perspective, this is deeply troubling, as it 
contributes to women’s subordination to men.481 
Apart from these concerns, the primary problem with a broad 
sex per se rule that would cover verbal and physical harassment is 
that the Supreme Court has rejected it. As Justice Scalia wrote in 
Oncale, “We have never held that workplace harassment, even 
harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination 
because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or 
connotations.”482 
The Supreme Court has not, however, ruled out a presumption 
that physical conduct of a sexual nature is “because of sex.” The 
Department of Education has interpreted Title IX, an analogue to 
Title VII in the education context, to forbid “acts of sexual violence” 
as “a form of sex discrimination” by definition.483 In the Title VII 
context, some courts already recognize unwelcome sexual touching as 
per se discrimination, regardless of whether it is part of a sexual 
advance.484 Courts might also recognize sexual extortion in the form of 
quid pro quo harassment as per se discrimination, regardless of the 
desires or ostensible orientations of harassers.485 Threats of sexual 
assault might qualify as well. Courts might reason that these are 
paradigmatic forms of masculine domination—even when wielded by 
women, or against men. There may be room for interpretation when 
it comes to the meaning of “sexual touching,” but doctrines that 
specify what types of touching are sexual (for example, intentional 
 
 481. This is even more troubling from the gender-disadvantage perspective. See Schultz, 
supra note 22, at 1687. Another problem is that a sex per se rule would create additional 
incentives for employers to ban welcome and consensual relationships on the job, creating a 
desexualized, sanitized, and ultimately dehumanized workplace in the service of an alienating 
form of managerial efficiency. Schultz, supra note 445, at 2087. Most sexual-domination 
theorists do not go so far as to take issue with welcome and consensual sex. See supra note 473. 
 482. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 483. Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for 
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1 (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (defining “sexual violence” as “physical sexual acts 
perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving consent”). Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (1972) 
(current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012)), provides that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.” 
 484. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 485. See, e.g., Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 483, at 1–2 (defining 
discrimination “on the basis of sex” under Title IX to include “rape, sexual assault, sexual 
battery, and sexual coercion”). 
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touching of genitals or breasts) are preferable to those in which the 
sexual nature of a touch is determined by the harasser’s orientation.486 
There is also room for homophobic interpretation when it comes to 
whether a harasser is engaged in quid pro quo harassment: explicitly 
or implicitly conditioning a professional opportunity on sex. But 
making the harasser’s purported sexual orientation irrelevant to this 
inquiry would be an improvement over the status quo. 
B. Gender Disadvantage 
The gender-disadvantage school regards sexual harassment as 
discriminatory because it is a tool for enforcing sexist stereotypes and 
prejudices against men and women, just as gender stereotypes and 
prejudices have historically been used to exclude women from highly 
valued forms of work.487 The key here is that gender, in the sense of a 
set of expectations regarding masculinity and femininity, is the mode 
of subordination.488 The paradigm case for this school is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,489 in which the 
female plaintiff was subjected not only to sexual innuendo but also to 
harassing comments designed to undermine her competence as the 
office’s only female manager. For example, she was asked, “‘You’re a 
woman, what do you know’”; she was told that “‘[w]e need a man as 
the rental manager’”; and she was called “‘a dumb ass woman.’”490 
The analogy here is to harassment based on race.491 
From the gender-disadvantage perspective, the judicial focus on 
sexuality and desire misses the point entirely, as the problem is not 
sexuality or desire per se, but harassment designed to preserve 
 
 486. This is not to say all sexual touching is unlawful discrimination. A plaintiff must also 
demonstrate that the conduct was unwelcome. See Caravantes v. 53rd St. Partners, LLC, No. 09 
Cv. 7821(RPP), 2012 WL 3631276, at *4, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) (distinguishing unwanted 
anal and oral intercourse from a “game” involving touching of genitals “over the clothes” in 
which participants adhered to certain “parameters”). 
 487. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 22, at 771 (describing sexual harassment “as regulatory 
practice,” that “inscribes, enforces, and polices a particular view of who women and men should 
be”); Schultz, supra note 22, at 1755 (describing a “‘competence-centered’ paradigm” that 
“understands harassment as a means to reclaim favored lines of work and work competence as 
masculine-identified turf—in the face of a threat posed by the presence of women (or lesser 
men) who seek to claim these prerogatives as their own”). 
 488. For elucidation of the distinction between sex and gender and its implications for Title 
VII doctrine, see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995). 
 489. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 490. Id. at 19; see Schultz, supra note 22, at 1710–12 (discussing Harris). 
 491. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
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workplaces as masculine or feminine spaces.492 Professor Vicki Schultz 
has illustrated how the focus on desire has caused courts to 
disaggregate “sexual” forms of harassment from “nonsexual” forms 
of sex discrimination, and to disregard the latter or to fail to see the 
connections between the two.493 Nonsexual forms of “sex harassment” 
might include sabotaging women’s work; characterizing more 
desirable jobs as too physically challenging, dirty, or competitive for 
women; isolating women from networks of social support; or 
withholding opportunities for training from women.494 The focus on 
sexual desire renders irrelevant evidence about “the larger structural 
context of the workplace, including the company’s record on job 
segregation by sex.”495 
The focus on desire is distracting to courts and litigants. It 
“creates a negative dynamic that encourages women (and sometimes 
men) to frame their complaints in terms of sexual offense, even when 
much more—or much less—may be at stake.”496 Take, for example, 
Love v. Motiva Enterprises, a case previously discussed for finding 
that sexual desire is inconsistent with disgust.497 The case also provides 
a useful example of how desire may have distracted from 
discrimination. Connie Love, the plaintiff, worked with Jeanne Sirey 
at Motiva’s oil refinery in Norco, Louisiana. Love, who had a degree 
in nuclear engineering,498 worked in the coker unit, monitoring 
production processes via computer screens.499 At the time Love began 
working with Sirey, she weighed 338 pounds.500 Sirey called Love a 
“stupid bitch,” a “fat cow,” and a “failure as a woman.”501 Sirey 
criticized Love for being “incapable of speaking up for herself.”502 She 
 
 492. See Schultz, supra note 445, at 2172–73 (arguing that the “proper goal is not to 
eliminate sexual conduct, but rather to dismantle sex discrimination”). 
 493. Schultz, supra note 22, at 1689–90. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. at 1797.  
 496. Schultz, supra note 445, at 2152.  
 497. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900, 902–03 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see 
supra notes 166–75 and accompanying text. 
 498. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Love v. Motiva Enters., LLC, 2008 
WL 4286662 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (No. 
07-5970). 
 499. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–3, Love, 2008 WL 
4286662 (No. 07-5970).  
 500. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 498, at 2. 
 501. Love, 349 F. App’x at 902. 
 502. Love, 2008 WL 4286662, at *1 n.2.  
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called Love a “sorry excuse for a woman” because Love did not make 
it “conducive for all women to come to the coker unit.”503 She said, 
“You do not deserve my respect because of the kind of woman you 
are” and asked, “How can you do the work you do as a woman and 
expect to get respect?”504 
After analyzing Love’s sexual-desire theory at great length, the 
district court addressed her sex-stereotyping theory almost as an 
afterthought.505 The court rejected the stereotyping argument on the 
procedural ground that it had not appeared in Love’s complaint.506 
Love’s attorneys, apparently, had drafted their complaint with sexual 
desire, not stereotyping, in mind. The court also rejected the 
argument on substantive grounds. In their summary judgment brief, 
Love’s attorneys argued that Sirey was engaged in sex stereotyping on 
account of Love’s failure to “conform to Sirey’s idea of a liberated, 
physically fit woman.”507 But in Sirey’s comments, the court saw just 
Sirey’s own “individual ideas” about “women’s liberation and 
physical appearance.”508 The court refused to connect Sirey’s 
criticisms of Love’s weight to larger cultural expectations about 
women’s bodies, although Sirey had made clear that her weight-based 
criticisms were connected to Love’s gender, that is, her “‘failure as a 
woman.’”509 Nor did the court see Sirey’s statements regarding Love’s 
failure to make the coker unit conducive for other women as sex 
discrimination.510 Here, Sirey faulted Love for failing to serve as a role 
model, representative, or pathbreaker—special requirements placed 
on Love because she was female. Sirey’s criticism may suggest that 
not very many women had advanced to desirable positions in the 
 
 503. Id. 
 504. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 498, at 6. 
 505. See Love, 2008 WL 4286662, at *9–10.  
 506. Id. at *9. This is despite the rule that “a complaint need not pin plaintiff’s claim for 
relief to a precise legal theory. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally 
requires only a plausible ‘short and plain’ statement of the plaintiff’s claim, not an exposition of 
his legal argument.” Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). 
 507. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 498, at 5. 
 508. Love, 2008 WL 4286662, at *10.  
 509. Id. at *1 n.2; see Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 643 
(2001) (“[T]he question of how entrenched the stereotype is should not be relevant, so long as it 
inheres in the decision-maker’s mind.”). 
 510. The court distinguished sex-stereotyping precedents on the ground that Love 
“stereotyped [Sirey] for not acting like a woman” rather than for acting “like a man.” Love, 
2008 WL 4286662, at *10. This distinction does not hold water. The sex stereotyping in Price 
Waterhouse included the criticism that the plaintiff was not meeting certain expectations for 
feminine behavior in her dress and demeanor. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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Norco plant.511 If the court were to take a structural account of the 
harm of discriminatory harassment, sex stratification of this sort could 
create a presumption that harassment was discrimination “because of 
sex.”512 However, Love did not argue, and it is not clear from the 
record, whether employment in the coker unit, or the refinery in 
general, was characterized by sex segregation or stratification. 
Preoccupation with sexual desire and sexual orientation can also 
prevent consideration of sex stereotyping against men. In Kalich v. 
AT&T Mobility, LLC,513 for example, a case decided by a federal 
court applying Michigan state law, a male supervisor mocked the 
male plaintiff in front of staff members by referring to him as 
“‘Virginia, Margaret, and Peggy.’”514 He also ridiculed the plaintiff’s 
Yorkshire terrier, calling the dog “Fluffy or Princess.”515 He made 
comments to the plaintiff like, “‘You should sew Kristine a quilt. 
Come on, Virginia. You know you can sew. Dear, you know you can 
do it.’”516 He stared at the plaintiff’s rear end and said, “‘What? Do 
you not eat? You are wasting away. Your pants don’t even fit you 
right anymore. You look like a girl.’”517 The harasser’s comments 
smack of gender stereotyping—that the plaintiff looked like a girl, 
that he should sew a quilt (traditionally women’s work), and even that 
he had a feminine dog. This harassment communicated to the plaintiff 
that he had failed to live up to masculine norms while reaffirming the 
harasser’s masculinity, a classic example of the sort of harm that 
sexual harassment law should address from the gender-disadvantage 
perspective.518 
Despite the sex-specific nature of these comments, the Sixth 
Circuit saw no evidence the plaintiff was singled out “‘because of’ his 
 
 511. It appears from the record that most of Love’s supervisors and colleagues were males. 
See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 498, at 4. 
 512. See infra note 526 and accompanying text; cf. Hall v. City of Chicago, 713 F.3d 325, 332, 
333 (7th Cir. 2013) (recognizing a cross-sex hostile-environment claim because the female 
plaintiff worked in a “traditionally male role[]” and her supervisor commented, “‘I could slap 
that woman’”). 
 513. Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 514. Id. at 468.  
 515. Id. 
 516. Id.  
 517. Id. 
 518. See Franke, supra note 22, at 769–71 (describing same-sex harassment cases in which 
conduct “authenticates the harassers’ status as ‘real men’ and exiles [the victim] from the 
domain of men”). 
CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  6:29 PM 
608 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:525 
gender.”519 The court rejected each of the three Oncale theories 
seriatim in a conclusory paragraph.520 Further, Michigan law, unlike 
federal law, has a separate element requiring that sexual harassment 
be erotic in form, which this was not.521 The court parsed each of the 
harasser’s statements and found no suggestions of sexual attraction.522 
From the gender-disadvantage perspective, it is impossible to read 
this discussion without thinking the court and the Michigan statute 
were entirely missing the point. 
What would sexual harassment doctrine look like from the 
gender-disadvantage perspective without the inference of 
discrimination from desire? First, the gender-disadvantage paradigm 
would support a broadened understanding of Oncale’s holding that 
harassment may be because of sex “if a female victim is harassed in 
such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make 
it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the 
presence of women in the workplace.”523 This reasoning would also 
apply to men who are victims of harassment for doing “women’s 
work” in female-dominated professions such as nursing or 
kindergarten teaching. Second, the gender-disadvantage perspective 
supports the recent trend toward increased reliance on sex-
stereotyping theories.524 Under these theories, harassment designed to 
ensure conformity with norms for male and female comportment is 
discriminatory, even if the motive is not “general hostility” toward 
one sex.525 Third, the gender-disadvantage perspective supports legal 
rules that focus on workplace structures rather than individuals, for 
example, by supporting a presumption that harassment in a 
workplace that is segregated or stratified along the lines of sex is 
discriminatory.526 
 
 519. Kalich, 679 F.3d at 471.  
 520. Id. The court also noted that the harasser “knew or suspected that [plaintiff] was gay,” 
and that “sexual orientation” discrimination was not prohibited by Michigan law. Id. 
 521. See id. at 471–73 (discussing Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Mich. 2003)). 
 522. Id. at 473. 
 523. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 524. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 525. Additionally, hazing may aim to inculcate norms about jobs as properly masculine and 
to ensure group cohesion in those jobs. See McGinley, supra note 7, at 1229.  
 526. See Schultz, supra note 445, at 2172–83 (discussing social science evidence supporting 
the presumption that workers are more likely to experience sexual behaviors as discrimination 
in sex segregated or stratified work environments). This would remedy the difficulty many 
plaintiffs face in bringing suits in single-sex workplaces. See supra note 48 and accompanying 
text.  
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These legal rules are not mutually exclusive with those founded 
on the sexual-domination theory—they might be employed in the 
alternative or in combination. The Sixth Circuit has developed a sort 
of hybrid rule that combines concerns about gender disadvantage 
with concerns about sexual domination. Under this rule, harassment 
is “based on sex” if it is “explicitly sexual and patently degrading to 
women,” meaning “that a reasonable person, regardless of gender, 
would consider the sexually offensive conduct and comments more 
offensive to women than men.”527 
C. Sex Differentiation 
Finally, the sex-differentiation school regards sexual harassment 
as discriminatory because the harasser has taken the victim’s sex into 
account, deviating from a norm of sex blindness.528 The key here is 
that sex, in the sense of biological maleness or femaleness, is the 
mode of differentiation. Justice Scalia’s opinion in Oncale may best 
represent this paradigm.529 
At first glance, it seems this perspective most strongly supports 
the presumption that desire is discrimination. A harasser 
discriminates against men if (1) he only desires men and (2) he 
harasses the male plaintiff out of desire. However, the post-Oncale 
cases demonstrate this theory is not workable.530 To determine 
whether a harasser desires only one sex, courts look to whether the 
harasser is “openly” homosexual.531 Yet the group of people who are 
out at work does not represent the group of people with exclusively 
 
 527. Bradford v. Dep’t of Cmty. Based Servs., No. 09-206-DLB-CJS, 2012 WL 360032, at *9 
(E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2012) (citing Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 567 F.3d 263, 271–
72 (6th Cir. 2009)). In Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., the male harassers subjected 
all employees, men and women, to a sexualized environment, referring to “female customers, 
associates and even friends as ‘bitches,’ ‘whores,’ ‘sluts,’ ‘dykes,’ and ‘cunts’”; ogling 
pornography; and discussing their strip-club exploits. Gallagher, 567 F.3d at 271. The court 
concluded that even though the plaintiff was not targeted because she was a woman, a 
reasonable person could have considered the harassment more offensive to women than to men. 
Id.  
 528. See generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing sex-blind norms in other 
antidiscrimination contexts). 
 529. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); supra note 34 
and accompanying text. 
 530. Katherine Franke has pointed out that “this reasoning works only in a world populated 
exclusively by Kinsey [Zeros] and Kinsey Sixes, that is, people who are exclusively heterosexual 
or exclusively homosexual.” Franke, supra note 22, at 737. 
 531. See supra Part I.B. 
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same-sex desires.532 Other courts, recognizing the difficulties of 
determining sexual orientation, require only evidence of sexual desire 
for the same-sex plaintiff.533 But a single instance of sexual desire does 
not support the inference of same-sex desires generally, let alone 
exclusively.534 
Legal scholars have suggested two alternative versions of this 
argument. The first is the inseparability theory: that sexual desire is 
always discriminatory, because it is inextricably bound up with the sex 
of the target, even for bisexual individuals. The second is the 
preference theory: that courts may presume sexual desire is 
discriminatory because only a small percentage of people are 
indifferent to the sex of their object of attraction (in other words, 
“perfectly” bisexual).535 But on closer examination, neither of these 
premises supports the blanket presumption that desire is 
discriminatory. 
The inseparability theory posits that the law should presume that 
all sexual desire—all sexualized conduct in fact—is inextricably 
bound up with the sex of the target. Thus, even if we assume a 
perfectly bisexual individual, whose general preferences are sex 
neutral, that person’s selection of any particular target will be 
informed by whether the target is a man or a woman, and how that 
target performs gender roles.536 But this begs an unanswerable 
theoretical question about whether there can be sexuality outside of 
sex (meaning maleness and femaleness).537 It also raises questions 
 
 532. See supra notes 89–93, 96, 113–114 and accompanying text. 
 533. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. As discussed, however, courts are unlikely to 
see same-sex sexual desire unless the alleged harasser self-identifies as gay. See supra Part I.C. 
 534. See supra notes 118, 152 and accompanying text. 
 535. By using the term “preference” here I do not mean to imply sexual orientation or 
desires are voluntarily chosen. I mean simply a preponderance of desires for members of one 
sex or the other.  
 536. See Schwartz, supra note 470, at 1783–84 (“To begin with, sexual conduct, whatever its 
motivation (desire or something else), occurs not between theoretical constructs—biological 
males and females lacking gender identity, or free-floating gender-role spirits—but between real 
people who display a complex mixture of biological sex and gender and who perceive and make 
assumptions about these same traits in the other. Such acts may be purged of much of their 
meaning if biological sex is removed from view.”).  
 537. Cf. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 26 (“Some people, homo-, hetero-, and bisexual, 
experience their sexuality as deeply embedded in a matrix of gender meanings and gender 
differentials. Others of each sexuality do not.”); Yvonne Zylan, Finding the Sex in Sexual 
Harassment: How Title VII and Tort Schemes Miss the Point of Same-Sex Hostile Environment 
Harassment, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 391, 420 (2006) (arguing for a distinction between 
sexuality and gender). 
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about what level of causal force a discriminatory motive must have: 
Could it be just one motivating factor or must it be a necessary 
condition?538 And whatever the quantum of causation required, it is 
not clear why a plaintiff should be able to rest on evidence of desire, 
rather than being required to point to evidence, such as statements by 
the harasser, indicating that the plaintiff’s sex played a role in the 
harasser’s selection of him as a target. Courts require this sort of 
evidence to support sex-stereotyping claims.539 
A second argument is the preference theory: that monosexuality, 
meaning a sexual orientation toward only one sex (heterosexuality or 
homosexuality), supports the inference that the harasser took the 
victim’s sex into account. This contrasts with bisexuality, in which sex 
is irrelevant to desire. To refine this argument, although some 
individuals might be bisexual, most nonetheless act in accord with 
preferences, however slight, for one or the other sex.540 This logic 
assumes a Kinseyian model of sexual orientation, in which all 
individuals can be arrayed on a spectrum from 0 to 6, with 0 being 
perfectly heterosexual, 6 being perfectly homosexual, and 3 being 
perfectly bisexual.541 Assuming only a small percentage of the 
population are Kinsey 3s, a theory of causation based on the 
presumption that desire is monosexual appears attractive for a legal 
 
 538. The Supreme Court has suggested it would hold that the term “because of” in Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006), means but-for causation, in other words, that sex was a 
determinative factor. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) 
(holding, in the context of Title VII’s retaliation provision, that “the plain textual 
meaning[] . . . of the word ‘because’” is but-for causation and that any contrary reasoning from 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), was displaced by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) 
(interpreting the term “because of” in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a)(1) (2006), to require but-for causation). But even if a Title VII plaintiff does not have 
proof sex was a but-for cause of discrimination, she can still prevail by demonstrating that 
“sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). However, if she does so, a defendant may limit 
her remedies to certain forms of declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and 
costs by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that it “would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Thus, even under the 
“motivating factor” standard, a plaintiff’s remedies are severely limited if a court concludes her 
sex was not a but-for cause of the harassment. Oncale’s desire analysis did not rest on a 
motivating-factor theory; rather, it rested on a notion of but-for causation: that in the typical 
case of male-female harassment, the “proposals of sexual activity would not have been made to 
someone of the same sex.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 539. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 540. Katz, supra note 24, at 133–35. 
 541. See id. at 138–39. 
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doctrine seeking a shorthand for determining when conduct was 
because of sex.542 Because most people have preferences for one sex 
or the other and act in accord with those preferences, desire should 
be presumed discriminatory. 
But there are problems with importing the continuum model of 
sexual orientation into the law for this purpose. First, this model is a 
spatial metaphor that reduces the multiplicity of definitions of sexual 
orientation to a single, flat dimension.543 Recognizing this, Kinsey 
himself argued that “the world is not to be divided into sheep and 
goats.”544 Second, the original Kinsey studies were based on self-
reports (now over sixty years old).545 We ought to be skeptical of self-
reporting in the area of sexuality, even today.546 The continuum model 
is premised on the notion that research could identify the valence of 
an individual’s sexual desires—whether monosexual or bisexual—
when people themselves struggle to identify their own sexual 
desires.547 The stigma associated with bisexuality is likely to lead to 
underreporting of such feelings and experiences, even to the subject 
herself.548 Third, the original Kinsey study did not purport to identify 
static preferences. It based its 0 to 6 designations on self-reports of 
whether individuals had ever experienced “psychosexual responses” 
or had “overt sexual experiences” with men and women.549 An 
individual’s past sexual experiences may not have been determined 
solely by internal preferences, but rather, in interaction with external 
 
 542. See id. (arguing for a rebuttable presumption of monosexuality). 
 543. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. Additionally, the continuum model 
assumes that an increase in same-sex attractions corresponds with a decrease in cross-sex 
attractions, and vice versa. More recent research suggests a spatial model with two independent 
dimensions, one for same-sex attractions and one for cross-sex attractions. See, e.g., Vrangalova 
& Savin-Williams, supra note 72, at 99.  
 544. ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE E. MARTIN, SEXUAL 
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 639 (1948). 
 545. Id. at 647; ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY, CLYDE E. MARTIN & PAUL 
GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 471 (1953). 
 546. See, e.g., Timothy L. McAuliffe, Wayne DiFranceisco & Barbara R. Reed, Effects of 
Question Format and Collection Mode on the Accuracy of Retrospective Surveys of Health Risk 
Behavior: A Comparison with Daily Sexual Activity Diaries, 26 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 60, 65–66 
(2007) (discussing discrepancies between diary and retrospective self-reports of sexual activity). 
 547. See supra notes 94, 96, 113 and accompanying text.  
 548. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.  
 549. KINSEY, ET AL., supra note 544, at 647; KINSEY, ET AL., supra note 545, at 471. The 
Kinsey scale is not widely used by researchers today because “it suggests finer gradations of 
sexual orientation than are usually supported by the underlying data.” LEVAY & BALDWIN, 
supra note 69, at 454. Instead, researchers use a five-point scale that includes homosexual, 
mostly homosexual, bisexual, mostly heterosexual, and heterosexual. Id. 
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opportunities and social contexts.550 Subsequent research calls into 
question the assumption that sexual preferences remain constant over 
time for every individual.551 
Another flaw in the preference theory is the presumption that 
harassers experience desire in accord with their general preferences. 
But what about those who experience desires contra their sexual 
preferences, for example, the Kinsey 1 (almost entirely heterosexual) 
who desires another man not “because of” that man’s sex, but in spite 
of it, perhaps eroticizing the taboo?552 In such a case, causation would 
be lacking for Title VII purposes.553 Thus, the preference theory 
would seem to lend support to those court decisions dismissing same-
sex claims in which harassers were involved in heterosexual 
marriages.554 One of the tasks of this Article has been to reveal this 
significant loophole by cataloguing the many cases raising the issue. 
Some research suggests that the number of people who fall into the 
category of “mostly heterosexual” may be larger than those who fall 
under any other nonheterosexual label.555 Moreover, this loophole 
exposes the normative void beneath the preference theory. Why 
should liability turn on orientation? 
 
 550. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 551. See, e.g., Savin-Williams & Ream, supra note 73, at 386–87 (“Evidence to support 
sexual orientation stability among nonheterosexuals is surprisingly meager.”). 
 552. The preference theory may also presume that for the majority of people, a target’s sex 
is a necessary precondition for desire; that is, if a person were of the other sex, he or she would 
never have been desired. This claim is belied by the experiences of many individuals, self-
identified as both hetero- and homosexual, who remain with their partners through changes in 
that partner’s sexual or gender identity. See, e.g., Sara Corbett, When Debbie Met Christina, 
Who Then Became Chris, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 14, 2001, at 84 (describing a partnership 
between two lesbians that continued following one partner’s transition from a female to a male 
gender identity). See generally HELEN BOYD, SHE’S NOT THE MAN I MARRIED: MY LIFE WITH 
A TRANSGENDER HUSBAND (2007); VIRGINIA ERHARDT, HEAD OVER HEELS: WIVES WHO 
STAY WITH CROSS-DRESSERS AND TRANSSEXUALS (2007). The argument raises a dilemma 
about whether desire is about bodies or souls. Cf. CRAIG LUCAS, PRELUDE TO A KISS 
(Dramatists Play Serv. Inc. 2010) (1990) (telling the story of a young, newlywed woman whose 
soul switches bodies with an elderly dying man, and looking at whether her husband’s desire 
could survive her change in sex and age). 
 553. See Katz, supra note 24, at 136–37 (“This is analogous to a white job applicant who fails 
to obtain a job at an employer that discriminates against minority applicants in favor of 
whites.”). 
 554. See supra Part II.A. 
 555. See, e.g., Vrangalova & Savin-Williams, supra note 72, at 96 (“[The mostly heterosexual 
identity group] was the most frequently chosen nonheterosexual identity label among both men 
and women. More women selected mostly heterosexual than all other nonheterosexual 
identities combined.”). 
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Those in favor of the presumption that sexual desire or sexual 
conduct is discriminatory often cast their arguments as a sort of 
realpolitik response to a judicial need for bright-line rules to redress 
harms to women.556 But the desire-based rule is not a bright line. 
Rather, it is a murky space within which judges allow ostensible 
heterosexuals to harass same-sex coworkers without risking their 
heterosexual identities. The bright-line rule applied by courts is that 
those who identify as gay must be harassing all same-sex coworkers 
out of sexual desire. 
A move away from the desire-based rule is not likely to leave 
cross-sex harassment plaintiffs out in the cold. Other theories of 
causation are just as likely to cover the classic scenarios.557 In the 
typical case of, for example, quid pro quo harassment, a man or 
woman should be able to demonstrate that he or she was subjected to 
sexual demands at work while members of the other sex were not, 
giving rise to an inference of discrimination.558 Whether the motive 
was desire, hatred, power, or something else should not matter and is 
not a problem courts trouble themselves with in cross-sex cases. 
The fixation with desire distracts courts from straightforward 
applications of the sex-differentiation principle. The logic of the sex-
differentiation principle, as articulated by Justice Scalia, is that “but 
for” his sex, the plaintiff would not have been harassed. But in cases 
involving masculine horseplay or hazing, courts do not consider 
whether the male plaintiff would have been treated the same had he 
been a woman. In EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, the male plaintiffs 
 
 556. See Estrich supra note 466, at 860; Katz, supra note 24, at 103-04; Schwartz, supra note 
470, at 1702. 
 557. See Figure 2. 
 558. For discussion of Oncale’s third evidentiary route, see supra note 37 and accompanying 
text. Prior to Oncale, some courts denied summary judgment based simply on evidence that a 
harasser had “single[d] out one sex” alone. Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 
(D.D.C. 1995); see also Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that there was “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged harassment 
was gender based” because male, but not female, employees were exposed to harassment in the 
form of “bagging,” which “typically involved an action aimed at a man’s groin area”). For a 
recent decision adopting Oncale’s third route in a case alleging male-on-male sexual assault, see 
Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., 512 F. App’x 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2013). Although this rule does 
not provide for liability when an employer can show men and women encountered identical 
courses of harassment, such cases are exceedingly rare. See supra notes 57, 61 and 
accompanying text. In all-male or all-female workplaces, a plaintiff may need to rely on other 
presumptions or legal rules. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For example, courts 
might allow such claims to proceed on the theory that harassment in all-male or all-female 
workplaces should be presumed discriminatory, based on research suggesting sex-segregated 
environments are prone to harassment designed to enforce gender norms. See supra note 526.  
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worked at a construction site where all but three of the 292 employees 
were men.559 The plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to “unwanted 
touching, poking, and prodding in their genital areas” by other men, a 
practice known as “goos[ing]” and thought to be male “horseplay.”560 
After one plaintiff complained, he was taunted and told that if he 
were a “‘real man,’ he would address the matter in a manner other 
than by filing a sexual harassment complaint.”561 The three women 
testified that although they had daily contact with the construction 
workers, they were never touched inappropriately.562 Both harassers 
stated that they would never have goosed the women.563 One of the 
harassers testified to the effect of, “Of course I didn’t do that to 
women. What kind of a guy do you think I am?”564 
The court disregarded this statement as self-serving chivalry in 
holding the harassment was not “because of sex.”565 It compared the 
conduct to Oncale, in which it was “easy to conclude the harasser 
would not have been predatory toward females” because “[t]he 
harasser was a homosexual.”566 This was a mistake—there was no 
finding in Oncale that any harasser was homosexual. The mistake 
illustrates the grip that sexual desire has on judicial imaginations. 
Looking at this case in terms of the sex-differentiation paradigm, the 
court should have found sufficient evidence that the harassment was 
because of sex—the harassers’ statements amount to direct 
admissions that they would not have subjected the plaintiffs to the 
same sort of hazing had they been women. But for their sex, the male 
plaintiffs would not have been harassed. Chivalry is no less disparate 
treatment because it favors women. This case reveals that the court 
conceived the real harm of harassment to be unwanted same-sex 
desire, not disparate treatment based on sex. 
The sex-differentiation paradigm would support many of the 
same evidentiary presumptions as the sexual-domination and gender-
disadvantage theories. It would also support finding causation when, 
for example, there is evidence showing no one of the opposite sex was 
 
 559. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 560. Id. at 501–02. 
 561. Id. at 502. 
 562. Id. at 503. 
 563. Id. 
 564. Id. at 520. 
 565. Id. This is despite the rule that credibility determinations are the province of the 
factfinder. See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594, n.* (2009). 
 566. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d at 522. 
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harassed in the same manner as the plaintiff,567 or a counterfactual 
admission by a male harasser that he would not have subjected the 
male plaintiff to the same sort of hazing had he been a woman.568 
A pessimist might argue that it seems unlikely, at this point, that 
sexual desire will lose its grip on sexual harassment law. Oncale 
recognized the theory and courts continue to recite it. However, 
judicial opinions on this issue reflect growing concern about the 
difficulties inherent in determining sexual orientations. If the 
desire/orientation inquiry will not be abandoned, as a second-best 
solution, then, courts ought to abandon efforts to determine the 
harasser’s sexual orientation for all purposes and in all contexts, and 
instead look for evidence of what I term the harasser’s “workplace-
harassment orientation.” This inquiry would find that harassment was 
based on sex if a harasser engaged in quantitatively or qualitatively 
worse treatment of men or women in the workplace. The Seventh 
Circuit described an inquiry akin to this approach in Shepherd v. 
Slater Steels Corp.,569 a case in which the plaintiff stated at his 
deposition that he believed the harasser to be bisexual.570 The court 
reasoned: “Whatever beliefs [the plaintiff] may have as to [the 
harasser’s] sexual orientation and his propensity to harass women as 
well as men are to a large extent irrelevant; what matters is whether 
[the harasser] in fact did sexually harass members of both genders.”571 
The court refused to dismiss the case on the ground that the harasser 
did not discriminate between men and women, holding that the 
evidence did not show that he “harassed women at the Slater plant in 
the same way and to the same degree that he allegedly harassed [the 
male plaintiff] . . . .”572 Such an approach would better reflect the 
social science on sexual orientation, which recognizes that there is no 
single test of sexual orientation, only various definitions that may be 
appropriate for various purposes.573 
 
 567. See supra note 558 and accompanying text. 
 568. But see supra notes 564–66 and accompanying text. 
 569. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 570. Id. at 1011. 
 571. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 572. Id. 
 573. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER CONTEXTS 
This Part will draw out some lessons from the same-sex 
harassment cases for determinations of sexual orientation and desire 
in other contexts, and ask some preliminary questions about how the 
law ought to engage with sexual orientation and desire in those areas. 
Although this study concludes that determinations of sexual 
desires and orientations should not function as proxies for 
discrimination in sexual harassment law, it does not suggest that 
ignoring sexual orientation is a possible or desirable goal for the law. 
Rather, sexual-orientation categories should be foregrounded and 
interrogated. In many of the cases discussed in this Article, courts 
purported to set aside Oncale’s requirement of “credible evidence of 
homosexuality” and look instead for evidence that the harasser 
desired the same-sex plaintiff.574 But in doing so, these courts did not 
set aside misconceptions about sexual orientation. Rather, they 
presumed harassers were heterosexual, unless the harasser self-
identified otherwise, and further assumed that this negated any 
possibility of same-sex desire.575 On the other hand, if confronted with 
evidence that a harasser self-identified as gay, courts found the 
inference of desire nearly automatic.576 The problem is not mere 
recognition of sexual-orientation categories; it is the assumption that 
specific desires necessarily follow or do not follow from orientations. 
In other areas of the law that turn on findings of sexual desire, for 
example, in family and criminal-law contexts, scholars, courts, and 
advocates might critically consider whether similar assumptions about 
sexual orientation are driving results.577 
The same-sex harassment cases show that there are still dangers 
in legal doctrines that navigate sexuality categories, even though legal 
and cultural norms are shifting toward a vision of variation in 
 
 574. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C. 
 575. See supra Part I.C. 
 576. This was the case in, for example, Dick v. Phone Directories Co. See supra notes 376–95 
and accompanying text. 
 577. Recent work has critically examined how race and gender norms influence 
determinations of sexuality in the context of child-molestation law. See Camille Gear Rich, 
Innocence Interrupted: Reconstructing Fatherhood in the Shadow of Child Molestation Law, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 609, 613–14 (2013). In light of the same-sex harassment cases, we might also ask 
whether sexuality determinations in child-abuse cases are influenced by views about sexual 
orientation. 
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sexuality as benign or even productive.578 The danger may not take 
the form of overzealous labeling of individuals as lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual, but rather, of undercounting those who do not fit neatly into 
these categories. Courts are likely to refuse to acknowledge forms of 
sexuality that do not fit predefined molds, particularly the farther 
they stray from the conventional model of sex within heterosexual 
marriage. Although courts may be less inclined to indulge outright 
homophobia, they may continue to impose normative visions of 
appropriate sexuality that protect traditional marriages.579 
This study shows that definitions of sexual orientation based on 
self-identification may not work in all contexts.580 When negative 
consequences attach to a determination of sexuality, as in sexual 
harassment law, definitions based on self-identification are likely to 
have unequal results. Those who are “openly” gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual will face adverse consequences, while ostensible 
heterosexuals who engage in the same behaviors will not. But self-
identification may also be problematic when positive consequences 
attach to a determination that a person is gay, lesbian, or bisexual. 
For example, many state and local laws protect against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.581 In this context, 
there is a temptation to require a plaintiff to prove she is a member of 
a protected class (that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender) as 
part of her prima facie case of discrimination.582 The problem is that 
just like in the same-sex harassment context, courts rely on narrow, 
self-identification and reputation-based definitions, which distract 
from the purpose of remedying discrimination and require a plaintiff 
who desires the law’s protection to “out” herself. New York law, for 
example, bars discrimination based on sexual orientation, including 
“perceived” sexual orientation.583 In one harassment case under the 
New York antidiscrimination statute, coworkers insinuated that the 
 
 578. William Eskridge, Jr., Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From 
Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1334–35 (2010). 
 579. See supra Part II.A. 
 580. This is not to say that self-identification is always inappropriate. For example, self-
identification may work in identifying participants for employer-sponsored diversity programs 
which have the goal of ensuring a critical mass of minority employees. 
 581. See supra note 27. Proposed federal legislation would do the same.  
 582. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (describing the prima facie 
case of discrimination).  
 583. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2010); see id. § 292(27) (defining “sexual 
orientation” as “actual or perceived”). 
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plaintiff was gay, taunting him for listening to “gay boy music,” and 
calling him a “‘dick smoker.’”584 But the court dismissed the claim, 
because the plaintiff testified “that he is a heterosexual male, was 
married, fathered a child, is masculine, and has no feminine 
characteristics, traits, tastes or habits.”585 The harassers testified that 
they did not think the plaintiff was gay.586 This case raises the 
question: Why are a harasser’s beliefs about the plaintiff’s “real” 
sexual orientation controlling? The law protects on the basis of 
“sexual orientation,” not “homosexuality.” The coworkers’ taunts 
were indisputably pointed at the plaintiff’s sexual orientation, 
whatever that orientation might have been. Moreover, their bullying 
promoted the stigmatization of gay identities and superiority of 
straight identities, with the potential to discourage the plaintiff or 
others from coming out at work. These forms of discrimination seem 
to be exactly what this type of statute was intended to address.587 
Likewise troubling are definitions based on the idea that same-
sex desire is always manifested in sincere, unambiguous, caring, 
private, committed relationships. These sorts of relationship-based 
definitions can undercount the population that needs protection.588 
For example, one basis for asylum is a likelihood of future 
persecution based on “membership in a particular social group,” 
 
 584. Glinski v. Radioshack, No. 03-CV-930S, 2006 WL 2827870, at *2–3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 
2006). 
 585. Id. at *11 n.12. 
 586. Id.; see also Akoidu v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. B147046, 2002 WL 399476, at *5–7 
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2002) (holding that a plaintiff who testified that “he was not 
homosexual” and that his “coworkers knew he had been married and had a child” had failed to 
establish he “was in the protected class of homosexuals or persons perceived as homosexual”); 
cf. 1212 Rest. Grp., LLC v. Alexander, 959 N.E.2d 155, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding a 
finding that harassers perceived a plaintiff to be gay based on their antigay insults and 
statements to coworkers that they thought the plaintiff was gay). Although I agree with the 
court’s conclusion in Glinksi that the harassment was not severe or pervasive, I question its 
conclusion that the harassment was not motivated by the plaintiff’s perceived sexuality. 
 587. For analogous arguments in the race context, see generally D. Wendy Greene, 
Categorically Black, White or Wrong: The Emergence of an “Actuality Requirement” and Identity 
Adjudication in Title VII Litigation, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148754 (discussing claims in which an 
identity characteristic has been misperceived); Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1497 (2010) (discussing interracial solidarity claims). 
 588. This is not to say relationship-based definitions are irrelevant in every context. Such 
definitions have obvious application in equal protection arguments for same-sex marriage. 
Many scholars have described how definitions of sexual orientation status that emphasize the 
importance of relationships to identities can support arguments for same-sex marriage. See 
supra note 2. 
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including sexual identity.589 In these cases, immigrants often have 
incentives to hide their sexual identities, for fear of persecution.590 
Nonetheless, some tribunals have applied restrictive definitions of gay 
identity requiring a consistent record of self-identification and same-
sex relationships. In one asylum case, although the petitioner stated 
he would probably engage in a same-sex relationship if returned to 
Morocco, the immigration judge (IJ) noted the petitioner had not had 
“any boyfriends or other gay encounters in Morocco,” and that 
although he had engaged in homosexual conduct in the United States, 
“he has had no boyfriends” and did not “appear to be committed to 
any particular homosexual relationship.”591 Here the IJ evaluated the 
petitioner’s sexual orientation by reference to an inapplicable, 
culturally specific model of gay identity as living openly in a 
committed relationship.592 
The same-sex harassment cases demonstrate that if not provided 
with a specific definition of the aspect of sexual orientation relevant 
for the particular legal inquiry, courts will apply idiosyncratic, faulty, 
or one-size-fits-all definitions. Legal actors assume that knowing 
someone’s sexual orientation is a matter of common sense. But the 
experience of social science researchers suggests no general definition 
is possible—sexual orientation is a multidimensional phenomenon.593 
It may be consistent or inconsistent, static or dynamic, acknowledged 
or unacknowledged, visible or invisible, a source of pride or shame, or 
all these things at once. Any purportedly comprehensive definition of 
sexual orientation will inevitably fail to match the lived experiences of 
many people and is unlikely to meet the purposes of the law. Rather 
than applying an all-purpose definition, courts ought to follow the 
 
 589. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other 
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. 
& N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990). 
 590. See, e.g., Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[The petitioner] was 
not open with his friends, family members, or community about his sexuality because 
homosexuality is perceived as deviant behavior in Morocco. He avoided dating and kept his 
contacts with gay men to a minimum.”); Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“Boer-Sedano testified that he has known he was gay since the age of seven and that he 
could not live ‘a gay life openly in Mexico’ because of how he would be treated if his sexuality 
were known.”). 
 591. See Razkane, 562 F.3d at 1286 (reversing a Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion); 
see also Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 491 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing a Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ opinion in which the IJ stated that “no one would perceive [the petitioner] as a 
homosexual unless he had ‘a partner or cooperating person’”). 
 592. Razkane, 562 F.3d at 1286. 
 593. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
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model of social scientists in disentangling the component of sexual 
orientation that is relevant to the legal inquiry.594 
CONCLUSION 
If the sexual harassment cases are any indication, courts are 
likely to presume that assignment of sexual orientations or sexual 
desires is a facile enterprise, without recognizing that sexual 
orientation might be defined along different axes for different 
purposes, and that such inquiries are likely to be intrusive and entail 
heterosexism. Courts, advocates, and legal scholars ought to abandon 
the search for a unitary theory of sexual orientation. They should 
scrutinize laws that turn on sexual desire to guard against the dangers 
that the resulting determinations will be descriptively inaccurate, 
normatively troubling, and legally irrelevant. There may be legal 
justifications for relying on sexual-orientation categories or inferences 
of desire in certain contexts. But we should not assume such 
determinations are simple or necessary. 
  
 
 594. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
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APPENDIX A 
Federal Cases on Whether Workplace Same-Sex Harassment was 
“Because of Sex”595 
1. Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., 512 F. App’x 115 (2d Cir. 2013)* 
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3. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012) 
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5. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012)* 
6. Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, 679 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2012)* 
7. Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2012)* 
8. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012)* 
9. Brown-Baumbach v. B&B Auto., Inc., 437 F. App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2011) 
10. Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)* 
11. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)* 
12. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc. 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009) 
13. Baugham v. Battered Women, Inc., 211 F. App’x 432 (6th Cir. 2006) 
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16. Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007)* 
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20. Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005)* 
21. Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005)* 
22. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005)* 
23. Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 396 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other 
grounds as recognized in Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164 
(10th Cir. 2006) 
24. James v. Platte River Steel Co., 113 F. App’x. 864 (10th Cir. 2004)* 
25. Noto v. Regions Bank, 84 F. App’x 399 (5th Cir. 2003)* 
26. McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540 (8th Cir. 2003)* 
27. Linville v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 335 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2003) 
28. King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68 F. App’x. 659 (6th Cir. 2003)* 
29. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003) 
 
 595. Those cases which address an alleged harasser’s sexual orientation or sexual desire for 
the plaintiff or analyze whether a plaintiff’s evidence or allegations suffice under Oncale’s 
sexual desire or sexual orientation inquiry are noted with an asterisk. 
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30. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
31. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002)* 
32. Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002)* 
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38. Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000) 
39. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000) 
40. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000)* 
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42. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999) 
43. Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999) 
44. Raum v. Laidlaw Ltd., 173 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1999)* 
45. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999)* 
46. Petrisch v. HSBC Bank USA, Inc., No. 07-cv-3303, 2013 WL 1316712 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 
28, 2013) 
47. Novak v. Waterfront Comm’n of NY Harbor, 928 F. Supp. 2d 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
48. Peone v. Cnty. of Ontario, No. 12-CV-6012 CJS, 2013 WL 775358 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 
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49. Guidice v. Red Robin Int’l, Inc., No. 11-CV-6099T, 2013 WL 749672 (W.D.N.Y Feb. 
27, 2013) 
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53. Rodas v. Town of Farmington, 918 F. Supp. 2d 183 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) 
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55. Bouchard v. Potter, No. 3:11-982-CMC-SVH, 2012 WL 7060567 (D.S.C. Dec. 14, 2012), 
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(D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2013)* 
56. Morris v. Bellevue Hosp. Ctr., No. 09-cv-5692 (SLT)(RML), 2012 WL 5932784 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012)* 
57. EEOC v. McPherson Cos., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (N.D. Ala. 2012)* 
58. Harris v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 2011-94, 2012 WL 5289392 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 23, 2012)* 
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2012) 
69. Kummerle v. EMJ Corp., No. 3:11-CV-2839-D, 2012 WL 2995065 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 
2012) 
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2012)* 
71. Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)* 
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26, 2012)* 
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79. Owens v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00699-TWT-RGV, 2012 WL 1454082 
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2012), adopted by No. 1:11-cv-00699-TWT-RGV, 2012 WL 
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80. McDowell v. Nucor Bldg. Sys., No. CA 3:10-172-MBS, 2012 WL 714632 (D.S.C. Feb. 
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APPENDIX B 
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 596. An asterisk indicates the court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficient allegations or 
evidence that the alleged harasser was homosexual.  
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Oncale Theory 2: Hostility Toward One Sex 
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2012) 
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Ky. Feb. 2, 2012) 
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4. Bailey v. Henderson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2000) 
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11. Ashmore v. J.P. Thayer Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Ga. 2004) 
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Price Waterhouse: Sex Stereotyping 
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July 28, 2005) 
6. EEOC v. Grief Bros., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004 WL 2202641 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) 
7. Fischer v. City of Portland, No. CV02-1728, 2004 WL 2203276 (D. Or. Sept. 27, 2004) 
8. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Or. 2002) 
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